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This thesis aims to examine the effect of Greenfield foreign direct investment (GFDI), 
merger and acquisitions (MNA) with the interaction effect of institutional factors on 
economic growth in ten selected Asian countries. The inconsistent results of previous 
studies are appealing researchers to advance further empirical testing with 
disaggregated FDI in the form of GFDI and MNA. The gap in the literature, as 
decreasing trend of GDP growth and increasing tendency of FDI in Asia need to be 
addressed.  Therefore, the study examines the interaction effect of institutional factors 
separately on the relationship between GFDI, MNA and economic growth, in selected 
Asian countries. In this thesis, we use a two-stage least squares methodology to control 
endogeneity, while the results of the Hausman test recommends that the fixed effect 
model is more appropriate for the analysis of ten selected Asian countries covering the 
period 2002-2016.The findings of the study show that MNA has positive impact on 
economic growth. while greenfield FDI is not significant in ten selected Asian 
countries. The results of the interaction effect of institutional factors show that 
performance of MNA increases with interaction effect of institutional factors. The 
institutional factors like political stability, rule of law and control of corruption show 
positive interaction effect with MNA. Similarly, government effectiveness and COC 
depict the positive interaction effect with GFDI although, voice and accountability and 
regulatory quality have negative interaction effect on economic growth in selected 
Asian countries.  The results suggest that MNA needs to be encouraged to enhance its 
potential impact to contribute positively to economic growth. The study further 
suggests that countries should improve their regulation which are in the favour of 
investors to get positive results from both types of investments (GFDI, MNA). 
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Tesis ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji kesan pelaburan langsung asing Greenfield (GFDI), 
penggabungan dan pengambilalihan (MNA) dengan kesan interaksi faktor institusi 
terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi di sepuluh buah negara Asia yang terpilih. Dapatan 
yang tidak konsisten dalam kajian terdahulu mendorong  penyelidik untuk menjalankan 
ujian empirik dengan lebih lanjut terhadap FDI yang disebarkan kepada bentuk GFDI 
dan MNA. Jurang dalam literatur yang menunjukkan tren menurun bagi pertumbuhan 
KDNK dan peningkatan kecenderungan FDI di Asia perlu ditangani. Oleh itu, kajian 
ini menyelidik kesan interaksi faktor-faktor institusi secara berasingan terhadap 
hubungan antara GFDI, MNA dan pertumbuhan ekonomi di negara-negara Asia yang 
terpilih. Tesis ini menggunakan metodologi kuadrat terkecil dua peringkat untuk 
mengawal endogeniti, sementara keputusan ujian Hausman mencadangkan bahawa 
model kesan tetap lebih sesuai untuk menganalisis sepuluh negara Asia terpilih ini yang 
meliputi tempoh 2002-2016. Penemuan kajian menunjukkan bahawa MNA mempunyai 
kesan positif terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi, manakala FDI Greenfield tidak 
signifikan dalam kesemua sepuluh negara Asia yang terpilih. Hasil kesan interaksi 
faktor institusi menunjukkan bahawa prestasi MNA meningkat dengan adanya kesan 
interaksi faktor institusi. Faktor institusi seperti kestabilan politik, peraturan undang-
undang dan kawalan rasuah menunjukkan kesan interaksi positif dengan MNA. Begitu 
juga keberkesanan kerajaan dan COC yang menggambarkan kesan interaksi positif 
dengan GFDI, walaupun suara dan akauntabiliti dan kualiti pengawalseliaan 
mempunyai kesan interaksi negatif terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi di negara-negara 
Asia terpilih ini. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahawa MNA perlu digalakkan untuk 
meningkatkan potensi impaknya untuk menyumbang secara positif kepada 
pertumbuhan ekonomi. Kajian ini selanjutnya menunjukkan bahawa negara-negara 
tersebut harus memperbaiki peraturan yang memihak kepada para pelabur untuk 
mendapatkan hasil positif daripada kedua-dua jenis pelaburan (GFDI,MNA) 
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1.1 Background of the study 
Economic growth is generally considered as a measuring tool for social welfare. The 
phenomenon is implicit but exist, by which social welfare increases directly with a 
positive change in economic growth. However, through appropriate policies and 
established institutions, numerous benefits can get from economic growth to achieve 
economic welfare. Furthermore, the level of full employment, stable prices, the main 
objectives of macroeconomic stability, and high economic growth can determine the 
wellbeing at the individual level and social welfare (Clarke, 2004; Hediger, 2000). The 
stable macroeconomic condition, a minimal budget deficit, life expectancy, lower 
inflation, and rule of law are the factors affecting economic growth (Barro, 1996; 
Fischer, 1993).  
 
Foreign direct investment has grown at a remarkable proportion since the early 1980s, 
and the world market for it has become more competitive. Developing countries are 
becoming increasingly attractive investment destinations, in part because they can offer 
investors a range of "created" assets. Mainly FDI has three types.  
(I) Greenfield FDI (GFDI) 
(II) Cross border merger and acquisition (MNA) 
(III) Joint venture  
Greenfield FDI is involved in constructing new production and facilities in the host 
country. While MNA show a combination of two firms and involved in trading different 
assets owned by multinational corporations. Furthermore, A partnership arrangement 
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with profit sharing between partners created for a specific purpose, no separate legal 
entity created and each of the partners with full legal responsibility for the project is the 
main structure of joint venture. Generally, there is no limitation on liabilities unless this 
is a formalized into a limited partnership (World Bank 2016). Besides, data of 
greenfield and MNA have maintained due to its importance and increasing trend in 
developing Asia by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
but not in the case of joint venture. 
According to the World Bank “Foreign direct investment refers to direct investment 
equity flows in the reporting economy. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, and other capital. Direct investment is a category of cross-border investment 
associated with a resident in one economy having control or a significant degree of 
influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy. 
Ownership of 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares of voting stock is the criterion 
for determining the existence of a direct investment relationship” (World Bank 2015).  
 
Furthermore, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is one of the most important determinant 
of economic growth (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998). The positive role of FDI 
is clearly related to host country’s circumstances. To gain positive effects from FDI the 
prerequisite is a good financial system in the host country because a developed system 
plays a significant role in technologies transfer from investors to the host countries. 
Which become the milestone for economic growth in the receiving economy (Hermes 
& Lensink, 2003). Besides relationship between financial development and economic 
growth, both have a substantial position in the context of development. More 
importantly, financial development promotes growth especially in Asian developing 
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countries (Christopoulos & Tsionas, 2004; Habibullah & Eng, 2006; Hassan, Sanchez, 
& Yu, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, the relationship between economic growth and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) has extensive importance in the economic history. There are sound conceptual 
reasons for believing that FDI can ignite economic growth while the empirical evidence 
is divided, most of the studies show a strong complementary connection between FDI 
and economic growth in both developed and developing countries. The variables of the 
study have considerable importance on the ground of economic growth of every country 
as are the main determinants of growth. Although, FDI contributes to economic growth 
only when a host country has sufficient absorptive capacity of the advanced 
technologies (Borensztein et al., 1998). But FDI is a remarkably important variable for 
growth in transition economies, as its effect on economic growth is positive and 
statistically significant in transition economies (Campos & Kinoshita, 2002). In the 
same way, FDI is positively correlated with economic growth and accelerate country’s 
growth with the condition of adequate human capital, trade liberalization and economic 
stability (Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003).  
There is a positive relation between inward FDI and economic growth in case of 
developed countries while developing countries show a mixed picture. FDI is 
considered as a source to transfer technology and train labor thus, the result of the 
human skills and technology in the host country should be economic growth. 
Interactions between FDI and human capital strive influence to attain economic growth 
(V. N. Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1999). Furthermore, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and trade are catalysts for economic growth in the developing 
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countries. While the effect of total FDI on growth is ambiguous and investments in the 
primary sector tend to have a negative effect on growth while investment in 
manufacturing a positive one (Alfaro, 2003). The study of Akinlo on FDI seems to 
support the argument that extractive FDI might not be growth enhancing (Akinlo, 
2004). 
 
The inflow of FDI augmented in 1990s toward developing countries and became the 
main source of foreign investment. In economic literature, most of the studies are about 
total FDI, but to know the real picture of FDI and its impact on economic growth, it is 
necessary to see the types of FDI and its impact on growth. Furthermore, FDI can be 
divided into two major types, Greenfield FDI (investment in mainly new assets) and 
mergers and acquisitions MNA (the purchase of existing assets).  
1.1.1 Overview of Greenfield FDI, merger and Acquisition in Asian countries 
Developing Asia is the largest recipient region of FDI inflows in the world, but a major 
part of FDI inflows is towards high-income and or large economies in the region. The 
detail study of data on announced greenfield investment projects and cross-border 
MNA sales support the anticipation that a decline is expected. In detail, the data at firm 
level entails that the investment in the form of greenfield FDI has been in a dominant 
position especially by the multinational companies investing in Asia. While, investment 
in the form of MNA is increasing quickly in recent years. In 2015, China, and India 




1.1.2 Overview of Greenfield FDI in ten selected Asian countries 
China is at the top of list for new FDI (Greenfield), mainly there are two approaches to 
foreign investment in China. The first one is greenfield investment, and second mergers 
and acquisitions (MNA). Greenfield FDI involves new fixed-asset investment while 
MNA can promote industrial restructuring with efficient use of existing resources.  
 
 
Figure 1.1  
Greenfield FDI in selected Asian countries 
Source: data.worldbank.org. 
 
The Figure 1.1 depicts that India and Indonesia are at the 2nd and 3rd number in receiving 
the greenfield FDI respectively. Both these countries are showing the increasing trend 
in Greenfield FDI. As the matter of MNA is concerned, China is also on the top position 










2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
GREENFIELD FDI IN IN TEN SELECTED 
ASIAN COUNTRIES ( Millions of dollars)
Year GFDI china GFDI indonesia GFDI philippine
GFDI Thailand GFDI veit Nam GFDI India GFDI sri Lanka
 GFDI Pakistan GFDI Malaysia GFDI Mongolia
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1.1.3 Overview of Merger and acquisition in ten selected Asian countries 
 
The Figure 1.2 shows that Chinese government encourages foreign investors to enter 
the Chinese market by the mode of MNA. The value of cross border MNA has been 
increasing continuously since 2010 except in 2012. Furthermore, the India is the second 
largest country to receive investment in the form of merger and acquisition. While, 
Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia are also showing increasing trend but the trend 
looks slightly smooth after 2012. 
 
 
Figure 1. 2  
Merger and Acquisition in selected Asian countries 
Source: World investment report (2015: 4). 
 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that in 
2013 there was a sharp decrease in general FDI inflow, but in the same year Greenfield 
FDI projects in Mongolia had increased dramatically. This situation depicts that inward 
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implying that Mongolia is attracting foreign investment. Greenfield FDI in 2014 
suddenly decreased and remained only USD 165 million. In the next year (2015) 
greenfield investment sharply increased and reached USD 5318 million.   
 
In 2014, Indonesia attracted USD 17183 million in the form of greenfield FDI, which 
was 7 % of total investment into the Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia is also competing 
with Malaysia, Thailand and a fast-emerging Vietnam. By number of announced 
greenfield FDI projects, Indonesia showed a figure of 167 in 2014 and 173 in 2015. 
Greenfield investments is the major source for Indonesia to regain its growth level and 
attention should also be given to FDI inflows in the form of MNA. Value of cross border 
MNA has also sharply increased in 2015 from USD 801 to USD 3082 million. 
Value of greenfield FDI in Malaysia showed a mixed picture of up and down values 
from the last five years. In 2014 the value become double as compared to 2013 
accounted for USD 9983 to USD 19230 million. Furthermore, in 2015 it remained low 
as USD 13609 million. The value of investment in the mode of MNA increasing from 
2014 to 2015 valued as USD 273 to USD 501 million.  
According to FDI market (an FT data service) the number of greenfield FDI projects in 
Philippine has increased dramatically since 2011 and reached USD 8739 million in 
2015 from USD 4159 million in 2011. Similarly, number of companies investing also 
rose by 89 per cent comparing 2014 with 2011. Number of cross border MNA almost 
remains the same 26, 26 and 25 in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. While value of 




In Thailand, value of greenfield FDI become double in 2015 as compares to 2011 
accounted for USD 8146 to USD 4041 million respectively. Furthermore, number of 
announced greenfield FDI projects has also increased from 140 to 183 between 2011 to 
2015. While the number of cross border MNA continuously decreasing from 2012 to 
2015 detailed as 67 in 2012, 58 in 2013, 48 and 34 are in 2014 and 2015 respectively. 
However, labor intensive manufacturing companies and natural resource sectors are 
interested to continue their investment in Thailand.  
 
Vietnam remained on top position in an emerging market for greenfield FDI. Number 
of announced greenfield project increased continuously from 2012 except in 2015, in 
which the value slightly decreased and accounted for 233 as compared to 254 in 2014. 
Value of cross border MNA suddenly decreased in 2014 accounted for USD 156 million 
while recovered in 2015 and reached USD 701 million. As far as the number of MNA 
are concerned the value continuously deceasing since 2012 and recovered in 2015 
calculated as 60.  
Greenfield FDI into India has been increasing since 2013 and the biggest change in 
greenfield FDI is seen in 2015. This growth in greenfield FDI by 8.6% in 2015 is a 
positive indication for economic development of India. The value of greenfield FDI 
accounted for USD 63440 million in 2015 increased from USD 24405 million in 2012. 
It is first time in the history that India showing the leading country in the world for 
greenfield FDI. Therefore, rapid growth of greenfield FDI in India is a major step to 
enlist it in the high-growth economies.  
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Furthermore, number of cross border MNA increasing from 206 to 246 between 2012 
to 2015. While value of cross border MNA decreased to USD 1407 million in 2015 
from USD 7545million in 2014. 
 
In Pakistan, the value of greenfield FDI has been increasing since 2010 with a 
substantial change in 2015 accounted for USD 18898 million from USD 1249 million 
in 2010. Number of greenfield FDI projects also increasing since 2012 and reached 40 
in 2015 from 18 in 2012. The number of cross border MNA remained below 10 since 
2010 except in 2015 showing the value 11. Pakistan has also entered in the list of top 
10 countries for capital investment in renewable energy for 2015. 
Greenfield FDI in Sri Lanka has been showing fluctuation since last five years and 
accounted for USD 1167 million in 2015 as was only USD 973 million in 2010. While 
the number of cross border MNA decreased in 2015 from 15 to 7. Sri Lanka received 
308 greenfield FDI projects between 2003 and 2015, spread across 34 different sectors. 
 
1.1.4 Average of GDP growth rate (%) middle income countries   
The study focuses on middle income countries because the literature and statistics show 
that the Asia is facing three main types of issues, the decreasing trend of GDP growth 
from 2007, Dutch disease and the middle-income trap. The Figure 1.3 depicts the trend 
of GDP growth in middle income countries. It can be clearly seen from the graph that 
that GDP growth is decreasing science 2009 to 2015. The possible reason of this issue 
may be low productivity or bad governance. There is need to research to dig out the 
factors which are involved in this phenomenon. The study tried to fill this gap through 
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examine the effect of main determinant of economic growth with interaction effect of 
institutional factors.  
 
Figure 1.3  
GDP Growth (annual %) Low & middle-income countries 
Source: World investment report (2015: 4). 
 
Furthermore, the Figure 1.4 also strengthens the issue that GDP per capita in upper and 
lower middle-income countries continually decreasing since 2007 except in one year 
2009. It could be seen that middle-income countries show a sharp decreasing trend of 
science 2007. The question arises that Figure 1 and 2 shows that FDI is increasing in 
middle income countries in Asia but the GDP of these countries is decreasing. 










2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP growth (annual %) low & middle income
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Figure 1.4   
Growth of per capita GDP by level of development 
Source: United Nation/DESA 
 
The current study tried to show the closer picture of the issue in Figure 1.5 by taking 
the trend of average GDP growth of ten selected Asian countries. Many countries 
belonging to this region showed an upward trend of FDI inflow like china, Indonesia 
and Sri Lanka, But the average growth rate of these countries is not increasing.  
 
Figure 1.5  
Average GDP growth (annual%) in ten Asian countries 








Average GDP Growth( Annual %) in ten selected Asian 
Countries 
GDP growth (annual %) in 2011.
Average of last four years GDP growth (annual %)(11, 12, 13, 14)
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The average GDP growth rate for most of the selected Asia countries shows decreasing 
trend except Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand.  
An increasing trend in FDI in developing Asian countries and decreasing growth trends 
of these economies make it interesting to search out the factors influencing this 
scenario. There are substantial factors that can influence the above mentioned foreign 
investments specially the institutions. Szanyi (2001) said if a country does not create a 
fundamental institutional framework and stable politically and economically it cannot 
expect that inflow of FDI increase in that economy. 
 
Another inserting motivation is the mixed picture of aggregated and disaggregated FDI 
and economic growth makes it feasible to investigate how GFDI, MNA has contributed 
to the economic growth in Asian countries with an important role of institutional 
factors.  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
The statistically data shows that in Asia especially, middle income countries (MIC) 
have decreasing trend of GDP growth since 2007, but this region remain on the top in 
receiving FDI. The issue highlights some gaps existing in the literature. The reason 
behind this issue could be the low quality of institutions, possibility of low productivity 
growth or Middle-income countries trap. The trend of rapid growth took many countries 
into the middle-income group but a few countries cross the group and reach high 
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income countries. One of the possible reason of sharp decrease in growth is low 
productivity (Agénor, Canuto, & Jelenic, 2012).  
 
The main problem in the Asia is that regardless this region remained on the top in 
attracting FDI in recent years but the growth rate of this region is not very high and 
most of the Asian countries show decreasing trend of GDP growth. Bad governance, 
law and order situation, corruption, energy crisis, political instability are the main 
hurdles to achieving economic growth (Azam & Emirullah, 2014; Freckleton, Wright, 
& Craigwell, 2012; Quazi, 2014; Saidi & Yosra, 2013).  
Related to this issue, the role of institutional factors gained a substantial position in this 
situation of Asian countries also where the growth rate is low. The questionable 
performance of institutions in these countries which are resource enriched leads to 
Dutch disease. In Asia, the countries have faced this problem of Dutch disease like Lao, 
Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia and Kuwait (Ismail, 2010).  
It is an institutional problem instead it to call a real economic problem, the cause of this 
danger to economy is mainly due to the mismanagement and transparency issue of 
institutions, so it relates to institutions of the host economy. Capital inflow has impact 
that can lead the economy towards Dutch disease. Along with the positive impact of 
foreign investment, this negative element attaches with FDI called mixed blessing for 
host country (M. Burger, Ianchovichina, & Rijkers, 2013; Saborowski, 2009). The 
rationale behind this negative phenomenon is that increased inflow of investment may 
cause an appreciation in the host countries and this can lead to a bad impact on domestic 
investment. Furthermore, this real appreciation of the currency deteriorates the current 
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account and leads to the economy to a vulnerable situation of crisis. This happens 
mostly in the resource enriched countries like Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia and Kuwait, 
because the export of the resources reduces the productivity of manufactured sector and 
the adverse effects of Dutch disease may prevail in the whole economy (Corden, 1984; 
Ismail, 2010; Saborowski, 2009). 
Over the last two decades or more, FDI more precisely GFDI and MNA became the 
main source of economic growth in most of the countries in the world. Particularly in 
Asia, FDI has a substantial role in the growth of the countries but inconsistency in 
results shows that there is still a gap need to be filled. Due to the importance of FDI in 
the context of economic growth an extensive literature on this area is available. These 
studies focus on total FDI and its impact on growth, results show the mixed picture in 
different countries.  
In some countries, total FDI has a positive impact on a country but MNA have negative 
although it is the part of total FDI. For instance, total FDI and greenfield FDI both are 
positively related to economic growth in different Asian countries like Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, China, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Sri lanka 
(Aurangzeb & Stengos, 2014; Duttaray, Dutt, & Mukhopadhyay, 2008; Fadhil & 
Almsafir, 2015; Harms & Méon, 2013; Hayali, 2014; Johnson, 2006; Kalotay & Hunya, 
2000; Khatun & Ahamad, 2015; Nennenkamp, 2002; Silajdzic & Mehic, 2015; Tahir, 
Khan, & Shah, 2015; Wang & Wong, 2009).  
While on the other side researchers like (Ashraf & Herzer, 2014; Azeem et al., 2013; 
Bertrand & Capron, 2015; Blonigen & Slaughter, 2001; Carkovic & Levine, 2005; 
Herzer, 2012; Liu & Zou, 2008; Mehrara & Musai, 2015; Mencinger, 2003; Saqib, 
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Masnoon, & Rafique, 2013; Temiz & Gökmen, 2014) have evidences of negative effect 
of total FDI, GFDI and MNA on economic growth in China, India, Sri lanka, Thailand, 
Malaysia and other developing countries. To see more clearly the study has considered 
positive as well as negative impact of total FDI on economic growth.  
 
Statistics show that in recent years FDI inflow increased in Asia and remained top in 
the word but percentage growth of these countries shows a low value (World Bank 
2015). The question arises why major determinant of growth (FDI) fail to perform in 
these countries and shows the mixed result. Therefore, it is needed to find out the factors 
influencing the effect of FDI on economic growth. The next, total FDI inflow gives a 
mixed result, it is necessary to see FDI separately to clear the picture which type of FDI 
is better for the country whether Greenfield or MNA. A huge number of studies are 
available on relationship or causality between total foreign direct investment, and 
economic growth but few on the impact of Greenfield FDI and MNA on development 
including institutional factors and their specific role in selected Asian countries.  
 
The inconsistent results discussed earlier give a motive to get a clear picture by seeing 
FDI separately (Greenfield FDI and Merger and acquisition) in Asian countries. It is 
also misleading to just see overall  FDI and its impact on economic growth as the 
performance of this investment is concerned it does not wholly depend upon the volume 
of FDI seems to be more dependent on the type of FDI (Nanda, 2009). Greenfield FDI 
cannot be used as a substitute of MNA and have offsetting effect with MNA. Due to 
this solid reason, it is worthwhile to see the impact of FDI separately, as multinational 
corporations (MNCs) also interested to do investment in a single type of investment 
like Greenfield FDI or MNA (Wang & Wong, 2009). In low-income and middle-
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income countries, Greenfield FDI positively influence the economic growth while, 
MNA has no any substantial effect (Harms & Méon, 2011).  
 
The most important goal of almost every country is to achieve its desired economic 
growth and FDI is one of the substantial element required to achieve this objective. A 
big hindrance in achieving this objective is a low level of institutional quality in Asia. 
The solid reason to check the role of institutional factors is that FDI can increase 
economic growth with the condition of human capital and institutional stability (Makki 
& Somwaru, 2004). Furthermore, bad governance, weak institutions are big issues to 
provide the proper and desired facilitation to the investor to do more investment (Gould, 
Tan, & Emamgholi, 2013; Mathur & Singh, 2013; Saidi & Yosra, 2013). 
The studies discussed GFDI separately also give mixed results. Most of the studies 
believe that GFDI is more beneficial than MNA for host economy (Wang & Wong, 
2009). However the conflicting result of different studies can be seen as Greenfield and 
MNA have no effect on growth or negatively related to growth (Ashraf & Herzer, 2014; 
Eren & Zhuang, 2015). There is a research gap whether these inconsistent results of 
GFDI and MNA are due to low level of institutional quality (Control of Corruption, 
Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence and Government Effectiveness).  Furthermore, GFDI is effective 
in some countries, while having a negative effect on economic growth in some 
countries. To fill this gap, it is inevitable to check Greenfield FDI inflow and MNA 




Inconsistent results and statistical justification of high FDI inflow in Asian countries 
and low growth rate left a big research gap. The data shows that in some countries 
which are included in sample of the present study, greenfield FDI is increasing and 
MNA showed a mixed trend. In Indonesia, greenfield FDI accounted for $ 38000 
million in 2015 while $ 13000 million in 2010 and Pakistan improved the value of 
greenfield FDI from $ 1300 to $ 18000 million between 2010 and 2015. Different 
countries have different circumstances due to which performance of FDI may change 
and waving data of both greenfield FDI and MNA have a sign to investigate these 
investments with influencing elements like institutional factors. 
 
 It is clear from the literature that the contribution of FDI to economic growth is highly 
jeopardized without seeing it separately (Greenfield FDI and MNA) and noticing 
institutional factors. It also seeks to fill the literature gap currently existing. The 
research on GFDI and MNA with the role of the institution is also suggested by other 
studies like (Burger, Ianchovichina, & Rijkers, 2015; Gonchar & Marek, 2014; Harms 
& Méon, 2013; Reddy, 2015). 
 
To the best of author’s knowledge, a few prior studies are available on the GFDI and 
economic growth with the role of institutional factors, where some of them include a 
few Asian countries. Furthermore, from these studies, most of the studies use only 
single institutional factor like corruption. The study is contributing by taking six 
intuitional factors separately with GFDI as well with MNA. The present study covering 
only 10 Asian countries consist of Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Sri lanka, the Philippines 
and Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Mongolia, and Thailand. The time period of the present 
study is relatively longer as compared to other studies. Similarly, set of explanatory 
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variables is visibly different and study also included all governance indicators 
(institutional factors). Finally, the study will use relatively more suitable methodology 
to achieve the set of objectives.   
1.3 Research Questions 
What is the impact of Greenfield FDI inflow on economic growth in selected ten Asian 
countries? 
What is the impact of MNA on economic growth in selected ten Asian countries? 
What is the interactive effect of institutional factors with Greenfield FDI on economic 
growth in selected ten Asian countries? 
 What is the interactive effect of institutional factors with MNA on economic growth 
in selected ten Asian countries?  
1.4 Research Objectives 
1.4.1 General Objectives 
The objective of the study is to explore the impact of greenfield FDI, cross border MNA 
and institutional factors on economic growth in selected Asian countries. 
 
1.4.2 Specific objectives 
The following are the specific objectives of the study. 




2.To examine the impact of MNA on economic growth in selected ten Asian countries. 
3.To measure the interactive effect of institutional factors with GFDI on economic 
growth in selected ten Asian countries? 
4.To measure the interactive effect of institutional factors with MNA on economic 
growth in selected ten Asian countries? 
 
1.5 Scope and limitation of the study 
The present study will use panel data set of 10 countries of Asia for the time  period of 
2002 to 2016. In detail, six countries from lower middle namely Pakistan, India, 
Indonesia, Srilanka, Mongolia, Philippine and Vietnam, four countries named as China, 
Malaysia, and Thailand are from upper middle-income group. The justification of the 
selection of these countries from middle income group is that these countries are a 
diverse group by size, population, and income level. Middle income countries are home 
of five of the world’s seven billion people and 73 percent of the world’s poor people.  At 
the same time, middle income countries represent about one third of global GDP and 
are major engine to global growth.   
 
The selection of countries is also done to exclude the high income and oil and resource 
rich countries. Furthermore, the selection is also bound to the availability of data of 
MNA for some countries, although study selected a maximum number of countries 
whose data is available. The time period of the study is 15 years from 2002-2016 due 
to data of institutional factors availability. The study will use secondary data to explore 
the impact of Greenfield FDI and MNA on economic growth in ten selected Asian 
countries. The countries are selected as most of Asian countries show the increasing 
trend of investment inflow but with decreasing trend of growth. (World Bank 2016). 
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Furthermore, the dependent variable in the research is Gross domestic product (GDP) 
and independent variables are greenfield FDI, MNA, domestic investment, population 
growth, human capital, trade openness and inflation. The limitation of study is that, it 
does not sufficiently explain the role of institutional factors at dimensions level and on 
sectoral level like the impact of greenfield FDI and MNA in the service sector. This 
role is also checked by using Fraser index. 
1.6 Significance of research 
 
This study will contribute to the existing literature and development economics as it 
will investigate the factors which are the obstacle to economic growth. Most of the 
empirical studies have been done to check the relationship between FDI, domestic 
investment, and economic growth. However, little research has been done on 
disaggregated FDI (Greenfield FDI and MNA) and economic growth in the context of 
institutional factors. Therefore, this study obtains vantage of novelty to investigate the 
impact of Greenfield FDI and MNA with the role of institutional factors in selected 
Asian countries.  
 
Furthermore, the results of this study can provide a fruitful guidance to the policy 
makers of developing Asian countries regarding policies about entry mode of 
investment and economic growth. In addition, understanding of the linkage of the 
institution between Greenfield FDI and economic growth is essential in formulating the 
appropriate policies to the future direction of development in developing Asian 
countries. Practical contribution of this study is that, if countries which are looking for 
investing from developed countries to Asian developing regions will be aware of the 
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intuitional factors affecting FDI, by seeing greenfield FDI and MNA separately. They 
will be able to decide, it is better to invest or not to get optimum results.  
 
As for as receiving countries are concerned after having information about the 
institutional condition they will be also able to make policies to rectify their institution 
to attract FDI and to get their targeted growth rate. Finally, the study will empirically 
contribute to economic growth by developing new model about Greenfield FDI, MNA, 
and economic growth by using different econometric techniques. Additionally, the 
research will consider the data on institutional factors in ten Asian countries from 2002 
to 2016. 
1.7 Organization of the study 
Chapter one will comprise of background: history, statistical data and statement of the 
problem, research question, research objective, the scope of the study and significance 
of the research. In the next chapter (two) the theoretical framework with underpinning 
theories of FDI literature review of previous studies such as the impact of FDI and 
economic growth role of institutional factors, GFDI and MNA with their effects on host 
economy in selected ten Asian countries are discussed. The third chapter consists of 
methodology, variable definitions and their measurement, sources of data, econometric 
models and the summary of the whole chapter. The fourth chapter consist of results and 






2.0 Introduction  
In the following section, study presents a review of the literature on growth in the 
perspective of FDI and GFDI. Literature supports the concept that FDI can play a 
facilitating role in promoting growth (Azam & Ahmed, 2015; Iamsiraroj & Ulubaşoğlu, 
2015; Zeb, Qiang, & Rauf, 2013). It is also interesting to see separate effects of GFDI 
and MNA on economic growth. Both have a different impact on growth in different 
countries (Eren & Zhuang, 2015; Harms & Méon, 2012).  
2.1 Theories of economic growth 
2.1.1 Basic Neoclassical (Solow) Model 
Growth is fundamental concepts in economic literature have many theories. The most 
important theories are neo-classical theory and endogenous growth model theory. The 
Solow–Swan model is an exogenous growth model based on neoclassical economics. 
The core concept of this model is that output can be produced by the major contribution 
of two factors of production named as capital and labour. The main objective of this 
theory is to perceive the growth rates of these factors. Theory believes that growth rate 
changes with an increase in capital and labor force but not permanently rise because of 
diminishing return to scale. The Solow growth model believes that a rise in capital 
accumulation and labor force will increase the economic growth rate, but only 
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temporarily because of diminishing returns. Another important feature of this model is 
that it is a single commodity model. The output of every investment is consumed and 
rest of which is saved. The saved part of output further invested and the overall capital 
stock is called capital accumulation. As earlier mentioned that it is an exogenous model, 
this is mainly due to consider technology as an exogenous variable. Renelt (1991) 
argued that technical change has a substantial impact on growth but this growth does 
not reflect as input.  
This uncalculated part of growth is called "Solow residual". Endogenous growth model 
has a wide scope to investigate the growth effect of variables like capital, labor, 
technology and population growth.  
2.2 Eclectic theory of international production 
International production as a concept was discussed by Dunning in 1976 in a 
presentation named as “The International Allocation of Economic Activity”. The main 
aim of this working was that activities of multinational corporation should be supported 
by different economic theories. It is also considered that in different channels of 
economic activities FDI is a prominent channel of foreign economic activity. A research 
in 1980 was also the continuation of the same idea with some improvement. It was a 
step forward in theory by focusing on the importance of ownership and another 
important thing “location” in the context of economic activity. (Dunning, 1980, 1988a). 




2.2.1 Ownership advantages 
Ownership advantages are further divided into three forms: 
 (I) Advantage of possession of assets that can generate profits  
(II) Advantage of enjoying growth of newly started company  
(III) Advantage of being multinational and divergence of geographical location 
The framework of location theory is suitable to see international direct investment. 
When a firm is working in local market it has a variety of option for growth, as it is 
involved in the production of knowledge it can purchase exiting firm, can penetrate in 
the foreign market also (Hirsch, 1976).  In the international market, ownership 
advantages of the firms are different due to different features of MNEs and the markets. 
Another main feature of the theory is that ownership advantage should be shifted to 
other country but in the control and organization of home country’s enterprises. It is 
also better to share these advantages instead of selling them. 
2.2.2 Locational Advantages 
Pros and cons of location advantage can be seen independently from ownership 
benefits. But the decision of investment is strictly connected to the ownership of the 
assets of a firm that is getting benefits. The theory also tried to dig out the elements that 
have substantial influence regarding foreign direct investment (Vernon, 1966) 
The theory reveals that enterprises should utilise its assets in foreign country otherwise 
the local firm will remain engaged in local markets and exports are only factor of 
international economic activity. To do this practice by MNEs can get benefits called 
locational advantage (Dunning, 1988b). 
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2.2.3 Internalization  
The concept of internalization is the transfer of knowledge and activities of the firms 
by licensing or franchising. The theory explores the proficiency of firms and decisions 
of the organization to invest. The theory also reveals that internalization is a process of 
controlling of economic activity related to value addition of products in other markets. 
Buckley (1988) gave a concept that locational variable should be assimilated with 
internalization variables. An important point was discussed by Dunning that FDI has  a 
considerable relationship with O, L and I variables (Dunning, 2000). Furthermore, 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) argued that institutional elements and components of OLI 
can be incorporated. As in volatile global economy, the institutions which are locational 
specific become more important in reducing the transaction cost of value added 
commodities across the border. 
2.3 An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 
Nocke and Yeaple (2008) developed a theory to conceptualize the composition FDI.    
Greenfield investment and cross-border acquisitions are the main investing modes of 
FDI. They argued that GFDI and MNA can be in the same industry but not in any single 
firm. Therefore, different countries and firms received two different mode of 
investment due to location characteristics of the host country. 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that GFDI is more important for the economies having more 
difference in cost of production. As, its flow is towards high to low cost countries. 
While, MNA have its own substantial position in those countries where difference cost 
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is minor. When two countries having the almost same cost of production of different 
commodities, foreign investment adopts the shape of MNA. The efficiency level of the 
firms related to GFDI is more than that engaged with MNA. 
2.4 Theoretical framework  
 
The Solow model is considered as a key item of theoretical framework to elaborate the 
growth patterns. The base of this model is affixed with the framework of neoclassical 
economics. However, the assumption of fixed proportion stated in Harrod-Domar 
Model is not considered in this model whether it is called an extension of Harrod-
Domar model. In the model, the population growth, saving rate and technological 
progress are assumed to be exogenous. There are two main factors of productions, 
capital and labour by which output can be produced (Solow, 1956). 
Furthermore, endogenous growth theory explores that growth can be achieved by 
foreign investment (FDI) from Multinational corporations (Romer, 1989). The theory 
emphasis that it the force that is the main cause of technological progress. The addition 
of human capital in the determinants of economic growth instead of only physical 
capital is a contribution of the theory. The concept of endogenized technological change 
is also a hallmark of endogenous growth theory (Renelt, 1991). Furthermore, Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) indicate that growth is related to research and development (R&D) 
and add this concept in the previous model of growth. In addition, capital deepening is 
the main cause of technical development (Barro, 1995; Romer, 1989). North (1990) 
argued that along with conventional determinants of economic growth institutions have 
its own importance.  
27 
 
A detailed and fruitful explanation compelled the neoclassical researchers to think 
about the importance of institution in the process of growth. However, the process of 
incorporating institution into the general theory of growth was under thinking. Lal 
(2000) also, tried to solve this theoretical concept of incorporating institutional 
development in general growth theory. The conventional understanding of Solow 
growth theory is that technology is an exogenous variable, which became the main 
difference between endogenous and classical growth theory. The study argued that 
there is no rational that institutions have a direct impact on economic growth.  
However, institutions can be related to the performance of investment indirectly. While 
the steady state growth rate may be targeted in countries which have the same level of 
institutions. By giving weightage to this discussion it can be concluded that institutions 
have a relationship with growth but not directly. It is an economic rational that growth 
can be determined by investment. Thus, the performance of investment is conditional 
and attached with institutions. 
 Furthermore, according to Barro (1996), economic growth can be achieved by taking 
amelioration in school enrolment and expectancy of life. In addition, low fertility rate, 
controlled prices, the rule of law and control of expenditure from the government are 
also push up factor to enhance the growth of a country.  Nocke and Yeaple (2008) 
develop a theory of assignment for foreign direct investment. The theory claims that in 
different countries and firm FDI is not in aggregated form but either in the form of 
greenfield FDI or MNA. Greenfield FDI is involved in constructing new production 
and facilities in the host country. While MNA show a combination of two firms and 
involved in trading different assets owned by multinational corporations.  
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Similarly, the theory also reveals that both types of investment have different 
consequences. Another claim of the theory is that role of both investments is different 
in different circumstance. When there is a minor difference between the costs of 
production between host and home country, more chances are there, the form of 
investment would be MNA. However, the role of greenfield FDI prominently can be 
seen in those countries which have low cost as compared to high cost country.  On the 










2.6 The empirical evidence  
 
Barro (1996) discuss growth in reference to policy and tested the hypothesis proposed 
by (Bhagwati, 1985). They found, the impact of FDI relatively large in those countries 
adopted outwardly oriented trade policy as compared to countries with an inwardly 
oriented policy to achieve economic growth (V. Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 
1996). Furthermore, essential conditions for economic growth consider as prerequisite 
is discussed by taking data of 41 middle income countries. They state that polices 
having fewer trade barriers, low inflation rate and substantial investment in human 
capital along with physical are the main conditions for growth.  The study also explores 
that price stability caused sustainable growth while inflation’s impact on growth shows 
negative sign(Dewan & Hussein, 2001).  
Economic growth’s linkage with exports of the countries studied by Vohra (2001). 
Economic growth, especially in less-developed countries is associated with the 
economic development of that country. When a country achieves at least initial 
standards of economic development it becomes easy to gain positive impact from 
exports. These countries also are recommended to adopt the policies which could 
accelerate economic growth with increased foreign investment inflow by export 
expansion. Barro (2003) also, tried to explore determinants of economic growth. Life 
expectancy ratio and educational attainment as proxies for Human capital conditionally 
related to economic growth. 
High level of these variables at initial stage influences the growth positively. Whereas 
inflation and high government expenditures are not in the favor of economic growth. 
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An important determinant of growth is financial development but it gives a mixed 
performance in different countries. As in OECD countries and China,  evidence shows 
that financial development does not lead to economic growth in a direct or indirect way 
(Shan & Morris, 2002). While  Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) utilized  panel data 
of 10 developing countries to dig out the relationship between financial development 
and economic  growth. By using fully modified OLS they find that financial 
development leads to economic growth.  
In the same way, another important determinant of economic growth is FDI. It is 
positively correlated with economic growth and accelerate country’s growth with the 
condition of adequate human capital, trade liberalization and economic stability 
(Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003). As the FDI comes from the European Union to the 
Middle Eastern countries resulted in economic growth, and also affect exports 
positively which in return help to attract more FDI (Metwally, 2004). Besides, FDI has 
a strong relationship to economic growth, it stimulates growth in developing countries 
as well as developed countries and combine with human capital exerts a strong positive 
impact on economic growth (X. Li & Liu, 2005). As well as, medium financial sector 
FDI supports growth conditionally sufficient human capital. Impact on economic 
growth also depends upon level and quality of FDI (Eller, Haiss, & Steiner, 2006). 
In addition, the same determinant of growth shows different results in different 
countries this can be seen by observing the behaviour of export led growth hypothesis. 
In India, Iran, Nepal and Fiji impact of exports on economies growth shows a positive 
sign and results of different researches support. However, in some countries 
performance of exports is not appreciable, as this hypothesis shows opposite direction 
in Bangladesh and Bhutan and in these countries, economic growth leads to increase in 
31 
 
exports. The situation of Pakistan and Sri Lanka is totally different, there is no any 
causality between exports and economic growth (Atrkar Roshan, 2007; Love & 
Chandra, 2005; Narayan, Narayan, Chand Prasad, & Prasad, 2007). 
Furthermore, M. Wang and M. S. Wong (2009) investigated the factors enhancing the 
growth effect of FDI. The study was conducted by using panel data of 69 countries 
from 1970-1989. Furthermore, study depicts that an economy with established financial 
markets and human capital can get a positive impact of FDI towards economic growth. 
The required results of economic growth can be achieved when human capital get a 
certain level. It is also revealed by a study that government can play a promising role 
in developing countries by tax holidays to attract FDI inflow. 
Rahimi and Shahabadi (2011) studied the impact of trade liberalization on growth in 
the economy of Iran. The study used the ARDL approach, time series data (1980-2006) 
with Cobb Douglas production function. Trade liberalization is positively related to the 
growth of Iranian economy as an increase in imports leads to a big positive change in 
exports. While the economy is badly affected by labor force and education. Law and 
Singh (2014)  supports Christopoulos’ research with some addition. It is stated that 
financial development can play its positive role in the growth of a country until it 
remains under a specific threshold level. But when it exceeds that level its impact 
become negative and this is true in both developed and developing countries. 
 
The literature on FDI, Greenfield FDI and MNA have substantial importance as it is 
the most attractive area of research in the context of Asia. Furthermore, Asia also 
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remained on top in attracting FDI (Greenfield FDI, MNA) even with the slowdown in 
economic growth (world investment report 2015). 
2.4 The relationship between GFDI, MNA and economic growth 
To achieve sustainable economic growth remained a salient object of every country. 
Determinants of economic growth have a substantial position in this regards. A boom 
of mergers in 1960 caught the attention of the researchers to trace the effects of these 
surges of foreign investment on different economies. While results showed 
inconsistencies among different countries of developed nation expect some cases of 
large firms gave a consistent result (Hannah, 1981).  However, Deneckere and 
Davidson (1985) demonstrated that it was not necessary to gain an advantage, mergers 
should have a large capacity, small mergers also gave profits but in small quantity. 
Along with profit, mergers are also the cause of the increase in price. Particularly, 
mergers that are incapable of generating a synergy (The concept that the value and 
performance of two companies combined will be greater than the sum of the separate 
individual parts) caused an increase in price. Furthermore, to get benefits from mergers, 
economies of scale are required (Farrell & Shapiro, 1990). While the Japanese’ 
corporations shifted their investment in the form of mergers from Asia to the developed 
countries in 1980 (Murmatsu, 1997). 
Waves of these investment show ups and downs in Asian history, in 1990 MNA 
direction toward India clearly can be seen. But the mode of entry in the form of 
Greenfield FDI remained dominant in performing perspective. Because of the superior 
quality of Greenfield FDI, it showed positive spillovers in different economies. 
Furthermore, physical capital produced by MNA is not enough to contribute economic 
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growth. Greenfield FDI showed a considerable amount of transferred knowledge 
comparatively more than that of MNA (Kumar, 2000b). 
Developing countries demonstrated an increasing trend of MNA, from 1991 to 1997 
accounted for 14 billion US dollars and 108 billion respectively. While, 44 % decrease 
in the sale of MNA in Asian countries reversed this trend. However, the performance 
of both types of investment is comparable, in the Asian countries. Greenfield FDI 
performed well in the process of capital growth and MNA also contribute, but the 
difference is only that Greenfield performance belongs to short term. While the effect 
of MNA toward growth seemed to be the long term. As greenfield investment promptly 
involved in creating new jobs but MNA delivered this work in long run. Both type of 
investments involved in the transfer of technology in the host country. An interesting 
picture can be seen in the perspective of competition, as greenfield FDI increased while 
MNA decreased the competition in the host countries (Kang & Johansson, 2000). 
Antalóczy, Sass, and Sass (2001) explored that both investments have different results 
when competition, jobs, capital growth and technology transfer were required to check, 
in different studies.  
Mody and Negishi (2000)  noticed that a sudden increase in MNA had been seen in 
East Asia especially in Korea in 2000. Different factors like liberalized policy for the 
mode of entry and facilitations for foreign investors played a predominant role in this 
upsurge of MNA in East Asia. The economies that were financially disturbed 





Cheng and Kwan (2000)estimated the effects of the determinants of FDI in 29 Chinese 
regions, while the time period for this study was from 1985 to 1995. The specification 
test for independent variable and GMM estimation is used as methodology. The 
findings of the study show that better infrastructure, size of a region’s market is 
positively related to the FDI although wage cost exert a negative pressure on FDI. 
 
Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) examine the connection among FDI, 
financial markets, and economic growth in 20 OECD and 51 non-OECD countries. The 
study used panel data between 1975 and 1995. Foreign direct investment alone shows 
uncertain results to contribute economic growth. Although good financial markets are 
complementary to gain positive effect of FDI on economic growth. The study further 
argues that low developed local financial markets are the main cause of ambiguous 
result of FDI. Furthermore, the study suggests that Better local conditions firstly can 
attract foreign investment and the other benefit is that it allows the receiving countries 
to take full advantage of these investments. 
 
Greenfield investment and MNA are the cause of the increase in domestic investment. 
However, both have a positive connection with GDP growth. In addition, economic 
growth worked as “pull” factor to attract both types of investments(Calderon, Loayza, 
& Serven, 2004). Economic growth is effected by mode of entry, GFDI and MNA have 
different impacts regarding employment. As GFDI is a considered a job creator 
investment while MNA show the inverse impact on employment sector in the host 
country. Due to launching new projects, GFDI can create new jobs and cause an 
addition of several assets in developing countries. However, MNA are not involved 
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such a type of activity and just takeover assets and liabilities of firms in the host 
countries.  
The aim of transnational corporations is to earn more profit from both types of 
investments, in this regard, MNA in certain cases do downsizing which ultimately 
effected the employment rate badly in the host country. The case of developing 
countries is different from the developed countries. Most of the public sectors in the 
developing countries usually overcrowded and government sell their sector to TNCs. 
These types of mergers and acquisitions projects may cause an increase in 
unemployment (Geishecker & Hunya, 2005). 
Mehic, Silajdzic, and Babic-Hodovic (2013) examine the impact of foreign direct 
investment on economic growth in seven countries of southeast Europe (SEE) by using 
the data from 1998–2007. The study used fixed effect panel data estimation, to get the 
results. The findings depict that there is significant positive relationship between FDI 
and economic growth in SEE countries. However, the impact of domestic investment 
in these countries are not strong enough to improve economic growth. 
 
2.4.1 Positive impact of Greenfield FDI on economic growth 
Typically, Greenfield FDI looks more beneficial for the receiving economy than MNA 
because former is resulted in the creation of new asset while  the latter is not capable of 
producing the new capacities (Kalotay & Hunya, 2000). Another reason to choose 
GFDI is that as the case of MNA is concerned it is just the change of owner of the firm 
and not affiliated to increase in investment in the host country. Thus, expected gain 
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from MNA is less than GFDI. Additionally, GFDI is related to new investment so have 
more attraction for the countries in developing nations (Nennenkamp, 2002). 
 Motivated by the increased concern to see FDI separately because multinational 
corporations (MNCs) do investment in the form of either greenfield investment or 
MNA. However, both types of FDI are positively related to increases in the growth 
rate(Calderon et al., 2004). Furthermore, GFDI increases the physical capital especially 
in developing countries because of investment in new facilities. While MNA shows the 
opposite picture by changing the physical capital stock in a small amount (Johnson, 
2006). Greenfield FDI and MNA can be differentiated in many ways but the most 
important difference is their implication. Because the MNA is an expansion of existing 
firm by trading in the foreign market initially it will have not a considerable impact on 
the productive capacity of the host country specifically in the developing countries. 
While the GFDI is involved in establishing the new capacity of production by 
purchasing the labor and capital from the host country (A. Wang, 2009). 
As FDI is the most consistent and stable component of foreign capital and also 
important as playing the role in the process of economic growth by providing monetary 
resources, skills and technology know- how through MNCs (Adams, 2009). Welfare 
impact received from both types of FDI are different, in detail, welfare implications of 
GFDI are leading in the receiving countries as compared to MNA. Cross-border MNA 
shows a negative affiliation to capital formation however the greenfield investments 
show the positive correlation in the major portion of industries in Korea. But after the 
formation of free trade agreement (FTA), entry mode of multinational firm changed and 
MNA is also preferable when strategic effects are concerned by the countries (Y.-H. 




Arslan and Larimo (2011) point out that the role of formal and informal institutional 
distance on entry mode of FDI; Greenfield FDI and merger and acquisition is different. 
The study used the data of 343 foreign direct investments in selected emerging 
economies of Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. The results of the 
study show that greater informal institutional distance is in the favour of Greenfield 
FDI by the Finnish MNEs. While, the preference of merger and acquisitions is 
depending upon high formal institutional distance. 
 
As for as the growth effect is concerned both types of FDI also have different results, 
such as in a sample of 84 countries including more than twenty percent Asian countries, 
greenfield investment positively attached with economic growth whereas MNA is 
negative. The reason behind this, MNA require a threshold level of human capital to 
achieve economic growth while GFDI promotes without it (Wang & Wong, 2009). 
Besides this GFDI augmented growth and while MNA is without any significant impact 
on growth (Harms & Méon, 2011).  
M. Wang (2009) argue that the ambiguous result of FDI and economic growth may be 
due to taking total FDI. Therefore, they use sector-level data of inward FDI and check 
its effect on economic growth in 12 Asian economies between the period of 1987 to 
1997. The findings show that performance FDI in manufacturing sector is positive but 
the non- manufacturing sector cannot get these effects from FDI in enhancing economic 
growth. The study further suggests that Asian economies should make policies in the 




Equally important, GFDI and MNA have a substantial importance as first become the 
cause of the expansion of capital stock of the host country and latter produces rent for 
the domestic industry. Additionally, GFDI positively plays a role in enhancing 
economic growth while the MNA sales fail to do so, the reason behind this is a real 
appreciation in host countries in the case of MNA (Harms & Méon, 2013). In 
developing countries, greenfield investment is comparatively more beneficial to 
economic growth as compared to brownfield investment (MNA). Furthermore, GFDI 
can effect economic growth without any new requirement but the brownfield require 
additionally a certain level of human capital for having a direct impact on economic 
growth (Hayali, 2014). 
2.4.2 Negative impact of Greenfield FDI on economic growth 
Whether foreign investment seen combined (FDI) or separately, greenfield FDI and 
MNA, it gives the mixed picture towards growth, e.g. more foreign investment in a 
country has a significant negative relationship with the sale growth of the local firms 
of receiving countries (Djankov & Hoekman, 2000). Similarly receiving countries 
showed that greenfield investment negatively  correlated with skill-upgrading 
(Blonigen & Slaughter, 2001). Furthermore, FDI inflow does not affect the economic 
growth(Carkovic & Levine, 2005). Similarly, the impact of FDI on economic growth 
is negative in ninety percent of the sample of study and sign remains the same in both 
time series and a panel of these countries except Lithuania (Mencinger, 2003). 
Additionally, FDI can be seen in different sectors like primary, manufacturing and 
service with negative, positive and ambiguous result respectively in OECD, and 
selected Asian countries (Alfaro, 2003). In the same way, economic growth is 
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negatively affected by financial development as this generates high capital flight. FDI 
have a negative effect on economic growth if the transnational corporations (TNCs) 
demand concession and high dividends (Akinlo, 2004). Similarly, GFDI also has 
negative impact toward growth due to the grip of local firms on the labour force, the 
challenge they face is hiring of labour (Liu & Zou, 2008). Greenfield FDI effects 
domestic investment negatively in the same way cross-border MNA also have an 
insignificant impact on domestic investment. Furthermore, greenfield FDI and MNA 
both are not capable of increasing total factor productivity (TFP) in developing 
countries. However, the picture is opposite in developed nations as MNA have a 
substantial and positive impact (Ashraf & Herzer, 2014; Ashraf, Herzer, & 
Nunnenkamp, 2014). 
Another angle of cross-border acquisition is that domestic investment and MNA are 
complementary to each other as both are essential to firm productivity. Because one 
makes more constructive to other for firm productivity (Bertrand & Capron, 2015). 
In Asia, especially the Middle East countries have to face the Dutch disease effect and 
become the volatile in macroeconomic performance and show a low level of economic 
growth (Arezki & Nabli, 2012; J. Frankel, 2012; J. A. Frankel, 2012). Similarly, 
Foreign capital inflows in natural resources cause an appreciation trend in the exchange 
rate which ultimately reduces the competition and finally Dutch disease in Lao (the 
country belongs to South-East Asia) economy can be seen with its bad affects 
(Insisienmay, Nolintha, & Park, 2015). 
Another essential point is the preference of entry mode, it is interdependent, if the 
export is more profitable as compared to greenfield investment then MNCs prefer to 
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choose the MNA mode of entry. Similarly, if there is a sharp increase seen in the cost 
of trade, MNCs also prefer MNA (Raff, Ryan, & Stähler, 2009). After selection of 
entry, the effect of both greenfield and MNA should rationally be different in different 
countries. Theoretically, both types of investments have different structure, nature and 
impact as compared to total FDI. Thus, it is interesting to see both investments 
separately to fill this research gap. 
2.5 Effect of Institutional Factors on FDI, Greenfield FDI, MNA and economic 
Growth 
The variables like tax and corruption both are negatively related to the inflow of FDI in 
the host country. In detail, multinational companies adversely react to the increase in 
tax rate and high corruption also diminish inflow of FDI (Wei, 2000). Seeing the direct 
impact of total FDI or disaggregated FDI on economic growth it is also important to 
see the factors responsible for shrinkage of the real effect of GFDI and MNA towards 
receiving economy. Some factors like Political instability and investment risk are the 
main determinant of FDI in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries while 
in the developing countries both are less important because investment risk is less 
there(Chan & Gemayel, 2004).  
Many institutional factors influenced the impact of aggregated or disaggregated FDI 
but the most important variable in term of the relation between domestic investment 
and FDI is political stability. As FDI is the cause of decreased domestic investment and 
increased total investment with a condition of the politically stable era (Morrissey & 
Udomkerdmongkol, 2012). The link between strong domestic institutions and bilateral 
investment agreements for the purpose of strengthening property rights protection 
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become the cause of negative effect on FDI inflow (Mina, 2012). Another essential 
point is political risk have an adverse effect on the inflow of FDI while this effect 
reduces with the possibility of larger capital flows from the all over the world (Méon & 
Sekkat, 2012). More importantly, the high quality regulatory system of a country and 
technology advancement in addition to political stability are the required condition for 
a market who is going to become an attractive market for MNA (Appadu, Faelten, 
Moeller, & Vitkova, 2014). 
Economic growth may be improved by institutional quality instead of conventional 
determinants like capital stock and technological spillovers (Long, Yang, & Zhang, 
2015). Because institutions play a moderating role between environmental externalities 
and FDI. The developed institutions can mitigate the negative FDI’s environmental 
externalities. Thus, stable institutes are a precondition for the sustainable development 
of china (D. T. Wang & Chen, 2014). The reason is that there is significant negative 
relationship exit between GFDI and politically stable economy having an adverse 
shock. Furthermore, political instability becomes the cause of low growth by affecting 
the FDI portfolio and trade related to non-resource especially in the Middle East (M. 
Burger et al., 2013). 
Another essential aspect discussed that institution of host countries and government can 
play a dominant role to display the valued picture of emerging market firm through 
MNA (Du & Boateng, 2015). Additionally, FDI and human capital have a significant 
impact on economic growth but with the condition of the better institutional role and 
less corruption in the host country (Azam, Ibrahim, & Bakhtyar, 2014; Mathur & Singh, 
2013).  A different angle is an attachment of FDI with innovation trough regional formal 
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institutions as these institutions can play a positive moderating role regarding 
innovation process (Qu, Qu, & Wu, 2015).  
Furthermore, FDI can influence the economic growth by a different channel like 
ameliorated institutional environment rather than traditional, as advance technology 
transfer and increased capital stock (Long et al., 2015). 
Floyd (2004) Compared the pros and cons of GFDI and MNA in Poland by taking data 
of 145 manufacturing firms. The study conducted a survey in 1997 and take as a sample 
those enter in Poland after 1989. MNA have more knowledge about host country than 
greenfield and advantaged in this regard. However, greenfield is more attached to 
different activities and creates more jobs than acquisitions. The study also finds that 
marketing activities and production level by greenfield are more than that in the case of 
acquisitions. Both types of investments are market seeking and short term in nature. 
The study reveals that GFDI is more uncertain than acquisition and less consistent. 
Furthermore, turnover from greenfield is more volatile in the case of Poland. It is 
suggested that investors should be taken more time to take a decision about entry mode. 
Méon and Sekkat (2005) evaluates the impact of corruption on economic growth and 
investment. The sample of the study consists of 63 to 71 countries, and data spanning 
from 1970 to 1998. The findings are consistent with economic rationale as both 
investment and economic growth are negatively affected by corruption. The study 
further investigates these effects with governance of the host countries. The findings 
show that low governance badly effect to get positive effect from investment and 
growth. furthermore, “sand the wheels” hypothesis is support by the study implying 




Demirbag, Tatoglu, and Glaister (2008) investigated the factors associated with the 
decision of mode of entry (GFDI or MNA) of multinational enterprise in Turkey. The 
study took the sample of 145 Western MNEs investing in turkey. Results of the study 
showed that motive of host country like the standard of input and capacity of the market 
influenced the entry mode. Furthermore, MNE prefers to enter in the form of MNA 
instead of greenfield if these motives become more important. While the other host 
country’s motive, investment risk supported the greenfield entry mode. 
Raff et al. (2009) discussed the mode of entry like GFDI, MNA and a joint venture 
from the multinationals firms in any host country. The study revealed that profit margin 
from these types of investments matters in accepting what type investment by domestic 
firms or host country. Furthermore, the study showed that these investments are 
interdependent as the profitability ratio of GFDI expected to reduce due to huge fixed 
cost the host country prefer to accept the MNA or joint venture. While a local form will 
not ready to accept a joint venture if the exports of that country are more profitable. 
However, home country firm preferred to enter with a mode of MNA when the trading 
cost was large enough as considered to reduce the profit. 
A. Wang (2009) tried to elaborate the two different foreign investments, GFDI and 
merger and acquisitions. The study explained the whole phenomenon by taking a single 
country china and inflow of foreign investments. The results of study explored that if 
the position of the competition in the market was low and profit gap is high the choice 
will tend toward Greenfield. However, when a problem of limitation of resources was 
there it is the only choice, MNA. Similarly, if demand did not remain constant or more 
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fluctuated over time, the preference had given to the MNA. furthermore, in the presence 
of local and foreign competitors, it was seen to greenfield FDI in a position where it 
could not make its space in the market. Concluding, the study suggested that every 
investor must think before they enter a market whether what type of entry mode is more 
advantageous for their investment. 
Masron and Abdullah (2010) Examine the role of institutional quality related to inward 
FDI into Asean. The study used annual data spanning from 1996 to 2008. Fixed effects 
method is found better model for estimation. The findings of the study support the 
concept that institutional quality could be used to accelerate the pattern of FDI inflows 
into Asean. Furthermore, Market size is also a main determinant of inward FDI. The 
study suggests that improving the institutional quality should be an essential element 
of future policy strategy to further enhance FDI inflow in this region. 
 
Alguacil, Cuadros, and Orts (2011) examine the absorptive capacity and its role to 
change the effect of FDI on economic growth in host economies. The study used the 
panel data over the period of 1976 to 2005. The findings show that institutional quality 
and macroeconomic stability are considerable contributor directly to economic 
performance. Furthermore, only incentives for foreign investors are not sufficient to 
achieve economic growth. Therefore, study suggest that better institutions and 
macroeconomic condition should be the prime priority of policy makers. 
 
Sun, Peng, Ren, and Yan (2012) investigated how the emerging countries’ 
multinational enterprises get advantages of their ownership. Data was consisted of 1526 
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mergers and acquisitions announced by the firm of China and India over the time period 
of eight years (2000 to 2008). The study developed a frame of comparative ownership 
advantage. The results of the study showed that investment inclination of Chinese firms 
remained towards natural resource sector. While Indian companies were more 
interested in service sector especially software. Therefore, both countries’ MNEs had 
comparative ownership advantage in their respective industries through MNA. 
Holtbrügge and Baron (2013) explored the entry decision about greenfield FDI and 
MNA with the strategic point of view. Data was taken from 564 multinational firms 
and studied their investments decision in BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) 
countries. The study also focused on success of the entry choice adopted by the firms 
in these countries. Results of the study indicated that greenfield FDI was preferable 
mode of entry in the BRIC countries as compared to MNA. In BRIC countries, affiliates 
which had a complete hold on firm’s stock presented the positive influence on market 
success but with empirically insignificant value. However, only the positive and 
significant value was shown by china. 
Slangen (2013) examined greenfield FDI and MNA and uncertain policies of the host 
economies. Data was collected by questionnaire from the executives of Dutch firms. 
The sample size consisted of 821 executives and 100 sub officers during the period of 
mid and late in 2003. The study found that GFDI increases when a country had not a 
certain policy and MNEs gave less attention on MNA. Further, the management of these 
enterprises expects less control form the political side and to get better performance of 
company they choose the country which was religiously very close to the home country. 
Furthermore, religious gap performs moderating role between uncertain policies and 
entry decision of MNEs.  
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Kumar (2000a) scrutinized Mergers and Acquisition’s deals by multinational 
enterprises in India from 1993 to 2000. The study includes 256 deals entered in the host 
country from MNEs. Three major effects of disaggregated FDI were discussed in this 
research, the knowledge received from greenfield was more as compared to MNA. The 
second aspect was development effect, the result showed that greenfield had a 
constructive role to increase the physical capital stock while MNA could not play such 
a role of this stock augmentation. Thirdly, the study reveals that greenfield FDI 
accelerate the competition but MNA reduces this type of competition. The study also 
suggested that a framework of competitive policies is a serious need in India. 
Calderon et al. (2004) analyzed the effects received from greenfield FDI and mergers 
and acquisitions. Panel data from 1987 to 2001 was used and number of countries was 
72 out of which 22 developed and 50 were developing. The study reveals that greenfield 
accelerated by an increase in MNA. Both type of FDI seen to had a substantial positive 
impact on domestic investment. Furthermore, growth had leading effect on foreign 
inflow but investment did not influence the growth. The channel is seen in this research 
that GDP growth acted as a pull factor for FDI and the investment inflow further 
enhance domestic investment. 
Di Giovanni (2005) studied the influential financial factor for the decision of 
investment that are related to MNA entry. Panel data was used with the time frame of 
1990 to 1999 for both developed and developing countries. Study depicts that increase 
in tax rate had not a positive impact flow of MNA. However, these inflows were 
motivated by a capital tax treaty. Furthermore, financial market amelioration was one 
of the causes of increasing MNA activity. More, results showed that countries those 
can share a common language and already had trade relations were favorable for MNA 
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activity. The regional agreement like free trade was a big obstacle in flows of MNA. 
whereas agreements concerning to services had positively related to MNA activity. 
Finally, the study revealed that financial market arrangements had a promising role to 
attract these invests in the receiving economies. 
Liu and Zou (2008) Investigated that how much industrial sector of china gained from 
GFDI and MNA through innovation. The study used panel data by dividing industrial 
sector of china into 21 subsectors and time period was from 1997 to 2004. Simple OLS 
was used to check the performance of the firm by innovation and the problem of 
endogeneity was tackled by suing GMM. The study revealed that research and 
development activities of GFDI accelerated the performance of local firms with a link 
of innovation. Furthermore, these benefits were within and between the industries of 
the host country. While the MNA showed the opposite in the same industry. Finally, 
the study pointed out that Greenfield had a negative effect with the interaction of labor 
market as in this case MNEs had faced the competition from a local firm in hiring 
laborers. 
Marinescu and Constantin (2008) compared the two different entry modes (GFDI and 
MNA) of FDI inflow by transnational corporations. The study used panel data of 100 
largest companies with time framework of 2002 to 2006 in Romania. The main 
determinant of GFDI was available resources in the host economy and for MNA, the 
most important element was the information. The present study also showed an 
inclination of Greenfield toward trade and MNA was tended to industry and service 





Neto, Brandão, and Cerqueira (2008) estimated that what is a difference of impact of 
both types of FDI, GFDI and MNA. The study was consisted of a group of 53 countries 
for the time period of 10 years (1996 to 2006). To check causality between FDI, GFDI 
and MNA with economic growth, the study used granger causality test. Results depicted 
that when research had taken overall FDI for analysis, it was concluded that FDI and 
economic growth were positivity related to each other. On the other hand, GFDI and 
MNA showed the mixed results in developed and developing countries. Greenfield FDI 
had a positive impact on receiving country while MNA indicated positive affects to 
developed and negative impact on developing country’s economic growth. 
Slangen and Hennart (2008) investigated whether multinational corporations give some 
preference to choose GFDI or MNA to enter in an economy because of culture distance 
between two countries. The study investigated 171 greenfield investments and MNA in 
35 countries invested by Dutch multinational enterprises. Furthermore, results indicated 
that MNEs when entering in an economy with culturally different country prefer GFDI. 
However, lack of international experience slows down the entry by greenfield mode. 
Finally, another important result that entry decision effected by previous market 
knowledge and working relationship with the host economy through acquisition. 
Estrin, Baghdasaryan, and Meyer (2009) studied the importance of differences of 
institutions and host country’s human resource in decision making, how to enter in a 
country. Panel data of 55 countries those invested in six economies of Asia, Africa and 
Europe was used in this study. Methodology explored that logit model was used by 
taking entry mode as a dummy dependent variable with value “1” for GFDI and “0” for 
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acquisition or other any mode. The result showed a negative effect of previous 
experiences in taking a decision about greenfield investment but not significant. Further 
results indicated that institutions and resource gap between two countries were the main 
cause of selection of GFDI as an entry mode by the investors. 
Y.-H. Kim (2009) examined the economies having the collaboration of policies and 
trade agreements with each other take what stance at the time of investment in selection 
between GFDI and MNA. Study constructed a model by taking three countries into 
account with a multinational firm in every country. An important result of the study 
showed a big shift in preference by selecting the MNA instead of GFDI after 
establishing a free trade area between two countries. Finally, the results presented that 
if the receiver economy had less specialized in technology perspective than the home 
economy, MNCs took the decision of greenfield mode of entry. Further welfare effects 
received by the GFDI were also high for the host country as compared to merger and 
acquisitions. 
Nanda (2009) investigated the growth effect of both types (greenfield FDI, MNA) of 
foreign investment, to check which one of the investment is more beneficial for the host 
economy. The study used the data of 83 countries out of which 65 are developing 
countries. Results of the study explored that GFDI is more advantageous for the host 
country as MNA especially in developing countries. But how the developing countries 
attract and welcomed the foreign investment the picture is different. Developing 
countries encouraged the FDI inflow in the form of MNA and dejected the GFDI. The 
study also discussed the reason behind the aspect of developing countries as the GFDI 
require several clearances from many departments at the government level. Finally, the 
study revealed that the regulation for the MNA seemed very weak. 
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Schiffbauer, Siedschlag, and Ruane (2009) scrutinized whether productivity of the local 
firms in the United Kingdom would enhance by Mergers and Acquisitions or not. To 
achieve this objective, the study used data of 2000 MNA having a time period of nine 
years (1999 to 2007). The results showed that benefits received from MNA were 
different in different industries. As information and communications technology (ICT) 
industries which were involved in manufacturing procedure can get more benefit from 
MNA as compared to the service sector industries. Furthermore, these foreign 
investments effect labor productivity positively while in the case of total factor 
productivity there was no effect. The further, MNA remained incapable in producing 
the technology spillovers and knowledge at the organizational level. 
 Harms and Méon (2011) examine how the growth of host economy is effected by 
greenfield FDI and cross border merges and acquisitions. Data used by the study was 
consist of 80 countries including low-income and middle-income. The time period of 
the study was divided into five year intervals from 1987-2005. Results of the study 
depicted that impact of GFDI on economies under this study was positive and 
significant. On the other hand, MNA had seen without effect or adverse for the 
economy. However, total FDI sowed a positive sign for the growth effect. In addition, 
when investment came in an economy in the form of MNA, the productivity of firm 
increased but competition regarding price faded and adversely effected to host 
economy. 
Bertrand, Hakkala, Norbäck, and Persson (2012) studied the behaviour of GFDI and 
MNA regarding research and development. The study used a unique data of 
multinational enterprises of Sweden by taking 34 countries’ panel over the period of 
1970 to 1998. At firm level, detailed data make this research valuable. Results of the 
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study showed that the multinational enterprises were more interested to provide high 
quality by giving weightage to R&D instead to cut down their expenses in this regard. 
An important result of the research was that MNA gave more attention to R&D due to 
a threat of competition. Greenfield FDI showed a low intensity toward R&D as 
compared to MNA. 
Byun, Lee, and Park (2012) investigated internal and external factors that can influence 
the decision of multinational enterprises, how to enter in the host economy. The study 
included 40 countries in a panel by taking the time period from 1990 to 2009. The study 
mainly obtained three different results, first, political stability effect both GFDI and 
MNA. Secondly, the investment decision was more inclined toward MNA when the 
host country included in the list of emerging market. Thirdly, the emerging countries 
that were financially stable showed a departed behaviour to select MNA. While, GFDI 
in this situation remained more attractive to the emerging economies. 
Chang and Chang (2012) examined the performance of greenfield FDI on assets of the 
shareholders. A sample of data was consisted of 343 announced GFDI over the time 
period of 1989 to 2007. These projects were announced by 289 US firms. Furthermore, 
the sample included developed and developing countries further divided into BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and non-BRIC. Results of the study showed that 
unusual returns were seen in the BRIC countries when this foreign investment enter 
these countries very first time. Short run results revealed that GFDI created valuable 
effects in developing countries. Similarly, in the long run the effects of Greenfield 
remained positive in host economies. In addition, the event studies of this research 
showed that GFDI received unusual returns at the day of project announcement. Harms 
and Méon (2013) studied how economic growth effected when the mode of investment 
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would be in the form of greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisitions. Panel data of 78 
countries was used for the time period of 1987 to 2005 in the Middle East and North 
Africa region. The study tried to explain both theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
difference between the results of these different types of foreign investment. Both 
analyses showed that GFDI remained dominant in its growth effect on receiving 
economy. The reason behind this was explored by a study that GFDI can augment the 
capital stock of host country but MNA had not this kind of effect on the economy. In 
addition, the study also suggests that future research should be done in the context of 
institutional factors, types of FDI and economic growth. 
Nagano (2013) investigated the similarities as well as differences among the 
determinants of greenfield FDI and MNA. Data consisted of Japanese firms investing 
in the Asia-Pacific region for a time period of 1999 to 2009. Results clearly demonstrate 
that intellectual property rights accelerate the inflow of greenfield investment while 
MNA remained unchanged under these protection laws. However, laws for shareholder 
rights had a substantial impact on MNA and firms augment the acquisitions investments 
in this situation of a country. Equally important, increased population and tax rate were 
the major determinants of both types of FDI. 
Zhuang and Griffith (2013) tried to explore the effects of two different types of 
investment greenfield FDI and MNA related to the income inequality. Unbalanced 
panel data was selected from 93 countries, for the time period of 1990 to 2009. A study 
presented that overall FDI augmented the income disparities. In detail, the study also 
gave results by analyzing GFDI and MNA separately. Greenfield FDI had positively 
concerned with income disparities and MNA showed an insignificant relationship with 
income inequality. The study also suggested that Policy makers should carefully handle 
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the effect of income equality when a country is receiving the investment in the form of 
GFDI. Hayali (2014) studied the effects received from brownfield FDI and greenfield 
to an economy regarding development. Data used in this analysis was cross section of 
57 countries over the period of 1990 to 2010.  A sample of the study was taken from 
the Asian and African developing countries. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method was 
adopted to get the results. Furthermore, GFDI could be seen such a type of investment 
that had a direct and positive effect on an economy. While, the matter of MNA was 
different as it had not a direct impact on host country’s economic growth. It required a 
threshold level of human capital to get same results as from GFDI. 
Burger and Ianchovichina (2014) discussed the sharp increase and decrease in the 
inflow of greenfield FDI and merger and acquisition and the factors behind these surges 
and stops. They constructed a unique type of data by taking 95 developing countries 
over the period of 1990 to 2010. A sudden increasing and decreasing trends can be seen 
frequently in GFDI than MNA, especially in developing countries. Further the factors 
behinds these changes in FDI inflow were different. The main factor behind the surges 
in both types of investment was Global liquidity. The elements behind the sudden 
increase in MNA were instability in the economic and financial sector in the host 
economy. 
Antonietti, Bronzini, and Cainelli (2015) tried to investigate the effects of inward GFDI 
in making novelty at the firm level. The study measured the innovative ability of a host 
economy considering patents as a measure of innovation. The study gave an argument 
that patents are given based on the judgment of high experts in the field of invention. 
Therefore, it should be taken as a measure, instead of taking proxies data collected by 
surveys. The business service firms producing intensive knowledge were capable and 
54 
 
seen involve in innovative activity with inward GFDI. The study also confirms that 
innovation in sectors was not equal as in manufacturing sector it was less seen. Service 
sector remained dominated in the field innovation with an inflow of GFDI. 
Appadu et al. (2014) assessed the capability and factors to attract the mergers and 
acquisitions in the host country through developing an index. Panel data of 148 
countries was used for 2006 to 2012. The study also showed the detail of overall top 
100 ranked countries. It was interesting to mention that three Asia countries Korea, 
Singapore and Hong Kong remained in the list of top five ranked countries. While other 
countries of Asia like Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Syria and Bangladesh remained in the lowest 
20 ranked countries in the index. Political stability and advanced technology were the 
preconditions for a country to include itself in a list of mature countries. Finally, the 
factors like infrastructure, assets of a country and suitable environment for economic 
activities played a substantial role to attract the MNA in developing countries. 
Ashraf et al. (2014) studied total factor productivity and its link with two different 
modes of FDI inflow. In an analysis of this study 123 developed and transitional 
countries were included. Panel data with the time period of nine years (2003-2011) was 
used. GFDI looked ineffective regarding total factor productivity in both industrial and 
transitional countries.  
The performance of MNA in developed countries remained appreciable as productivity 
enhancement can be seen through this mode of entry. However, the failure of this mode 
of entry in developing was that, the standard of development required to gain benefits 




Zhang and He (2014) studied the accomplishment of acquisition with an effect of 
economic nationalism in China. In this research time series data of 7275 acquisition 
was used between the time period between 1985 and 2010. Government-owned 
enterprises showed a low figure of completion of activity with incoming acquisition 
due to security restriction imposed by country. Another important result revealed that 
the acquisition came from MNEs which were agreed to transfer technology and 
collaborate with a local firm in boosting their performance appears to be completed. 
Furthermore, the acquisition of friendly countries with China anticipated as beneficial 
for the economic growth of china. Finally, the study claimed that Political and economic 
policies can change the effect received from foreign acquisitions. 
Ashraf and Herzer (2014) tried to manifest the outcomes of investing in the form of 
GFDI and acquisitions. The study had taken a large number of countries’ sample for 
the time period of 2003 to 2011. Unit of analysis was 100 developing countries in which 
both types of investment were the major part of foreign capital inflow. As far as, 
outcomes of Greenfield were concerned this type of investment badly affected the host 
country’s domestic investment. Similarly, MNA also had not positively influenced by 
domestic investment. In the same way, MNA also did not contribute to the growth of 
economies of the receiving countries. While, GFDI favored the developing countries in 
growth perspective but still not at an appreciable level. 
Burger et al. (2015) investigated the institutional factor like the politically instable 
condition of a country how much disturb the level and type of coming investments. The 
study used quarterly data of GFDI of the Middle East and North African countries over 
the time period of 2003 to 2012. Political instability influenced different sectors of an 
economy in which GFDI was coming. Foreign investment in manufacturing and service 
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sector negatively affected by political instability. While the energy sector remained 
unaffected by the adverse political situation in a country. The reason behind this effect 
explained by the study was that when a country faces this type of circumstances, 
become more dependent on resources. The study suggested that institutional factors 
should be investigated in terms of two different type of FDI in developing countries. 
Davies, Desbordes, and Ray (2015) tried to dig out the difference between two 
investments (GFDI and MNA) in manufacturing and service sectors. A unique data was 
used by the study from 2003 to 2010 including developed and developing counties. 
Gross domestic product and countries apart from each other matters in the flow of both 
investments. However, flow looked from developed to developing countries. Although 
manufacturing sector had a substantial share of both types of investment but not more 
than service sector. Furthermore, higher taxes from the host countries cut down the ratio 
of investment. The market size was a vital factor to attract foreign investment and this 
inflow accelerate when the barriers from host country are removed. 
Eren and Zhuang (2015) studied how the growth of a receiving country effected by 
greenfield FDI and acquisitions. Data of the study consisted of 12 countries newly 
member of the European Union and time period from 1999 to 2010. To avoid being 
biased results and to control cross country effect generalized method of moments 
(GMM) was used. The study found overall FDI or disaggregated FDI both had not a 
positive impact. However, different factors like absorptive capacity played a functional 
role to gain positive spillovers from both investments. While a country with the 
developed financial system can receive more benefits from MNA. On the other hand, 
GFDI performs well if a specific country had achieved the threshold level of human 
capital. Furthermore, extensive use of electricity adversely related to that economy 
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which was receiving GFDI. Li and Hattari (2016) examined the determinants of cross 
border merger and acquisitions in developing Asian countries. The study comprised 
panel data of 342 pairs between sender and receiver countries for the time period of 
2000 to 2010. The study explored that in financial crisis 1997, Indonesia and South 
Korea remained the most benefited countries along with Thailand in Asia. Both home 
and host country’s real per capita GDP looked a favourable element of the flow of MNA 
and the direction of this flow remained mainly from advanced to developing Asian 
countries. The study founded two main determinants of MNA after analysis, first the 
global liquidity and other was a major element “risk conditions” associated with the 
host country. 
2.6 Summary  
This chapter reviewed the literature on GFDI, MNA, institutional factors and economic 
growth. Chapter puts light on theories of economic growth as well as foreign 
investment’s theory. Previous and present studies reveal that major determinants of 
economic growth are greenfield FDI, human capital, trade openness and institutional 
factors have its own importance in determining growth especially in developing 
countries. 
The gap from the literature is found that previous studies give a comprehensive work 
on total FDI and economic growth but to see the greenfield FDI and MNA with 
economic growth in selected Asian countries is less discussed. Furthermore, another 
gap is that the intuitional factors (Voice and accountability, Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence, Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of law, 
Control of corruption) are also not checked separately with greenfield FDI and MNA. 
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The contribution of the study regarding investment is that it should have clear from the 
research that the countries can get more benefit from which type of investment whether 
greenfield FDI, or MNA, then the investors have confident to invest in the form of 
greenfield FDI or MNA. Another contribution is relevant to the performance of 
institution in the selected Asian countries as the study will express the situation of 















3.0 Introduction  
The aim of current chapter is to delineate research methodology for the investigation of 
the impact of GFDI and MNA on economic growth with interaction of institutional 
factors in 10 selected countries of Asia. The dependent variable is GDP per capita which 
is used as a proxy for economic growth. There is 6 independent variables named as 
GFDI, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, trade openness, human capital, inflation, 
population growth. Furthermore, along with theoretical framework an econometric 
model is included in this study for examining the positive or negative impact of GFDI 
and MNA on economic growth. The study contributed by checking interaction effect 
of institutional factors (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, Absence of 
Corruption) with both types of FDI separately. 
3.1 Model specification  
 
The current study focuses on the interactive role of institutional factors with segregated 
FDI inflow in the form of Greenfield FDI and MNA on economic growth. Thus, to 
check this interaction between institutional quality and foreign investments a model 
being developed on the base of endogenous growth theory and Romer growth model. 
The model will be used to check the impact of GFDI and MNA in 10 Asian countries 
out of which six countries from lower middle namely Pakistan, India, Indonesia, 
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Srilanka, Philippine and Vietnam, four countries named as China, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
and Thailand are from upper middle-income group. The dependent variable in this study 
is gross domestic product per capita which is used as a proxy for economic growth.  
As far as the independent variables are concerned these are a blend of economic and 
demographic variables like foreign direct investment, GFDI, cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions trade openness, human capital, inflation, population growth. As the main 
aim of the study is to investigate the impact of GFDI and MNA on economic growth 
study developed a model by taking a base from growth model. 
The study further extended this basic concept with the help of Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The study reconstructed and dynamically transformed this model 
into a general production function. 
Y = F (K, L) ………………………………………………………………….(3.1) 
Y (t) = K (t) α (A (t) L (t)) 1- α                   where < α < 1 
Y = output 
K = capital 
L =labor 
A = level of technology 
Labor and level of technology are assumed to grow exogenously at rates c and d: 
L (t) = L (0) ect 
A (t) = A (0) edt 
While the A (0) term reveals not only technology but many other factors like 
institutions, resource grants etc. Therefore, it may be different in different countries 
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(Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1990). On the basis Romer and Barro’s research, 
Borensztein develop a model including total FDI as determinant of economic growth. 
Basic model of (Borensztein et al., 1998) was to investigate the impact of FDI on 
economic growth is as follows: 
 
Yit = αit + α1 FDIit+ α2FDIit *Hit + α3 Hit+ α4 Y0it + α5 Ait + µit …3.2 
Where 
Y= Dependent variable 
FDI = foreign direct investment 
H = stock of human capital 
Y0 = initial GDP per capita 
A = a set of other variables that affect economic growth 
To see the segregated effect of FDI (greenfield FDI and MNA) Nocke and Yeaple 
(2007) develop a model. This model explores that different firms with distinct 
characteristics select different mode of investment like Greenfield investment or MNA. 
Furthermore, application of this model shows firms’ characteristics can influence the 
choice of entry mode. Similar to this, Harms and Méon (2013) develop a model focused 
on impact of greenfield FDI and MNA on economic growth.  
3.2 A Model of Greenfield Investment, MNA and Growth 
 
Greenfield FDI and MNA sales have different growth impacts and possibly interact 
differently with institutional factors. To find the relationship between Greenfield FDI, 
MNA, and economic growth, study follows the basic theme of the models developed 
by Nocke (2007), Wang (2009), Philipp Harms and Méon (2013) model. However, 
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institutional factors are added to make a model as a moderator to sure the novelty of 
work. Furthermore, the study disaggregated total FDI into Greenfield investment and 
MNA to differentiate the effects of two different modes of entry on economic growth. 
The econometric models are as follows: 
Log (Y)it = α it + α1 log(GFDI) it + α2 log(MNA) it + α3 log(DI) it + α4log(HC) it + α5 
log(TO) it +α6 log(POPG) it + α7 log(INF) it + µit…… (3.3) 
Log (Y)it = α it + α1 log(GFDI) it + α2 log(MNA) it + α3 log(DI) it α4 log(GFDI*IF) it + 
α5log(HC) it + α6 log(TO) it +α7 log(POPG) it + α8 log(INF) it + µit…. (3.4) 
Log (Y)it = α it + α1 log(GFDI) it + α2 log(MNA) it + α3 log(DI) it + α4 log(MNA*IF) it   
α5 log(HC) it + α6 log(TO) it +α7 log(POPG) it + α8 log(INF) it + µit…. (3.5) 
Where:  
Yit = Gross demostic product  
DI = Domestic Investment 
GFDI = Greenfield FDI  
POPG = Population growth  
MNA = Merger and Acquisition  
IF = Institutional Factors  
SECENR = Human Capital 
TO = Trade Openness  
INF = Inflation 
µit      = Error term    
The main objective of the study is to determine, which type of FDI (GFDI, MNA) has 




3.3 Definition of institutional factors 
 
There are six governance indicators that can be defined as: 
3.3.1 Voice and accountability  
“Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media”. 
3.3.2 Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
“Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including 
terrorism”. 
3.3.3 Government effectiveness  
“Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies”. 
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3.3.4 Regulatory quality  
“Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”. 
3.3.5 Rule of law  
 “Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”. 
3.3.6 Control of corruption  
 “Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 











Table 3. 1 
 Definition of variables measurement 





GDP per capita (current US$ 
million) represents economic 
growth 
World Development Indicator 
2015 world bank data base and 





Gross capital formation 
(annual % growth) 
World Development Indicator 
2015 world bank data base and 





Value of inward greenfield 
FDI in millions of dollars 
Data of green field FDI is 
constructed by the method 






Value of merger and acquisition 
seller in millions of dollars 




Trade openness Exports of goods and services 
as a % of GDP 
World Development Indicator 
2015 world bank data base and 






Human capital Percentage of Gross secondary 
school enrollment proxy of 
human capital 
World Development Indicator 
2015 world bank data base and 
economic surveys of each 
country 
+ 
Inflation Proxy by Consumer price 
index annual percentage 
World Development Indicator 
2015 world bank data base and 










Population growth (annual %) World Development Indicator 
2015 world bank data base and 
economic surveys of each 
country 
 
World bank. Governance 
indicators/ WGI                             +  
- 




3.4 Data sources 
The present study will use secondary sources of data for analysis. Panel data set of 10 countries 
included in the selection of countries, out of which seven countries from lower middle namely 
Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, Srilanka, Philippine and Vietnam, three countries named 
as China, Malaysia, and Thailand are from upper middle income group. Furthermore, the time 
period for this study consists of 15 years from 2002 to 2016. Data will be collected from world 
development indicator 2016 (WDI) world bank database and also from united nation 
conference on trade and development (UNCTAD).  
The study will also take help regarding data from the economic surveys of all the countries 
include in this research. More importantly, data of greenfield FDI was not available on these 
databases. To sort out this data issue the author adopted the method suggested by Calderon et 
al. (2004) for  the construction of greenfield FDI data. 
3.4.1 Selection of countries  
All countries in the sample of this study mentioned in chapter one are belonging to the middle 
income (lower middle and upper middle income) countries of Asia.  
Middle Income Countries (MICs) are defined as; 
“The countries having GNI per capita of more than $1,045 but less than $12,736”. 
The reason to select this group of income is that when the countries from low income to middle 
income there is a threat called middle income trap. This group consist of more than two third 
population of the world and 70 percent poor people in the world belongs to this group (World 
Bank 2016).  
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Moreover, one third of global GDP comes from middle income countries. To narrow down the 
sample selection, study select Asian middle-income countries as statistics show that regarding 
inflow of FDI (Greenfield FDI, MNA) it remains on top in attracting foreign investment. 
Another reason of selection of these countries is that growth rate in Asian countries is not 
consistent some economies shows upward trend while most selected countries demonstrate 
down ward trend. The middle income countries also have the threat of “middle income trap”. 
(Ozturk, 2015). Lastly, unlike the developed countries in Asia countries, there is an issue of 
data availability of Greenfield FDI. However, study selected the maximum countries in Asia 
having the data of Greenfield FDI. 
3.5 Justification of variables and measurement 
3.5.1 Dependent varible  (Economic growth)  
Economic growth is acknowledged the main objective of every country. The measurement of 
economic growth is attached to many theoretical and practical problems. But normally growth 
rates are used for the measuremnt purpose. Measurement of economic growth continue to rely 
upon the  theoretical framework of the neoclassical economists but some issues in measurement 
are need to be discussed. Economic growth is linked with resource development, advancement 
in technology and formation of capital. This shows that growth cannot be articulated by a single 
measure.  
For measurement, if the output of a country is changed we cannot say that economy of that 
country is performing well and travel to economic growth. Because there is the difference 
between proposed out and actual output and the reason of this difference may be under 
utilization of resources and available technology. 
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Furthermore, the difference between potential and actual growth rates is the cause to think these 
rates as an uncertain measure of economic growth. If it takes the gross national product (GNP) 
as a measure of economic growth, the problem of double counting in the calculation of GNP 
become a big hurdle in considering it as a measure. Another problem of a clear declaration of 
final and intermediate goods is there, as these products are not classified as intermediate or 
final output (Treasury, 1964).  
Another study by Fisher (2005) explores that for the measurement purpose several alternatives 
have been used, for example, the level of education and capital accumulation. But these 
measures are not appropriate as both are the end result of growth. All the above discussion 
guides us to take measurement concept given by new classical school of thought. The new 
classical economist believes that it is better and appropriate to measure the economic growth 
by taking GDP per capita income as a measure.  
3.5.2 Human capital 
There are two proxies widely used for the measurement of human capital.  Years of school 
attainment or high grades achievement both have substantial position as a measure of human 
capital. Several short comings remained attached with these proxies. Firstly, both of measures 
overlooked the quality of schooling. More importantly, education attainment is much 
concerned with the time which a student had spent at school. It is necessary to see schooling 
as a value-added product to become a clear measure of human capital. Another important 
indicator “heath” is also used because it easily measurable.  
The data of child mortality can be used to define health. But the shortcoming of this indicator 
is that nutritional status, maternal education is also related to child mortality. Furthermore, 
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physical health and proportion of illness together are problematic in nature and it is hard to 
measure these indicators (Strauss & Thomas, 1995). Human capital can be measured 
empirically with help of educational quantity explained as years of school attainment. If the 
age of population consider 25 or above and in another sample take 15 years, the findings remain 
the same for the measurement of human capital (Barro, 2001). The age group 15 years or above 
shows better performance especially in the case of developing countries. Educational 
attainment as a measure of human capital considered a good option as the reliable data of 
quantity of education is easily available (Barro & Lee, 2001).  
3.5.3 Foreign direct investment  
The most agreed and practical definition also called operational meaning of FDI is that a type 
of foreign investment represents the interest and aim of investor by  gaining a long term interest 
in a transnational corporation in another economy. The long trem interest reperesents the 
relationship between multinational corporation and the investor. In detail,  the demand of this 
relationship is to get a considerable influnece in that enterprise. Influnce means control on the 
management of MNCs. The requirement for establishing this relationship is that FDI as 
ownership acquired 10 percent of the ordinary shares or voting power in a business enterprise 
operating in a country (Patterson, 2004).  
3.5.4 Trade openness 
Trade ratio (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) is the most common and popular measure 
of the trade openness (Barro, 2001). The data of this measure is easily available for most of the 
countries and it also provide a ground for comparing the cross-country situation. It is also called 






Trade openness can be measured by many other proxies with their shortcomings. Population 
densities are also used to measure the openness. The calculation of this proxy is obtained 
simply divided total population to total are. The reason to take this proxy is that more 
international relations shows that the concerned country has high density. The other measures 
are related to trade restrictions. The tax on trade and tariff barrier are the measure of trade 
barrier and have connection with trade openness. All these measures have measurement errors 
and their own shortcomings. Underestimation of actual tariff is a big hurdle to make it possible 
that tariffs should takes as a good measure (Yanikkaya, 2003).  
The best measure could be an index containing all barriers and average of tariff and non-tariff. 
Many other authors develop openness index but the problem is that data of these indices is not 
available for most of the countries. Coming back to first point, a problem with trade ratio divert 
the attention of the researchers towards a point that it is assimilated with foreign markets 
instead of trade policy aligned. However, trade (Exports of goods and services as a % of GDP 
) is frequently used measure of trade openness as it is a broad measure and availability of data 
is not an issue unlike other measures (David, 2007). 
3.5.5 Inflation 
To measure the inflation there are two main indices, gross national or domestic product deflator 
and consumer price index (CPI). According to World Bank, “consumer price index reflects 
changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that 
may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly”. The Laspeyres index is used to 




∑ =1𝑛𝑗  pjt qj0
∑ =1𝑛𝑗  pj0 qj0
 
Where Lt is the consumer price index and the 0 shows the value of base year, t refers  
to the current year and j refers to the good. Due to change in the selection of base years  
there may be different results received. Another method to measure inflation is GNP deflator. 
But this deflator is not a reliable calculator of inflation as it is basically use for the monetary 
studies as nominal money balance deflator (Alchian & Klein, 1973). Furthermore, CPI is 
broadly used measure of inflation but in some calculation it gives overestimated results like 
cost of living (Shapiro & Wilcox, 1996).  
Furthermore, an effort to calculate the biased results of CPI, considering it as a measure of 
inflation was done by Bryan and Cecchetti. They used a statistical framework to calculate 
weighting bias appeared in CPI. However, these weighting biases that are negligible because 
statically have very low value(Bryan & Cecchetti, 1993). The above discussion shows that CPI 
is the most reliable and widely used measure of inflation. 
3.5.6 Population Growth 
 
Population growth rate is defined as: 
 “The increase in a country’s population during a period, usually one year, expressed as a 
percentage of the population at the start of that period”. It reveals that total number of births in 
one year and deaths in the same period, also including the number of individuals migrating to 
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and from a specific country. The true picture of population growth trend can be seen through 
growth rate in a single year World Bank (2001). 
 
3.5.7 Institutional Factors  
 
Each of six aggregate WGI measures (VA, PS, GE, RQ, ROL, COC) are constructed by 
averaging together data from the original sources that correspond to the concept of governance 
being measured. The six aggregate indicators are reported in two ways: (1) in their standard 
normal units, ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, and (2) in percentile rank terms from 0 
to 100, with higher values corresponding to better governance. 
 
3.6 Panel Data Analysis 
Any data which contains N cross sections and T number of observations is stated as Panel Data. 
For instance, the simple equation for this would be as follows where effect of one independent 
variable “𝑊” on “Z” over the time would be examined: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎 +  𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡……………………………………………………………………………………………………….(3.7) 
Where 𝑍𝑖𝑡 represents the dependent variable for N number of cross sections over the T number 
of periods. Panel data is called balanced panel if all the cross sections are same across the time. 
However, the unbalanced panel means that few of the observation in the data are not available 
across time for all the cross sections. 
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Moreover, in those cases where intercept would not remain same for all the cross sections will 
include some degree of heterogeneity in this panel by relaxing the fact that the constant a must 
be identical for all cross-sections. Following equation describes the situation. However, it may 
also be asked that if intercept varies across cross sections, slope values for individual cross 
sections can also vary. According to Asteriou and Hall (2007) it will require a separate analysis. 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡………………………………………………………………………………………………………….(3.8) 
3.7 Methods of estimation 
Panel data can be analyzed using different methods including panel data estimation using a 
common intercept, using fixed effects estimation or using the panel data estimation with 
random effects.  
3.7.1 Pooled Regression 
If zi contains only a constant term, then ordinary least squares provides consistent and 
efficient estimates of the common α and the slope vector β (Greene, 2003b). furthermore, the 
principal assumption for pool model is cross-sectional dimension should have no differences 
among the data matrices. In the pool model estimation, there is common constant α for all 
cross-sections(Asteriou & Hall, 2007b) 
 
3.7.2 Common Constant Method 
The common constant means that the intercept for the different cross sections do not vary and 
same intercept has been allowed. These cross sections might be companies, countries or other 
entities that can form the panel data. According to (Asteriou and Hall (2007a)) this method 
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assumes that data is priori homogenous means that data includes the similar type countries, 
companies etc. Similar type of companies might be high growth, high income countries or the 
countries from a similar region like European Union etc. Nonetheless, this study intends to 
involve the estimation of fixed effect and random effect models and the selection of the 
appropriate model at the end. 
3.7.3 Fixed Effect Method 
The fixed effect method means that intercept is measured as cross sections specific. In the fixed 
effect method intercepts for each cross section would be reported separately. This case will 
include the model as is presented in the equation 3.2 above. It is a kind of dummy variable 
method because it includes dummy for each cross section to capture the different constant for 
every group. That is why this method is called least square dummy variables (LSDV). 
Following model can better explain the mechanism of the fixed effect estimation in the panel 
data format.  
𝑍𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ … … . 𝛽𝑘𝑊𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . (3.9) 
This can be rewritten as follows: 
𝑍 =  𝑑𝑎 +  𝑊𝛽
′ +  𝑢 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . (3.10) 
In the above equation dummy variable is used for every group to measure the different intercept 
for every cross section. It will provide the group specific estimates for the constants.  
However, the estimation of fixed effect method requires some post estimation tests in order to 
diagnose if the fixed effect method suits.  It can be confirmed by using the standard F -test that 
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will provide the F value. If the F value is greater than the F critical value, the null hypothesis 
of homogeneity of across cross sections will be rejected. In that case, common constant method 
will have rejected and fixed effect method will be applicable. 
𝐹 =  
(𝑅𝐹𝐸
2 − 𝑅𝐶𝐶
2 )/ (𝑁 − 1)
(1 − 𝑅𝐹𝐸
2 )/  (𝑁𝑇 − 𝑁 − 𝐾)
 ~ 𝐹(𝑁 − 1, 𝑁𝑇 − 𝑁 − 𝐾) … … … … … … … … … … . (3.11) 
Where, 𝑅𝐹𝐸2  represents the coefficient of determination for the fixed effect estimation whereas 
the 𝑅𝐶𝐶2  represents the coefficient of the determination for the random effect mode. The null 
hypothesis is the homogeneity of cross section means if the null hypothesis in not rejected 
common constant method will be appropriate.  
3.7.4 Random Effect Model 
Random effect method assumes that intercepts are not fixed across the groups but are random 
parameters. This method is treated as an alternative to the estimation of the fixed effect method. 
Similar to the previous diagnostic, this decision to choose among fixed and random effect will 
depend on the post estimation tests. Hence the variability of the constant for each section comes 
from the fact that: 
𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎 +  𝑣𝑖 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (3.12) 
Where v; is a zero-mean standard random variable. As an outcome, the following random effect 
model can be defined: 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = (𝑎 + 𝑣𝑖) + 𝛽1𝑊1𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑊2𝑖𝑡 +  … … … … … … … … + 𝛽𝑘𝑊𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 … … … . . (3.13) 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑊1𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑊2𝑖𝑡 + … … … … … … … … + 𝛽𝑘𝑊𝑘𝑖𝑡 + (𝑣𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡) … … … … . (3.14) 
Random effect model is based on the assumption about the distribution of random components 
that makes it less attractive. This shortcoming comes in because of the biased and inconsistent 
estimates of random effect in that the disregarded cross section effect might show a relationship 
with regressors. In this case the estimates might prove biased and inconsistent. Nonetheless the 
random effect model brings the certain compensations because it requires lower number of 
parameters as are required in the fixed effect estimation. In addition, it could also come in as 
attractive because it does not hinder the inclusion of the dummies in that it does not restrict the 
additional regressors having equal observation within the cross sections. 
According to Asterio and Hall (2007) using the random effects method requires the careful 
examination on the decision of choosing the most appropriate estimation between fixed effect 
and random effect method. However, the random effect estimation is superior as compared to 
the fixed effect model in that random effect estimation is generalized least square estimator 
whereas the fixed effect model deals only where deviation of individual effect is rather large. 
As mentioned earlier, random effect estimation is based on the assumption of uncorrelated 
regressors (see, for example, Asterio & Hall, 2007). 
 
Besides the arguments given above, both tests should also be seen in terms of their application. 
For instance, random effect model differentiates the cross sections on the basis of error terms 
whereas the fixed effects model is based on the difference in the intercepts across the cross 
sections. Moreover, Asterio and Hall, (2007) stated that fixed effect method suit the balanced 




3.7.5 The Hausman test 
Asterio & Hall, 2007 stated that the decision between the choice of random effect method or 
fixed effect method can be made up based on the Hausman test1. Given the estimates of fixed 
effect method, the results under the random effect method are analyzed if they are as good as 
got under the fixed effect method. The Hausman test examines the null hypothesis that random 
effect estimates are consistent against the alternative hypothesis that estimates from random 
effect are not consistent See, for example (Ahn & Moon, 2014; Asteriou & Hall, 2007a; 
Hausman, 1978). 
The following equation explains the test:  
𝐻 = (?̂?𝐹𝐸 −  ?̂?𝑅𝐸)′[𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̂?𝐹𝐸) − 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (?̂?𝑅𝐸)]
−1
(?̂?𝐹𝐸 −  ?̂?𝑅𝐸)′~ 𝑥2(𝑘) … … . (3.15) 
In case the estimates of Hausman test show significant results, it means that null hypothesis of 
consistent estimates of random effect model would be rejected. On contrary, insignificant 
results states that null hypothesis of consistent random effects cannot be rejected.  
                                                          
1 Hausman (1978) test states that according to null hypothesis of zero correlation, the estimates from ordinary 
least square or generalized least square are consistent however, ordinary least square estimates may not be 
efficient. On contrary, under the alternative hypothesis ordinary least square is consistent while the generalized 




EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
4.0 Introduction  
This chapter four presents the findings of the empirical tests applied on the variables selected 
for this study and discussion of these results. The focus of the research is to find the effect of 
greenfield foreign direct investment, merger and acquisition and institutions on economic 
growth in ten Asian countries. The results present that institutions play a vital role to change 
the effect of greenfield FDI and merger and acquisitions towards economic growth in selected 
countries of Asia. The voice and accountability has a negative impact on the greenfield FDI 
performance to enhance economic growth. While the political stability has positive impact on 
to achieve economic growth by GFDI. In selected Asian countries control of corruption shows 
a positive impact on economic growth means “grease the wheels” rule is applicable. While, 
regulatory quality is negatively related to economic growth achieved by GFDI. In addition, 
government effectiveness and control of corruption both have positive impact on economic 
growth when interacting with MNA. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Descriptive statistics of data is used to define the basic features of dataset such as  mean, 
median, and mode are the three measures of central tendency of a random variable (Gujarati, 
2004). The key aspect of descriptive statistics is to present quantitative descriptions of the data 
in a manageable form like table. Thus, descriptive statistics are estimated for all the variables 
included in the model.  
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Table 4. 1 
 Descriptive Statistics of variables 
   Variable   Mean  Maximum  Minimum Std. Dev.  Obs  
GDP 2.9492 11.3070 0.4771 2.4724 150 
GFDI 21.574 268.571 -4.061 53.014 150 
MNA 2.3890 54.9126 -4.967 5.8238 150 
DI 3.337 4.063 2.640 9.2904 150 
TO 43.502 115.373 8.6945 26.226 150 
INF 5.9101 25.0566 -0.895 4.6182 150 
POPG 1.2514 2.12084 0.1427 0.5228 150 
SECENR 19.457 119.400 0.2759 30.044 150 
VA 2.5318 3.45026 1.3127 0.6510 150 
PS 3.2809 5.10953 1.1936 0.9050 150 
GE 1.9725 3.23873 1.1876 0.4667 150 
RQ 1.8078 2.83654 1.1239 0.3715 150 
ROL 1.7445 2.64048 1.0252 0.3951 150 
COC 2.5356 3.47679 1.8660 0.3262 150 
Note: GDP= Gross domestic product; GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic 
Investment; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School 
Enrolment; VA= Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; 
RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption. 
 
 
Table 4.1 depicts the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables taken by the 
present research. In this study, dependent variable is GDP per capita whereas, GFDI, MNA, 
TO, POPG, INF, SECENR and six institutional factors (VA, PS, GE, RQ, ROL and COC) are 
used as independent variables. These six variables are taken as to identify the interaction effect 
or simultaneous influence of these variables and GFDI, MNA on economic growth of selected 
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countries in Asia. Table 4.1 shows that TO has the highest means value 43.50 although GFDI 
show the second highest average value 21.57. The mean value of GDP is 2.9. 
The average population growth rate is 1.254 percent for whole sample size of countries, 
although peak value for growth of population is 2.12 percent and lowest percentage of 
population growth is 0.1428. The other macroeconomic variables like inflation have average 
rate 5.19 for over entire group of countries, however highest values accounted for 25 percent, 
and lowest -0.9 percent which could be considered as monotonic and should leave as they are 
(Sarel, 1996). The average value for secondary school enrolments is 19.29 million while the 
minimum value of school enrolment is 0.27 million while the maximum value is 119 million. 
The descriptive statistic of institutional factors show that PS has highest mean value 2.28. 
4.2 Multicollinearity Analysis 
Multicollinearity is a related to the set of regressors variables excluding the account that 
existence of dependence between regressors and dependent variable (Farrar & Glauber, 1967). 
As far as the detection of multicollinearity among independent variables is concerned, it is 
frequently determined by using two measures firstly, by pairwise high correlation between two 
independent variables. Secondly, large variance inflating factors (VIF) value (Mansfield & 
Helms, 1982). Variance inflating factor is a measure of the degree to which the variance of the 
OLS estimator is inflated because of the collinearity. Complementary to this, the inverse of 







Table 4. 2  
Correlation Matrix  
 GDP GFDI  MNA DI  TO POPG SECENR INF 
GDP 1        
GFDI  0.2929 1       
MNA 0.1771 0.5939 1      
DI  0.1417 0.5442 0.3865 1     
TO 0.3873 -0.122 -0.1691 0.062 1    
POPG -0.3255 -0.4217 -0.2249 -0.341 -0.1965 1   
SECENR -0.1902 0.6213 0.446 0.1562 -0.4734 -0.1031 1  
INF -0.3466 -0.1914 -0.1097 0.0926 -0.1778 0.2302 -0.095 1 
Note: GDP= Gross domestic product; GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic 




Pairwise correlations indicate that a problem of multicollinearity exists when two independent 
variables are highly correlated and value for coefficient of correlation exceed or meet 0.90 
(Gujarati, 2004; Mansfield & Helms, 1982). The correlation matrix presented in table 4.2, 
indicates that there is absence of multicollinearity among regressors. The highest value in this 
matrix is 0.6213 which shows a correlation between GFDI and SECENR.  
The second highest value is 0.5939 demonstrate the correlation between GFDI and MNA. 
While another higher value for correlation -0.4734 exists showing the relationship between TO 
and SECENR. All these apparently high values in Table 4.2 are in safe area. As the yardstick 
value for multicollinearity is 0.90. Therefore, it may be called that there is no multicollinearity 




Table 4. 3 
 Multicollinearity Diagnostic Test: VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
GFDI 3.22 0.310394 
MNA 1.61 0.621128 
DI 1.72 0.580308 
TO 1.5 0.667452 
POPG 1.38 0.727015 
SECENR 2.37 0.421578 
INF 1.21 0.82545 
Note: GDP= Gross domestic product; GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade 




According to the rule of thumb of O’brien (2007) which is most commonly used in research is 
the “rule of 10” which means that VIF value should not be more than 10. The highest value of 
VIF in this calculation is 3.22 for GFDI showing that it is less than the threshold level value 
for multicollinearity. In Table 4.3 all the VIF values are less than 10 showing the absences of 
multicollinearity in dataset of these variables. 
4.3 Homoscedasticity Analysis 
In classical linear regression model (CLRM) it is assumed that in a regression model 
disturbance should be spherical, means that error term ui has uniform variance across 
observation and are not correlated with one another. If disturbances have same variance it is 
said to be the case of homoscedasticity. On the contrary, non-uniform variance of the 
disturbance affix a problem with itself called heteroscedasticity (D. Gujarati; Kennedy, 2003). 
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Furthermore, to detect heteroscedasticity the most common methods used in research are the 
Breusch-Pugan and white tests. Thus, present study used Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test to find 
the heteroscedasticity in the dataset of 10 selected Asian countries.  
The criteria to decide the presence of heteroscedasticity is that the value of p is greater than 
0.05 (p>0.05) depicts absence of heteroscedasticity means that null hypothesis will be rejected 
which is there is heteroscedasticity. Complementary to this, if p value is less than 0.05 (p<0.05), 
allows us to do not reject null hypothesis which is about existence of heteroscedasticity. 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey has outcomes which is found to be significant at p<0.05 supports the 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the model of present study. 
Table 4. 4 
 Heteroscedasticity Test 
Test Statistic  DF Pr > ChiSq 
Breusch-Pagan 4.74 1 0.0295 
Note: If P, Value < 0.05 (or your chosen alpha value); you reject the null and infer the presence of 
heteroskedasticity 
 
If the sample size is large it is suggested that this problem can be rectified by using White’s 
Heteroscedasticity-consistence standard errors also knowns as robust standard errors (D. 
Gujarati). Another essential point, this test is more appropriate test to remove heteroscedasticity 
from data if model is fixed effects (Greene, 2003a). Furthermore, these standard errors are 
asymptotically valid in the presence of any kind of heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Therefore, the White's corrected standard errors provide us with a better and more accurate 
estimation. (Asteriou & Hall, 2007a). 
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4.4 Auto-Correlation Analysis 
The assumption regarding autocorrelation in classical linear regression model (CLRM) is that 
the error terms should be uncorrelated. One error term is not related to error term at time (t – 
1) or any other term in the past. To see the presence of autocorrelation two commonly used test 
are Durbin-Watson (DW) and Breusch-Godfrey LM test. However, DW test has several 
drawbacks such as it may give results inconclusive and unable to detect higher orders of serial 
correlation (Breusch & Pagan, 1980; Debarsy & Ertur, 2010). Therefore, present study use 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test which is most appropriate for serial correlation. The dataset of ten 
selected Asian countries has problem of autocorrelation, in detail, the LM test have p value less 
than 0.05 as the null hypothesis for autocorrelation do not be rejected.  
Table 4. 5 
 Lagrange Multiplier Test (LM)  
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test  
F-statistic 178.9614 
P-value  0.000 
Note: The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test is that there is no serial correlation in 
the residuals up to the specified order. 
 
The autocorrelation problem is tackled by White cross-section clustered estimator. The 
estimator is designed to accommodate arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within cross-section 
serial correlation. This method is the most appropriate to remove autocorrelation problem 




4.5 Two Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable estimation for endogeneity 
 
Endogeneity issue depicts there is a correlation between some of the explanatory variables and 
the error term of corresponding equation. We have checked the endogeneity of GFDI and MNA 
collectively called FDI. The results of Durbin and Wu-Hausman test show that endogeneity 
problem exit in the model. The problem could be tackled by using instrumental variable or by 
lag value of FDI. 
 
 While the study control for the endogeneity problem by using instrumental variable approach 
proposed by (Alfaro et al., 2004; Borensztein et al., 1998). The study used real exchange rate, 
voice and accountability and government effectiveness as instruments for disaggregated FDI. 
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation was done by using instruments to tackle the 
problem of endogeneity. Furthermore, the results of the endogeneity, use of weak instrument 
and over identification are shown in appendix B.  
 
4.6 Panel Data Analysis 
Several methods of estimation (linear) panel regression models, such as common effects, fixed 
effects and random effects can be used for analysis in dataset of ten selected Asian countries. 
But to search the most appropriate model different selection tests are applied. To choose 
between the common and fixed effect, redundant fixed effect test is performed. In the selection 




4.7 Selection among pool model, fixed effects and random effects model  
 
The outcomes of redundant fixed effect test reject the null hypothesis of pool model and do not 
reject the alternate. So, the fixed is appropriate for the dataset of this study. For further selection 
between fixed effects and random effects a test is performed named as Hausman test. Selection 
criteria for decision is p-value <0.05, and for Hausman test, study test H0, the random effects 
are appropriate and H1, the fixed effects are consistent and efficient (Asteriou & Hall, 2007a).  
Here in the present study, the results of Hausman test reject the null hypothesis and do not 
reject the alternate, recommends that fixed effect model is more appropriate for the following 
analysis. Accordingly, to analyse the panel dataset of ten selected Asian countries fixed effects 
are consistent and efficient. 
Table 4. 6  
Redundant fixed effect test, Hausman test 







                          0.0000 
 
                          0.000 
 
Test name    Cross-section random Chi-Sq. d.f.      P vale 
   
Hausman test 45.428741 
 
   7                        0.000 
Note: If the difference between the estimates is significant, so we reject the null hypothesis that the random 
effects model is consistent and we use the fixed effects estimators.  
 
4.8 Empirical results  
To empirically evaluate the role played by greenfield FDI and merger and acquisition to 
achieve economic growth the model will be estimated by applying panel data techniques. The 
problem of panel data like endogeneity is removed by using instrumental variables.  
87 
 
The other problem of panel data such as heteroscedasticity and auto correlation is corrected by 
applying FGLS (White cross-section) because this method is more appropriate to rectify the 
data problem like heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. Feasible GLS is a transformed 
version of OLS and asymptotically more efficient than OLS (Wooldridge, 2010).  
4.8.1 The Results of Fixed effect estimation  
Table 4.7 presents the results of Fixed effect estimation on the relationship greenfield foreign 
direct investment, merger and acquisition, institutions and economic growth. To do analysis 
the present study determine that fixed effect model is more appropriate which is the result of 
several selection tests. The effect of greenfield foreign direct investment and merger and 
acquisition is measured on economic growth for ten Asian countries with interactive effects of 
institutions.  
To get the results of these foreign investments the fixed effects model is applied. The next 














Table 4. 7 Panel data estimations (fixed- effect estimations) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
GFDI 0.2810 1.4165 0.1590 
MNA 0.1815 3.7184 0.0003* 
DI 0.3884 0.9430 0.3474 
TO -0.7433 -3.7602 0.0003* 
INF -0.0056 -0.4095 0.6828 
POPG -0.1019 -1.0569 0.2924 
SECENR 1.0314 2.1262 0.0353** 
R-squared 0.7804   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7540   
F-statistic 29.5543   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
N 150   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; *, **, *** denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, Dependent variable GDP. 
 
 
Table 4.7 show that F-statistics and its probability value is significant means that the whole 
model is significant. Table depicts that MNA, TO and SECENR have significant relationship 
with economic growth of ten selected Asian countries. Whereas GFDI, DI, POPG and INF 
show insignificant relationship with economic growth. In whole table, the only single 
significant negative value for TO show that it is negatively affixed with the economic growth. 
The results show that coefficient of GFDI have positive sing but with insignificant probability 
value. It means that GFDI has not a significant impact on economic growth in the selected 
Asian countries.  The study’s findings are consistent with many studies (Calderon et al., 2004).  
state that neither type of FDI show a positive impact to economic growth in developing as well 
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as industrial countries. Another study claims that different experiences from developing 
countries suggest that FDI and trade, by themselves, may not guarantee economic growth. 
Institutional stability and good macroeconomic policies can affect the country’s economic 
growth (Makki & Somwaru, 2004). Furthermore, FDI is a positive contributor to the economy 
but in Pakistan it has not contributed much to the economic growth this could be due less 
developed infrastructure and human resource (Falki, 2009). 
 Similarly, possible reason of current study’s results is that the countries have not such an 
absorptive capacity to gain the positive effect of foreign investment on economic growth or the 
level of education is not at the level to gain the required results. As it is claimed that an 
availability of absorptive capacity can play a role to accelerate the economic growth of host 
country. Different types of FDI have different effect on the economy but GFDI and MNA do 
not have significant positive impact on the host countries. Additionally, to gain positive effect 
from GFDI a minimum threshold level of human capital is needed (Eren & Zhuang, 2015). 
The results of the current study show that the MNA has positive coefficient value with 
significant probability vale means that it is positively related to the economic growth in these 
countries. It shows that one percent increase in MNA have 0.18 percent increase in GDP of 
selected Asian countries. The results show that MNA is that type of investment which can 
positively influence the economic growth in Asian countries. In developing host economies 
MNA can derive substantial positive impact, as this type of investment involve cross-border 
capital transfers that is a big source of total investible funds available to receiving economies. 
Furthermore, the economies with low investment can get more profit from MNA if it induces 
sequential and associated FDI by the acquiring companies. The MNA is also a source of 
transfer technology like GFDI in host economies that do not possess these types of advance 
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technology. The MNA may introduce managerial innovative practices in the host economy and 
it is easy for a country to involve in global marketing networks. 
The results of the study are consistent with previous studies, as Chen and Findlay (2003) state 
that Foreign affiliates established through MNA may easily adopt new technology because they 
already have the capability to absorb advance technology. Additionally, diffusion of 
technology is speedily due to stronger linkage between two affiliates. Furthermore, Liu, Shu, 
and Sinclair (2009) claim that FDI inflows and inward MNA are the substantial elements to 
accelerate economic growth in Asian countries. It is also found by another study that both GFDI 
and MNA contribute positively to enhance economic growth (Luu, 2016). 
The findings show that the coefficient of DI is positive but the results is not significant. It shows 
that DI do not accelerate the economic growth in Asian countries. One of the possible reason 
of the result is that the insignificance of DI might be due to small nature of private capital in 
the host economy or the country has been dominated by other sector of investment like 
government sector over the years. The other rational behind this result is that the domestic firm 
has low capability to compete the advance technology owned firms and may not be beneficial 
to economic growth. The results of the current study are consistent with other studies. Makki 
and Somwaru (2004) find that coefficients for domestic investment is statistically insignificant 
that means the domestic investment do not contributes positively to economic growth. 
Furthermore, both private capital and foreign investment have small and not a statistically 
significant effect on the economic growth (Akinlo, 2004). The reason of insignificant impact 
of domestic investment is that the domestic investors may lack the ability to compete with more 
efficient foreign companies(Acar, Eris, & Tekce, 2012). 
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The result of trade openness is negatively significant means that impact of TO is not positive 
on economies of these Asian countries. The relationship between TO and economic growth has 
been theoretically controversial, some theoretical studies claim TO, is not always beneficial to 
economic growth. As the theoretical studies by Redding (1999) Young (1991) claims that TO 
openness due to comparative advantage in term of potential productivity growth in an economy 
might be welfare reducing element.  
The results of the are consistent with previous studies like Makki and Somwaru (2004)  
estimated that the co-efficient for trade is not statistically significant, means that TO is not 
contributing economic growth. Another study points out that there is non-linear pattern 
between trade openness and growth. The low-quality export is considered the main cause of 
insignificant of TO on economic growth. Additionally, TO may  enhances growth in those 
countries which have specialized in high quality products (Huchet-Bourdon, Le Mouël, & Vijil, 
2011). In the same way, all types of TO measures, named as real openness, current openness, 
and fraction of liberalization are checked but all are not significantly associated with economic 
growth (Ulaşan, 2015). Similarly, the findings of  a study support the view that there is non-
linear relationship between TO and economic growth (Zahonogo, 2017). 
While numerical value of coefficient of SECENR depicts its impact on GDP. This beta value 
implies that increase in SECENR has a substantial positive impact to make economic growth 
well. Numerically, one percent change in SECENR stood change in GDP by 1.03 percent. 
Present results of the study are also consistent with previous studies. Human capital investment 
in less-developed areas contributes to economic growth(Fleisher, Li, & Zhao, 2010). 
Furthermore, human capital is an important instrument to accelerate economic growth 
(Hanushek & Woessmann, 2012; Siddiqui & Rehman, 2017). 
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4.9 Fixed effect estimation 
Fixed effect estimation is used to check the interaction effect of institutional factors on the 
relationship of greenfield FDI and economic growth in ten selected Asian countries. The data 
set for this analysis has problem of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation which is tackled by 
using FGLS White-Cross estimation. Baron and Kenny (1986) stated that a directional change 
and/or strength of the interaction terms (regressors * independent variable) are studied to find 
the presence of interaction effect on relationship of regressors and dependent variable in the 
model.  
4.9.1 The interaction of six institutional factors on the relationship of greenfield FDI 
(GFDI) and economic growth in ten selected Asian countries. 
Institutions have a protruding rule to economic growth of a country. Good institutions with 
better governance play a role to attract foreign investment that subsequently influence 
economic growth. Additionally, institutions have capability interact the effect of main 
determinants of growth like FDI. Furthermore, institutions and governance improve the 
development performance (Fayissa & Nsiah, 2013). Similarly, good institutions can directly 
affect the inflow of FDI in developing counties and without good governance economic growth 
stand on a vulnerable position (Asiedu, 2013).  
4.9.1.1 The interaction Effect of VA on the Relationship of greenfield FDI and GDP in 
ten Asian countries. 
To detect the interaction effect of voice and accountability (VA) to relationship between 
greenfield FDI and economic growth in ten Asian countries following model has been tested. 
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Table 4. 8  
The interaction Effect of voice and accountability 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 1.0981 6.0449 0.0000* 
MNA 0.1655 3.4378 0.0008* 
DI 0.3213 0.8425 0.4011 
TO -0.8539 -5.1982 0.0000* 
POPG 0.0537 0.5538 0.5806 
SECENR 0.8124 2.2092 0.0289** 
INF -0.0047 -0.3881 0.6986 
VA  5.976 3.2450 0.0121** 
GFDI*VA -0.7862 -3.1583 0.0020* 
R-squared 0.8109 
  






Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 




To detect the interaction effect of voice and accountability (VA) to relationship between 
greenfield FDI and economic growth in ten Asian countries following model has been tested. 
The table 4.8 presents that in this model GFDI has positive beta sign and it is statistically 
significant. The main variable in this model is VA, having negative sign and statistically 
significant, when the interaction effect is applied in the form of GFDI*VA. The interaction 
effect institutional factor namely voice an accountability (VA) in the form of GFDI*VA in this 
model has proved. It is negative and statistically significant means that the relationship between 
GFDI and economic is weaker with interaction of VA. 
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4.9.1.2 The interaction Effect of PS on the Relationship of greenfield FDI and GDP in ten Asian 
countries. 
Table 4. 9  
Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 0.9903 1.7102 0.0896* 
MNA 0.1976 4.4894 0.0000* 
DI 0.4471 1.1001 0.2733 
TO -0.7762 -4.2722 0.0000 
POPG -0.0151 -0.1443 0.8855 
SECENR 0.7622 2.0333 0.0440 
INF -0.0093 -0.7920 0.4298 
PS  4.156 1.256 0.344 
GFDI*PS -0.5258 -1.0411 0.2998 
R-squared 0.7884   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7594   
F-statistic 27.1236   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 




To estimate the interaction effect of Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS) on 
relationship between greenfield FDI and economic growth in ten Asian countries a model has 
been tested. In table 4.9 sign of this core variable with its interaction (GFDI*PS) is negative 
but the results are not significant. 
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4.9.1.3 The interaction Effect of GE on the Relationship of greenfield FDI and GDP in 
ten Asian countries. 
The main purpose of this model is to distinguish the impact of greenfield FDI on GDP with or 
without applying interaction (GFDI* GE) in Asian selected countries. In this model, interacting 
Table 4. 10  
The interaction Effect of Government Effectiveness  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI -0.1614 -0.4397 0.6609 
MNA 0.1715 3.7012 0.0003 
DI 0.3845 0.9639 0.3369 
TO -0.7308 -4.1338 0.0001 
POPG -0.0870 -0.8717 0.3850 
SECENR 0.7944 2.2306 0.0274 
INF -0.0021 -0.1887 0.8506 
GE -6.4528 -1.0411 0.1034 
GFDI*GE 0.7460 1.7065 0.0903 
R-squared 0.7936   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7652   
F-statistic 27.9821   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 
GFDI*VA=Interaction terms; *, **, *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, Dependent 
variable GDP. 
 
variable has positive sign with significant result. The meaning of this result is that the 
institutional factor GE has a statistically significant effect on the relationship of GFDI and 
GDP. Furthermore, it may be said that one percent change in GE could change the impact of 
GFDI on the economic growth .74 percent. The GE is positively accelerating the impact of 




4.9.1.4 The interaction Effect of RQ on the Relationship of greenfield FDI and GDP in 
ten Asian countries. 
Table 4. 11 
 The interaction Effect of Regulatory Quality 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 0.7955 2.8537 0.0050* 
MNA 0.1473 3.5355 0.0006* 
DI 0.4613 1.1121 0.2681 
TO -0.7962 -3.6680 0.0004* 
POPG -0.1362 -1.4627 0.1459 
SECENR 1.0507 2.1246 0.0355 
INF -0.0059 -0.4764 0.6345 
RQ 7.9545 1.2560 0.0195 
GFDI*RQ -0.9100 -2.6910 0.0081* 
R-squared 0.7892   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7603   
F-statistic 27.2582   
Prob(F-statistic) 0   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 




In this model study, has checked the interaction effect of regulatory quality on relationship of 
greenfield FDI and economic growth in ten Asian countries. When interaction term GFDI*RQ 
applied results show that the probability values for is significant. It means that RQ is negatively 




4.9.1.5 The interaction Effect of ROL on the Relationship of greenfield FDI and GDP in 
ten Asian countries. 
Table 4. 12 
 The interaction Effect of Rule of Law  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 0.267634 0.954291 0.3417 
MNA 0.144753 2.433983 0.0163 
DI 0.267606 0.776433 0.4389 
TO -0.668069 -3.25318 0.0015 
POPG 0.062904 0.747504 0.4561 
SECENR 1.204091 2.43688 0.0162 
INF -0.016555 -1.262932 0.2089 
ROL -3.854 -2.356 0.0762 
GFDI*ROL 0.203912 0.772025 0.4415 
R-squared 0.81117   
Adjusted R-squared 0.785224   
F-statistic 31.26367   
Prob(F-statistic) 0   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 






Table 4.12 depicts that effect of interaction (GFDI*ROL) on the relationship between GFDI 
and GDP has checked. In detail, the sign of rule of law (ROL) is positive means that it is 
positively related to the dependent variable but this result is not significant. Furthermore, the 
results show that ROL just has the positive value but insignificant result means that this 




4.9.1.6 The interaction Effect of COC on the Relationship of greenfield FDI and GDP in ten Asian 
countries. 
Table 4. 13  
The interaction Effect of Control of Corruption 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI -0.4427 -0.9580 0.3398 
MNA 0.1667 3.6609 0.0004 
DI 0.3917 0.9655 0.3361 
TO -0.6932 -3.2843 0.0013 
POPG -0.0730 -0.8008 0.4247 
SECENR 1.0454 2.1306 0.0350 
INF -0.0111 -0.9290 0.3546 
COC  -8.5218 -2.5421 0.0092 
GFDI*COC 0.8344 2.3642 0.0195 
R-squared 0.7898   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7609   
F-statistic 27.3414   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 






To estimate interaction capability of an important variable from institutional factors, control of 
corruption (COC), on the relationship of greenfield FDI and GDP a model has been tested on 
the data set of ten Asian countries.  
 
To estimate interaction capability of an important variable from institutional factors, control of 
corruption (COC), on the relationship of greenfield FDI and GDP a model has been tested on 
the data set of ten Asian countries.  
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The interaction (GFDI*COC) is applied in the model produced a positive change. Therefore, 
interaction term used in the model proves its interaction effect. Another meaning of the result 
is that interaction effect of COC strengthen the relation between GFDI and economic growth 
in ten selected Asian countries. Specifically, one percent change in COC can change the effect 
of GFDI on economic growth by 0.83 percent in selected Asian countries. 
4.10 The interaction of six institutional factors on the relationship of merger and 
acquisition (MNA) and economic growth in ten selected Asian countries. 
The present study separately checked the moderating role of merger and acquisition on the 
relationship of MNA and economic growth in ten selected Asian countries. Luu (2016) states 
that MNA have the capacity to accelerate economic growth. Similarly, it can play a positive 
role particularly in high-tech industries (Yang, Wei, & Chiang, 2014).  
Furthermore, MNA is  a channel of productivity growth, as it involves the restructuring of 
domestic firms (Stepanok, 2015). While Jude and Levieuge (2013) claim that alone FDI is not 
sufficient to effect economic growth. Similarly, Eren and Zhuang (2015) stated that without  
developed financial MNA do not have their own effect on economic growth.  





4.10.1 The interaction Effect of VA on the Relationship of merger and acquisition and 
GDP in ten Asian countries. 
Table 4. 14  
The interaction Effect of Voice and Accountability 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 0.3144  1.5270 0.1292 
MNA 0.3197  2.7816 0.0062* 
DI 0.2069  0.5612 0.5756 
TO -0.7491  -3.7810 0.0002* 
POPG 0.0825  0.8798 0.3806 
SECENR 1.2231  2.3563 0.0199** 
INF -0.0052  -0.3764 0.7072 
VA -0.114  -2.0563 0.9234 
MNA*VA -0.1412  -1.1884 0.2368 
R-squared 0.7893    
Adjusted R-squared 0.7603    
F-statistic 27.2552    
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000    
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 




The table 4.14 presents the interacting variable voice and accountability has been checked 
whether its effect changes the strength of relationship between MNA and GDP. The sign of 
interacting variable is negative and probability value is insignificant. The application of 
interaction remained in vain in this model.  
As the result, may be interpreted as to say that interaction effect of VA has no statistically 
significant effect on the relationship of MNA and GDP in ten selected Asian countries. 
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4.10.2 The interaction Effect of PS on the Relationship of merger and acquisition and 
GDP in ten Asian countries. 
Table 4. 15  
The interaction Effect of Political Stability 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 0.2814 1.3078 0.1932 
MNA -0.6867 -1.8219 0.0708*** 
DI 0.5107 1.1531 0.2510 
TO -0.7437 -3.5776 0.0005* 
POPG -0.0795 -0.7653 0.4455 
SECENR 0.9561 1.8388 0.0682*** 
INF -0.0097 -0.7701 0.4426 
PS -7.296 -0.5632 0.01311 
MNA*PS 0.8125 2.3574 0.0199** 
R-squared 0.7848   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7552   
F-statistic 26.5358   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 
GFDI*VA=Interaction terms; *, **, *** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, Dependent 
variable GDP. 
 
Political stability and absence of violence is an interacting variable in this model presented in 
table 4.15. The effect of this term has checked to interact the relationship between MNA and 
economic growth. The result of this model reveals that interaction term (MNA*PS) has positive 
sign with significant probability value.  
In detail when PS is interacted to MNA to check its interaction effect, result shows that after 
combined these variables the sign of interaction term is positive. implying that one percent 
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change in PS could change 0.81 percent positively the effect of MNA on GDP in ten selected 
Asian countries. 
4.10.3 The interaction Effect of GE on the Relationship of merger and acquisition and 
GDP in ten Asian countries. 
 
Table 4. 16  
The interaction Effect of Government Effectiveness  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 0.2584 1.2246 0.2229 
MNA 0.0083 0.0364 0.9710 
DI 0.3790 0.8957 0.3721 
TO -0.7513 -3.9928 0.0001* 
POPG -0.0970 -0.9863 0.3258 
SECENR 1.0861 1.9879 0.0489*** 
INF -0.0033 -0.2842 0.7767 
GE -1.5246 -0.325 0.6365 
MNA*GE 0.2289 0.6728 0.5023 
R-squared 0.7821   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7522   
F-statistic 26.1233   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 




To check the interaction effect of government effectiveness on the relationship of MNA and 
economic growth a model has been tested.  
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The results for interaction term shows positive value moreover the situation for the probability 
value remains insignificant. The results show that in this model interaction MNA*GE has no 
capacity to change the effect of MNA on GDP in the selected sample. 
 
4.10.4 The interaction Effect of RQ on the Relationship of merger and acquisition and 
GDP in ten Asian countries. 
Table 4.17 shows that regulatory quality is used as interacting variable in this model.  
Table 4. 17  
The interaction Effect of Regulatory Quality  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 0.2715 1.2909 0.1990 
MNA 0.6490 1.5142 0.1324 
DI 0.4063 0.9576 0.3400 
TO -0.7526 -3.8250 0.0002* 
POPG -0.1004 -1.0123 0.3133 
SECENR 1.0665 2.1576 0.0328** 
INF -0.0059 -0.4583 0.6475 
RQ 6.5676 2.1695 0.3145 
MNA*RQ -0.7634 -1.0782 0.2829 
R-squared 0.7825   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7526   
F-statistic 26.1793   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 





When the interaction of RQ and MNA is applied the value of coefficient become negative, but 
it is statistically not significant. It means that RQ has no capacity of interaction effect between 
MNA and economic growth. 
 
4.10.5 The interaction Effect of ROL on the Relationship of merger and acquisition and 
GDP in ten Asian countries. 
To detect the interaction effect of rule of law on the relationship between MNA and GDP, a 
model has been tested as shown in table 4.18. 
Table 4. 18  
The interaction Effect of Rule of Law 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 0.3675 1.6821 0.0949*** 
MNA -0.1246 -0.6781 0.4989 
DI 0.2601 0.7708 0.4422 
TO -0.6820 -3.1844 0.0018 
POPG 0.0622 0.7520 0.4534 
SECENR 1.1850 2.4265 0.0166 
INF -0.0162 -1.2482 0.2142 
ROL  -6.6968 -0.563 0.0068 
MNA*ROL 0.5296 1.8747 0.0631**** 
R-squared 0.8117   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7859   
F-statistic 31.3787   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 






The value of β coefficient for the interaction of ROL and MNA is positive and statistically 
significant. The results depict that interaction effect is positive on the relationship between 
MNA and economic growth. In detail, one percent change in ROL may change the impact of 
MNA 0.52 percent on GDP of selected sample of the countries. This institutional factor proves 
its interaction effect on the relation between MNA and economic growth of selected Asian 
countries.  
4.10.6 The interaction Effect of COC on the Relationship of merger and acquisition and 
GDP in ten Asian countries. 
Table 4. 19 
 The interaction Effect of Control of corruption  
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
GFDI 0.3117 1.3982 0.1644 
MNA -0.8045 -1.8096 0.0726 
DI 0.3754 0.9158 0.3614 
TO -0.7588 -3.6635 0.0004 
POPG -0.0885 -1.0364 0.3019 
SECENR 1.0075 2.0551 0.0419 
INF -0.0101 -0.8726 0.3845 
COC -10.534 -2.356 0.0184 
MNA*COC 1.0868 2.2932 0.0234** 
R-squared 0.7873   
Adjusted R-squared 0.7581   
F-statistic 26.9424   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000   
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; DI=Domestic Investment; TO=Trade openness; 
INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= interacting variable; 




Table 4.19 demonstrates that interacting variable, control of corruption has been checked 
whether the relationship between MNA and GDP has changed.  
 
Table 4. 20  
summary of overall results  
                                        Results without institutional factors 
 Greenfield FDI  Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
Results  
 Not significant  Significant 
impact on 
GDP 
Merger and Acquisition has 
positive effect on economic 
growth but not GFDI in Asian 
countries. 













 Voice and accountability 
negatively interact with GFDI  
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence 
- Positive and 
significant  
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence is positively interacting 






- Government effectiveness is 
positively interacting the effect of 
GFDI on economic growth. 
Regulatory quality Negative and 
significant 
- Regulatory quality negatively 
interacts with GFDI 
Rule of law - Positive and 
significant 
Rule of law is positively 








Control of corruption is positively 
interacting the effect of GFDI as 








Furthermore, interaction term has introduced in the model to estimate the change in relationship 
between MNA and GDP. The sign for β coefficient value is positive and this result is also 
significant. Results show that interaction term has capacity to perform its role to strengthen the 
relationship between independent and dependent variable. Clearly, COC is positively moderate 
the MNA’s impact on economic growth. One percent change in COC may change the effect of 
MNA by 1.08 percent on GDP of selected Asian countries. 
 
4.11 Country wise analysis  
 
The present study did cross sectional analysis to check the significant of greenfield FDI and 
MNA on economic growth in each country. The study has achieved all its objective, but to 
know the significance of institutional factors this analysis has been done. Country wise analysis 
do by using panel data as previous studies also done the same methodology to check the cross-
section analysis (Chou, 2013; Nath, 2009). 
More importantly, the study also checked the impact of institutional factors on the relationship 
of GFDI, MNA and economic growth in each country separately.  
 
4.11.1 Greenfield FDI, MNA, interaction effects of institutions in China 
The results of cross-country show that greenfield FDI has positive coefficient value in china. 
It means greenfield FDI has significantly positive effect on economic growth in China. In 
detail, one percent change in GFDI cause a change in GDP of China by 0.68 percent. Sign for 
trade openness is negative and probability value is significant. The study applied six interaction 
term to verify the moderation effect of these governance indicators. The results show that PS 
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and COC interacting the effect of GFDI on economic growth in China. While interaction term 
(GFDI*PS) has positive sign and statistically significant.  
Positive sign of PS interaction term depicts that the effect of GFDI on GDP in China is 
increased. Another interaction term in this country wise analysis COC has the same result as 
PS. The interaction term (GFDI*COC) has a positive sign in this model.  The positive beta 
value of interaction term shows that due to institutional factors named as control of corruption 
strengthen the   impact of GFDI on GDP growth in China.
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Table 4. 21  
country wise significance of institutional factors 
 VA PS GE RQ ROL COC 





   3.845515 (0.004) 
GFDI*COC 
India  0.905 (0.000) (GFDI*PS) 
   4.356 (0.006) 
(GFDI*COC) 
Srilanka  80.822 (0.000) MNA*VA 
 13.454 (0.012) 
GFDI*GE 















Malaysia  -14.924 (0.000) MNA*VA 
 13.807 (0.010) 
MNA*GE 
  4.937 (0.051) 
GFDI*COC 
Philippines      -7.349 (0.059) GFDI*COC  
























Pakistan -5.206 (0.092) GFDI*VA 
 2.374 (0.057) 
GFDI*GE 
   












Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, Dependent variable GDP.
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4.11.3 Greenfield FDI, MNA, interaction effects of institutions in Indonesia  
The interaction effect of six institutional factors on relationship between greenfield 
FDI and economic growth in Indonesia has checked. The results of institutional factors 
show the negative coefficient values implying that the institutions are weak in 
Indonesia.  
4.11.4 Greenfield FDI, MNA, interaction effects of institutions in Malaysia 
To ascertain the interaction effect of institution in Malaysia a group of models has 
been tested. Firstly, the results show that GFDI have positive coefficient value with 
significant value of probability. Furthermore, interaction term (GFDI*COC) shows a 
positive coefficient value. The result of interaction (GFDI*COC) effect is significant 
meaning that COC is positively interact the impact of GFDI on economic growth of 
Malaysia. The interaction of (MNA*GE) has been tested, the results show that GE 
moderates the relationship and between MNA and GDP in Malaysia. The institutional 
factor GE strengthen the effect of MNA on the GDP of Malaysia. Moreover, VA is 
negatively related to outcomes expected by MNA for economic growth in Malaysia.  
4.11.5 Greenfield FDI, MNA, interaction effects of institutions in the Philippines 
The present study investigates the interaction effects of governance indicators on the 
relationship between GFDI and economic growth of Philippine. The coefficient value 
for greenfield FDI is positive and statistically significant. In detail, GFDI is positively 
related to economic growth in the Philippines. The institutional factor’s result is that 
all the interaction terms have insignificant coefficient value. It could be said that 
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institutional factors have not a significant relationship with economic growth in the 
Philippines. However, the only COC is interacting the GFDI negatively.  
 
4.11.6 Greenfield FDI, MNA, interaction effects of institutions in Thailand 
To find out the moderating effect of six institutional factors on the relationship 
between GFDI and economic growth in Thailand six model has been tested. Results 
show direct relation of selected variables and economic growth. Greenfield FDI in this 
model has a positive coefficient value with significant probability value. Furthermore, 
interaction term (GFDI*PS) has a negative sign means that political instability 
negatively moderates the relationship between GFDI and GDP in Thailand. The 
coefficient value for (GFDI*GE) is positive and significant implying that GE 
positively interact the effect of GFDI on economic growth in Thailand. 
While, the interaction term (GFDI*RQ) having negative coefficient value meaning 
RQ can moderate the relation negatively.  The rule of law has also negative coefficient 
and statistically significant. Likewise, the previous interaction it also has negative beta 
value. The results in model 6 show that ROL weaken the effect of GFDI on economic 
growth. The effect of interaction term (GFDI*COC) has positive coefficient value 
implying that COC strengthen the effect of GFDI on economic growth in Thailand. 
The other interaction terms (MNA*RQ) has positive coefficient value. The result show 




4.11.7 Greenfield FDI, MNA, interaction effects of institutions in India 
The present study tried to explore the interaction effect of institution on economic 
growth in India. The results depict that MNA has positive coefficient value with 
significant probability value. In this analysis, political stability significantly 
moderated the relationship between GFDI and GDP in India. More specifically, the 
sign for interaction term (GFDI*PS) is positive. It means that political stable condition 
strengthens the relationship between GFDI and GDP of India. Similarly, the 
interaction term (GFDI*COC) also have positive beta value implying that COC 
strengthen the relationship between GFDI and GDP. 
4.11.8 Greenfield FDI, MNA, interaction effects of institutions in Pakistan  
Institutions have a substantial position in a country to achieve economic growth also 
having capacity to moderate the impact of variables on growth. The interaction effect 
of governance indicators has been tested. The results show that greenfield FDI has 
negative coefficient value and the result is statistically significant.  Furthermore, the 
results of interaction effect of institutional factors on the relationship of greenfield FDI 
and GDP show that VA has negative coefficient value.  
This result is also statistically significant meaning that VA negatively influenced the 
economic growth. while the interaction effect of GE has positive beta value. Therefore, 




 4.11.9 Greenfield FDI, MNA, interaction effects of institutions in Srilanka 
 
The present study investigated the interaction effect of institutional factors on 
economic growth in Srilanka. Results show the direct effect of macroeconomic 
variable to growth. Greenfield FDI has positive coefficient value and this result is 
statistically significant. In Srilanka the greenfield FDI has positive impact on 
economic growth.  
As far as the matter of interaction terms is concerned the results show that all 
intuitional factor GE has positive interaction effect on the relationship between GFDI 
and GDP in Srilanka. Furthermore, the interaction term MNA*VA also show the 
positive coefficient value implying that VA is positively interact the GFDI. 
Additionally, ROL is another institutional factor that is showing the interacting 
capability. The positive sign of MNA*ROL depicts that ROL has significantly change 
the effect of MNA in positive direction. Lastly, the COC is also interaction with MNA 
and the sign of this interaction term is positive implying that control of corruption 
enhances the positive effect of MNA on economic growth in Srilanka. 
 
4.11.10 Greenfield FDI, MNA, interaction effects of institutions in Vietnam 
To see the interaction effect of institutions on growth in Vietnam, six models has been 
tested. The results express that greenfield FDI is present here with positive beta value. 
This result is statistically significant meaning that GFDI is positively related to GDP 
in Vietnam.  
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Furthermore, the interaction term GFDI*RQ has statistically significant coefficient 
value with negative sign. The influence of this interaction term on the relationship of 
GFDI and GDP in negative means that RQ dampens the effect of GFDI to GDP in 
Vietnam. Similarly, the MNA*RQ also has negative sign implying that RQ negatively 
affect the relationship of MNA and GDP. 
 
The interaction term GFDI*ROL and MNA*ROL both have negative sing. It shows 
that ROL is negatively related to growth effect of GFDI as well as MNA in Vietnam.  
The interaction term GFDI*COC shows a positive sign meaning that COC have 
positive impact on the relationship of GFDI and GDP in Vietnam. Lastly, the 
MNA*COC also has positive sing showing that control of corruption positively 
favoured the effect of MNA on economic growth in Vietnam.  
 
4.12 Greenfield FDI, mergers and acquisition, institutions, and Economic 
Growth 
The main research area of this study is to find growth effects of greenfield FDI, with 
certain weightage of interaction effect of institutional factors. It is likewise to 
scrutinize the effective factors that are capable to enhance greenfield investment’s 
return on economic growth. Institutions of a country establish the framework to do 
economic activity and quality institutions offer an environment to enhance the 
economic growth. while, weak institutions dampen the effects of investment on 
economic growth. The countries with democratic institutions and a high value of “rule 
of law” improve growth performance (Butkiewicz & Yanikkaya, 2006). Foreign direct 
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investment has both direct and indirect effect on economic growth. In detail, 
institutions play a moderating role to enhance growth effect of FDI in developing 
countries. Furthermore, aggregate FDI can be divided into two investments namely 
greenfield FDI and merger and acquisition. Next, the question is that how different 
mode of FDI affect economic growth in recipient country. 
 The answer is, because greenfield FDI involve in setting up new facilities while 
purchasing of existing facility is the way of investment by merge and acquisition. 
Thus, it is clearly seen that both forms of FDI are different in nature and produce 
different economic consequences. For instance, greenfield FDI has positive effect on 
economic growth without considering the country’s level of human capital while, 
MNA is effective to achieve economic growth when a host country has achieved a 
minimum level of human capital (Wang & Wong, 2009).  
 
Naturally, greenfield investment is connected with accumulation of production 
capacity (M. Wang, 2009). As far as the entry mode of FDI is concerned  greenfield 
FDI have a stronger impact on economic growth than merger and acquisition (Harms 
& Méon, 2014). The growth effect of foreign investment is moderated by institutions 
quality. Institutions can play a substantial role to achieve economic growth. Certainly, 
good institutions, by the promotion of foreign investments exert their positive impact 
on economic growth. Additionally, less uncertainty with higher expected rate of return 
are affixed with good institution. Thus, institution consider an important channel to 
moderate the positive effect of FDI on economic development (Bénassy‐Quéré, 
Coupet, & Mayer, 2007). Furthermore, institutional quality undoubtedly moderates 
the return of FDI to growth especially in developing countries. It is an important point 
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that singly FDI has no significant impact on economic growth. However, a promising 
institutional environment with FDI exert a positive pressure to achieve higher 
economic growth (Jude & Levieuge, 2013).  
4.13 Fixed Effects Estimation Results of the effect of greenfield foreign direct 
investment, merger and acquisition on economic growth in ten Asian countries. 
The results of regression shown in table 4.7 depict that MNA has positive effect on 
economic growth in ten selected Asian countries. The strength of coefficient is also 
high means that GFDI has positive substantial impact on economic growth. Similarly, 
the present shows that MNA also have positively related to economic growth. But the 
strength of the coefficient of MNA is low. Therefore, the impact of MNA is low as 
compared to GFDI on economic growth. These results are clear indication that GFDI 
is more effective than MNA in the selected sample of Asian countries. Greenfield FDI 
could more beneficial with many reasons as it is involved in new production capacity 
building, generate employment subsequently contributes to a more equal income 
distribution also. Another important contribution of GFDI is that it could be a cause 
of addition in the capital stock of a host economy. Our results are compatible with 
other studies, as Stepanok (2015) stated that greenfield investment is more productive 
than MNA. Greenfield FDI and MNA have a positive impact on an economy if a 
country have a specific level of human capital (Eren & Zhuang, 2015; Luu, 2016). 
Furthermore, trade openness has negative impact on economic growth in selected 
Asian countries. While on the other side secondary school enrolment is positively 
related to economic growth. As the secondary school enrollment is taken as a proxy 
of human capital it means that human capital has positive impact on the economy of 
117 
 
selected countries. Additionally, population growth shows negative sign and inflation 
positive, but both results are insignificant.  
4.13.1 Greenfield FDI and economic growth with interaction effects of 
institutional factors. 
North (1990) stated that institutional quality indirectly effects economic growth by 
innovation and progress in technology. The sound institutional frameworks are crucial 
to achieve high economic growth for a country. Institution with its positive impact is 
a core entity to increase the inflow of FDI and subsequently high economic growth 
(Long et al., 2015). Beyond shadow of a doubt FDI can accelerate economic growth 
with good governance (Fayissa & Nsiah, 2013) but alone FDI is not sufficient to effect 
economic growth (Jude & Levieuge, 2013). 
 
4.13.1.1 Interaction effect of voice and accountability (GFDI*VA) 
The results of our study reveal that voice and accountability has moderating effect 
between GFDI and economic growth.  The results show that the interaction term 
(GFDI*VA) is included, the impact of greenfield FDI on economic growth become 
negative the result is also significant. There are many reasons that VA negatively 
moderate the relationship between GFDI and economic growth. The main reason is 
that, inclusive factors of VA like freedom of expression, independent media and fair 
participation of people to choose their governments are inefficient. 
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 Therefore, it is less chance that GFDI perform well under this less accountability 
environment, which subsequently dampen economic growth. On the other hand, it is 
also noteworthy, the corrupt investors remain in seek to invest in a corrupt country 
that are ultimately less accountability approach. Our results also support different 
studies as Jadhav (2012) stated that Voice and Accountability in negatively related to 
inward FDI especially in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). 
Furthermore, Voice and Accountability have no significant impact on FDI (Daude & 
Stein, 2007). 
 
Additionally, Voice and accountability emphases on different indicators related to the 
political process, control of government actions, civil rights such as independent 
media. The possible reason of VA is not performing positively in ten selected Asian 
countries is, in such an environment where the government want to remain popular, 
reduces accountability either directly or indirectly. Therefore, governments take 
inefficient changes in policy which could be in favour of foreign investment. Another 
threat of military intervention is also a reason in which a government is unable to 
function effectively and that the country has an uneasy environment for foreign 
investors (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009). 
 
4.13.1.2 Interaction effect of Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
(GFDI*PS) 
The present study checked a moderating effect of PS on economic growth expecting 
from GFDI. In detail, the interacting effect of political stability on greenfield FDI and 
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economic growth of ten selected Asian countries is not significant. The results after 
interaction (GFDI*PS) reflect a change in direction but with insignificant probability 
value. The meaning of this result is that investment in the shape of GFDI is not effected 
by political stability. 
4.13.1.3 Interaction effect of Government effectiveness (GFDI*GE) 
The present study tried to investigate Greenfield FDI’s outcome with interaction of 
GE on economic growth in ten selected Asia countries. Government effectiveness 
mainly checked by quality of public services, civil service and degree of its 
independence from political pressures. 
The result of interaction term (GFDI*GE) is significant. The meaning of this result is 
that GE can strengthen the effect of GFDI on economic growth in selected Asian 
countries. The main reasons of this result are the favourable environment for 
investment, good civil service and less political pressure to interfere this type of 
investment. Our results are supported by many studied as Daude and Stein (2007) 
claim that government effectiveness has a positive impact on foreign investment 
(FDI). Furthermore, the efficient government exerts a positive impact on economic 
growth of a country’s GDP by implementing the good policies (Bettin & Zazzaro, 
2012). Likewise, if a country wants to increase in its investment projects it should have 
increase government effectiveness. Especially the non-African FDI is statistically 




4.13.1.4 Interaction effect of Regulatory quality (GFDI*RQ) 
Sound policies and regulations to promote private sector are the core elements of 
regulatory quality has been tested whether can play moderating role between GFDI 
and economic growth of ten selected Asian countries. The outcomes reveal that after 
applying interaction term the sign of coefficient has changed and the results are 
significant. It means that interaction term has a negative effect on relationship between 
GFDI and GDP. 
The results of our study are similar to previous study of Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén 
(2005). This study reveals that high levels of regulation are the main cause of lower 
growth especially in the product and labour markets.  Furthermore, the reason could 
be simple that firms which are involved in production may adopt a way to work outside 
the legal framework if heavy regulatory burden is put on these firms. This step of these 
firm leads to lower growth in a country.  
 
Consequently, high levels of regulation are allied with low economic growth. 
Similarly, corporations of India and china invest in those countries that have high 
corruption and poor legal systems especially in the mining industry in the form of 
merger and acquisition. Because the corporations incline to poor institutional quality, 
have been blocked in some developed countries. Furthermore, investments are 
preferred from those emerging countries that are motivated to attach less 
conditionality (De Beule & Duanmu, 2012). Another study also claims that labour 
market regulatory quality negatively affected the subsidiary performance (Pattnaik, 
Choe, & Singh, 2015). 
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4.13.1.5 Interaction effect of rule of law (GFDI*ROL) 
Interaction effect of rule of law has been verified to see its impact on GFDI to 
strengthen or weaken the relationship with GDP. The interaction term (GFDI*ROL) 
has positive beta coefficient but the results is not significant. It means that ROL neither 
strengthen nor weaken the impact of GFDI on economic growth of the ten selected 
Asian countries. These results also have support from other studies like Daude and 
Stein (2007)  stated that rule of law have no significant impact on foreign investment 
(FDI). Furthermore, high rule of law can play a negative role for African companies 
in the context of investment (Rolfe et al., 2015). 
 
4.13.1.6 Interaction effect of control of corruption (GFDI*COC) 
The present study tried to check the interaction effect of COC, between association of 
greenfield FDI and GDP. Our main results for interaction term (GFDI*COC) show a 
positive coefficient value, meaning control of corruption enhance the impact of 
greenfield FDI on economic growth in ten selected Asian countries.  
The result is according to a common belief that control of corruption has positive 
impact on economic growth. The meaning of this result is control of corruption can 
enhance the impact of GFDI on economic growth of selected Asian countries. The 
reason for this result may be that control of corruption is playing a key role to start a 
business. 
The countries with high control of corruption could improve their institutions and 
produce effective bureaucracy, sincere politicians and good environment to the 
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investors leads to economic growth. Consequently, improvements in governance by 
control of corruption creates a more efficient and effective bureaucracy and a better 
investment climate, as well as improve allocation of resources, that ultimately enhance 
economic growth (Azam & Emirullah, 2014). 
The interpretation of this positive sign may be written as lower levels of corruption 
augment the effect of foreign invest on economic growth. Corruption is a big 
hindrance to achieve economic growth in Asian countries as economic activities are 
effected by corruption. Furthermore, investments may reduce due to high level of 
corruption because investors feel that cost of doing business increase in this 
environment of corruption. High level of corruption damages the institutions of a 
country as lack of accountability and transparency become main features of the 
economy. 
Our results are consistent with a number of previous studied, state that corruption 
dampens economic growth and low corruption (that is, a higher value on the corruption 
perception index) leads a country to a higher levels of GDP per capita (Azam & 
Emirullah, 2014; Higbee & Schmid, 2004). Furthermore, high corruption significantly 
lessens the effectiveness of FDI on growth for about 70 percent of 60 countries of non-
OECD. The increase of 1 point in the level of corruption persuades a decline in returns 
earning from foreign investment (Delgado, McCloud, & Kumbhakar, 2014). 
Higher levels of corruption reduce the impact of FDI on economic growth as the direct 
impact of FDI to economic growth is 70 points. Adding corruption as an interacting 
variable show that one-point change in this interaction term leads to 50 points change 
in per capita GDP. Thus, it is clear indication that high corruption weakens the 
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relationship between FDI and economic growth (Freckleton et al., 2012). Additionally, 
corruption have negative impact on economic growth more than military expenditures 
have on economic development. It is also considerable that interaction of corruption 
and military expenditures increase the negative impact of military expenditure on 
economic growth (d'Agostino, Dunne, & Pieroni, 2016). 
4.14 Merger and acquisition and economic growth with interaction effects of 
institutional factors. 
In contemporary business mergers and acquisitions (MNA) play a prominent role to 
get competitive advantages for those firms conducting MNA. According to  Thomson 
Reuters (2013) global MNA review in 2012 the value of worldwide MNA accounted 
for US$2.6 and the project announced was over 37 thousand. The inflow of merger 
and acquisition mainly depends on two factors, the external push factors and internal 
pull factors. Furthermore, institutional quality plays an imperative role to attract MNA 
in a country. Another important factor to capture MNA is the level of economic 
integration between host and source country. Inflow of MNA is positively related to 
market size and same language in both countries whereas, distance between host and 
source country is negatively affixed with inflow of MNA (Hyun & Kim, 2010). As far 
as growth effect of MNA is concerned, MNA have no significant effect alone. It is the 
absorptive capacity of the host country plays an important role to stimulate the growth 
effects of MNA. Furthermore, a developed financial system can be considering as a 
precondition to see the impact of MNA on economic growth (Eren & Zhuang, 2015). 
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Notably, institutions have their own moderating capability to amend the impact of 
investment on economic growth whether investments are in the form of greenfield FDI 
and MNA. Quality of public institutions also matter to detect effect of MNA, Chinese 
firm are influenced by formal institutional distance. Thus government and institutions 
of the host country play a decisive role in obtaining the effects of MNA on economic 
growth (Du & Boateng, 2015). 
4.14.1 Interaction effect of voice and accountability (MNA*VA) 
Merger and acquisitions have a positive impact on economic growth in developing 
countries. The study tried to dig out the interaction effect of one institutional factor 
voice and accountability with MNA on the relationship between GDP and MNA. The 
results of the study depict that after applying interaction term results remained 
insignificant, means that this form of investment is not effected by moderating effect 
of VA. The selected sample of the countries receiving MNA do not receive any 
encouraging effect from interaction of VA. 
4.14.2 Interaction effect of Political stability and absence of violence (MNA*PS) 
The study checked the interaction effect of (MNA*PS) on the relationship between 
MNA and GDP. After applying interaction term (MNA*PS) the sign of relationship 
between MNA and GDP is positive. It means that this interaction effect positively 
influenced economic growth.  Our results show that political stability and absence of 
violence positively influenced economic growth.  
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The economic rationale behind positive effect of political stability and absence of 
violence is that in a political stable environment, property rights are very secured. 
Consequently, the investors feel comforts to invest in these countries which are 
political stable. The investment become a base to achieve economic benefits. 
Similarly, average economic growth rates have positive connection with political 
stability.  
Our results are consistent with previous studies, like Mauro (1995)  political stability 
and bureaucratic efficiency are highly correlated and these are also affecting per capita 
GDP positively. Furthermore, the stable regime and a political system are main 
foundation of rapid economic growth. Political stable  government  is likely to provide 
favourable conditions to economic growth (Feng, 1997). Furthermore, political 
stability is positively related to FDI. The volume of FDI is increasing in political stable 
countries (Daude & Stein, 2007). 
A second possible interpretation is that; political instability is inversely related to 
economic growth as well as foreign investment. Practically, there are adverse effects 
attached with political instability especially on property rights. It is also valuable that 
property rights are linked with private investment and these linkages produce bad 
economic outcomes due to political instability (Barro, 1989). Another consistent 
statement with our results is that political instability is negatively affixed with 
economic growth in MENA countries (Omri, Shahbaz, Chaibi, & Rault, 2015). 
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4.14.3 Interaction effect of Government effectiveness (MNA*GE) 
The present study tried to investigate mergers and acquisition’s outcome with 
interaction of GE on economic growth in ten selected Asia countries. Government 
effectiveness mainly checked by quality of public services, civil service and degree of 
its independence from political pressures. If a government has preceding qualities and 
remained credible to implement such policies should have positive impact on 
investment to achieve growth.  
The study checked the interaction effect of government effectiveness, whether GE 
moderate the relationship between MNA and economic growth. The results is not 
significant, the reason behind this inefficiency is that the leaders who are running 
governments have their personal benefits which are not compromised most of time. 
Thus, interaction term (GE*MNA) have insignificant results in dataset of selected ten 
Asian countries. The results of this study supported by Knutsen (2013) who 
investigated the  interaction effect between democracy and state capacity on economic 
growth.  
In detail, the democratic governments have low economic growth with interaction of 
high state capacity, nearly GE.  These governments have a positive effect on economic 
growth but with weak capacity states. Non-functional interaction term of this study 
has been supported by this discussion as all the countries which are selected in this 
study have democratic government.  
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4.14.4 Interaction effect of Regulatory quality (MNA*RQ) 
Regulatory quality is capability of the government to make and implement policies 
that are favourable to private sector. The expected sign of RQ is positive but our results 
show negative sign of regulatory quality’s coefficient.  
Furthermore, the interaction term (MNA*RQ) shows a negative coefficient value in 
our results but this is statistically not significant. It means that the investment in the 
form of MNA loose its effect with high regulations. Generally, MNA investment 
inclined towards less regulatory environment. 
This result is also justifiable, one possible reason for this result may be that the 
investors who are doing investments in the form of merger and acquisition remained 
uncomfortable with high level of regulation and legal systems. Some empirical studies 
also support our results as Loayza et al. (2005) state that regulation may be negatively 
related to economic growth. Reason behind this scenario is deliberately create such a 
type of regulation may compel firms to work outside the legal framework of the 
country.  
4.14.5 Interaction effect of rule of law (MNA*ROL) 
Rule of law mainly capture the features like protection of property rights, economic 
activities abide by the rulebooks of society, probability of crimes and violence and 
well-mannered implementation of contracts. The present study finds that interaction 




The argument behind the positive impact of rule of law is that ROL is prerequisite for 
sustainable economic development. Furthermore, ROL is a foundation of property 
rights that can lead to economic growth. In Asian countries, there are considerable 
evidence that rule of law is necessary for economic growth but alone it is not sufficient 
Rule of law and formal legal system are  positively correlated with economic growth 
(Peerenboom, 2002). Furthermore, an empirical study also indicates that the regions 
in which people have property rights awareness and a greater rule of law is present are 
gaining stronger economic growth (Hasan, Wachtel, & Zhou, 2009). Similarly, rule of 
law contributes significantly to economic growth and its interaction effect is also 
positive with remittances. The result is showing the presence of sound institutions 
(Bettin & Zazzaro, 2012). 
Many experts believe that rule of law and property rights are substantial elements for 
foreign investment and in the presence of greater rule of law economic activities also 
increased manifold. Additionally, one of the possible path for economic growth is that 
democracy can leads to more rule of law and greater ROL results more democracy that 
can ultimately promote economic growth (Barro, 2013). 
 
4.14.6 Interaction effect of control of corruption (MNA*COC) 
The study tried to check the impact of control of corruption on returns of MNA to 
economic growth. The effect of COC is positive means that it is positively related to 
economic growth. The sign for the coefficient of interaction (MNA*COC) term is 
positive and results are also significant. It means that control of corruption has capacity 
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to enhance the positive impact of MNA on economic growth in ten selected Asian 
countries.  
The result  of our study is consistent with other studies like Anoruo and Braha (2005) 
state that low corruption is allied with high economic growth, as one standard 
deviation decrease in corruption made increase in economic growth by 0.83 percent. 
The results also suggest that control of corruption accelerates economic growth. 
furthermore, the results of another study also state that control of corruption is in the 
favour of investment while high corruption tends to further reduce investment. 
Therefore, in the perspective of economic growth the “grease the wheels” hypothesis 
is rejected for the results of investment on growth. High corruption impedes 
investment in those countries where bad governance is present. Therefore,  results are 
in the favour of “sand the wheels” and strongly reject the “grease the wheels” 
hypothesis (Méon & Sekkat, 2005). 
Furthermore, control of corruption shows a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient, suggests acquisitions are more likely to take place in countries with better 
control of corruption (De Beule & Duanmu, 2012). Similarly, findings indicate that 
impact of corruption is negative on economic growth. The economic rationale is that 
improved governance not only controls the corruption but enhances instruction’s 
quality also. The quality institutions, low level of corruption is helpful as fuel for 
development projects and finally accelerates economic growth (Farooq, Shahbaz, 
Arouri, & Teulon, 2013). 
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The above discussion endorses our results, that control of corruption accelerates the 
positive impact of MNA on economic growth. 
4.15 Country wise analysis of greenfield FDI, MNA, institution and economic 
growth in ten Asian countries. 
The preceding analysis give a clear picture of impact of institutional factors on the 
relation of GFDI, MNA and economic growth in selected Asian countries. To further 
investigate the detail of significance of greenfield FDI, MNA and institutions in each 
country another analysis has been done. Furthermore, present analysis gives results of 
all institutional factors with interaction effect on greenfield FDI and MNA separately. 
These results are more profound to see the interaction effect of institution in each 
country. Additionally, it would also clearly have known that institutional factors can 
moderate the impact of greenfield FDI, MNA or both from which one of the selected 
countries. 
4.15.1 Greenfield FDI, institution and economic growth in ten Asian countries. 
China is the first country that has been discussed in this part of chapter 4. The results 
for this country show that greenfield FDI is positively related to economic growth of 
China. The interpretation of this positive sign is that if greenfield FDI inflow is 
increased it can amplify the economic growth in china. 
Our results are supported by other studies as Luu (2016) stated that greenfield FDI 
contribute positively to accelerate economic growth in emerging countries including 
China. Similarly Neto, Brandão, and Cerqueira (2010) argue that rapid growth of FDI 
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especially in the form of greenfield FDI, economic growth of host country increase 
more speedily. The main reason of effectiveness of GFDI is it evolves in new capacity 
building that could be a foundation to economic growth.  
Furthermore, the study finds the result of interaction effect of PS on economic growth. 
As the sign of this interaction term GFDI*PS is positive it could be said that political 
stability strengthens the relationship between GFDI and economic growth. In other 
word, the results reveal that political stability is positively influence the impact of 
GFDI to economic growth in China.  
The results are also consistent with previous studies as De Beule and Duanmu (2012) 
state that control of corruption shows a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with acquisitions. Furthermore, control of corruption is in favour of 
growth, while high corruption is negatively attached with economic growth 
(d'Agostino et al., 2016). 
As greenfield FDI in Mongolia is showing positive sign with insignificant probability 
value. Simply, GFDI is not significantly related to economic growth in Mongolia. 
While the performance of institutional factors to moderate the impact of GFDI to 
economic growth also produces uncommon result in this analysis. The interaction 
terms of VA, GE and COC show negative coefficient values implying that the effect 
is not as the expected results of institutions. In other word, no support has been found 
for the impact of interaction effect of all institutional factors with GFDI on economic 
growth in Mongolia.  
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The results of GFDI*COC show the negative sign meaning that COC has negative 
impact on the relationship of GFDI and GDP of Mongolia. It could be said that in a 
more corrupt environment GFDI perform well to economic growth in Mongolia. This 
result is also supported by other studies as Huang (2016) stated that in South Korea 
“grease the wheels” hypothesis is supported by the results as corruption has 
significantly positive impact on economic growth. Another justification of this result 
is that government official are involved in bribery to smooth operation, to do benefits 
to the investors (Y. Wang, Du, & Wang, 2015). 
The results of data set of Indonesia disclose that Greenfield FDI has a high coefficient 
value than but the results are not statistically significant. As far as interaction terms 
are concerned results depict that all coefficient values are negative implying that 
institutions are very weak. 
 As the impact of institutional factors in Indonesia are not as the expected according 
to economic rational. The rule of law negatively treats the relationship between GFDI 
and GDP in Indonesia. These results indicate the greenfield investment perform low 
under higher rule of law. The argument may be see on the opposite side of the results, 
African companies show that feebler the rule of law, the larger the number of projects 
(Rolfe et al., 2015). 
The situation of Malaysia is very different form Indonesia as there is a significant 
relationship between greenfield FDI and economic progress. The coefficient value for 




Greenfield FDI has positive effect on economic growth as it increases the productivity 
in the host economy (Stepanok, 2015). The interaction term GFDI*COC in Malaysia 
shows a positive coefficient value implying that control of corruption is highly 
correlated to economic growth. The high coefficient value for this interaction term 
show that COC is an effective institutional factor in Malaysia. Control of corruption 
positively interact the effect of GFDI and economic growth. It means that COC 
strengthen the positive effect of GFDI on economic growth in Malaysia. The results 
are also consistent with previous studies like Azam and Emirullah (2014) state that  
control of corruption will strengthen the country’s institutions, and a suitable 
environment is created by good governance.  
The results reveal that effect of greenfield FDI in Philippine is different from 
Malaysia. In Philippine GFDI has positive effect on economic growth. The results are 
justifiable as greenfield investment involved in new production and do transfer of 
technology from investor to host country, it could be a cause of healthier performance 
of GFDI in a country.  
Stepanok (2015) also, argue that when a firm is investing in the form GFDI become 
more productive as compare to invest in the shape of MNA. Similarly, greenfield FDI 
contribute positively to accelerating economic growth (Luu, 2016). While the results 
for institution factors show not an encouraging situation in Philippine. The results 
show that institutions do not moderate the effect of GFDI on economic growth. The 
possible justification for this result is that inefficient and inadequate institutions are 
responsible of low growth in country. Similarly, Daniele and Marani (2006) argue that 
unfavourable trading reform to investors, inadequacy in institutional and legal 
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framework of a country is the main cause of low attractiveness to investors towards a 
country especially in MENA. 
Whereas greenfield FDI has positive sign but with significant results. So, it could be 
said that GFDI is contributing the economy of Thailand.  
Tourism is an important factor in Thai economy, according to the World Travel and 
Tourism Council (2015), direct and indirect impact induced by the tourism industry 
was 20.2 percent, 19.3 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively (Kummong, Supratid, & 
Chan, 2016). But the situation is interesting, to see the results of interaction effects of 
institutional factor. Most of the institutional factor negatively moderate the 
relationship between GFDI and economic growth in Thailand. 
The interaction term GFDI*GE also has negatively treated to economic growth. The 
possible reason can be attached more political pressure and weak policy implications 
are in disfavoured to investment performance. The regulatory quality also negatively 
influenced the foreign investment’s outcome in Thailand. 
 The possible justification of this result is that high rules and regulations from the host 
country discourage the investors to invest. To support, a study claims that high 
regulation leads a negative impact on economic growth (Loayza et al., 2005). 
Similarly, regulatory quality in labour market negatively affect the subsidiary 
performance (Pattnaik et al., 2015). Furthermore, Rolfe et al. (2015) also stated that 
rule of law has a negative effect on African companies.  
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The key aspect of the main result of dataset of India show that greenfield FDI has 
positive sign but insignificant probability value. It means that greenfield FDI is not 
significantly affecting economic growth in India. The possible justification of this 
result is that India has giant population while FDI inflows has labour displacing nature 
for India (Chakraborty & Basu, 2002). Therefore, to avoid unemployment it is more 
focused on domestic investment rather the foreign investment. Another important 
point is that multinational companies squeeze the profit from host country and take to 
the home economy which has a negative impact on the economic growth of receiving 
country. (Khurshid, Ahmad, Zhahiruddina, Zamanb, & Malaysia, 2014). Furthermore, 
Ashraf and Herzer (2014) also argue that greenfield FDI has a large negative effect 
and clearly damage the domestic investment.  
The factors discussed lately may be the factors of ineffectiveness of greenfield FDI in 
India. As far as the interaction term GFDI*PS is concerned it has positive impact on 
the relationship of GFDI and economic growth in India. The results are also consistent 
with previous studies as Omri et al. (2015) state that political instability damage the 
economic growth in MENA countries. Furthermore, High corruption has a sizeable 
nonlinear impact on the relationship of FDI and economic growth. High corruption 
significantly lessens the effectiveness of foreign investment on growth for about 70 
percent of non-OECD countries (Delgado et al., 2014). 
In addition, the results for Pakistan show that there is a negative impact of greenfield 
FDI on Pakistan’ economy. This result is also justifiable, in Pakistan the MNCs are 
not involved in producing the export quality product. Another reason may be that 
whole profit can be captures by home economy and the host economy does not positive 
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spillovers. Pakistan is still labour intensive country the foreign investment only helps 
to reduce unemployment but this effect has no capacity to increase economic growth. 
Corrupt government officials and bureaucrats are also a hurdle to get benefited from 
foreign investment in Pakistan. Our results are also supported by other studies like 
Mencinger (2003) claims that FDI is negatively correlated to growth thus,  FDI can 
hampered the economic growth. furthermore, country corruption is negatively affixed 
with foreign investment (Wei & Wu, 2002). 
Additionally, the situation of institutional factors in Pakistan shows that the interaction 
term GFDI*GE has positive sign. The interpretation of this result is that government 
effect positively moderates the impact of GFDI on economic growth in Pakistan. The 
other studies also explored that governments effectiveness may enhance their ability 
to increase FDI projects (Daude & Stein, 2007; Rolfe et al., 2015). 
On the contrary, greenfield FDI in Sri Lanka shows a positive sign meaning that GFDI 
can enhance economic growth. The mean reason behind this result is Sri Lanka is 
moving towards higher middle-income country. It has the absorptive capacity to 
foreign investment. According to the world bank 2016 Sri Lanka’s economy is 
changing from agriculture economy to urbanized economy. It is trying to provide a 
higher level of services, growing responsiveness to facilitate the foreign investment 
subsequent to increase economic growth. 
 The results for interaction term are very uncommon as no institutional factor has the 
capacity to moderate the impact of GFDI on economic growth in Sri Lanka. As we 
earlies mention that Sri Lanka is in transition stage and has not been fully developed 
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its institutions. Therefore, the results for influencing foreign investment through 
institutional factors are not very encouraging. Moreover, these results are still 
supported the other study like Daniele and Marani (2006)found that governance 
indicators including institutional factors related to business environment are not 
advantageous to MENA countries.  The only interaction term GFDI*GE show a 
positive coefficient value implying that GE is exerting positive pressure to achieve 
economic growth in srilanka. Another study claims that government effectiveness 
exerts a positive impact on the economic growth of a country (Bettin & Zazzaro, 
2012). 
Similar to the results regarding greenfield FDI in Sri Lanka, the Vietnam also having 
positive gain from GFDI to economic growth. There are sound reasons present in 
literature to support that GDDI is positively affixed with economic growth. As Y.-H. 
Kim (2009) states that greenfield FDI, if selected is a welfare dominant entry mode 
for the host country. Similarly our result are supported by  Stepanok (2015) who claims 
that greenfield investment is  more productive than MNA. Furthermore, the interaction 
GFDI*RQ has negative sign suggesting that high RQ dampen the effect of GFDI on 
GDP in Vietnam. 
It is a common practice in high rules and regulation are not in the favour of better 
investment. Similarly, regulatory quality for labour market has negative impact on 
performance (Pattnaik et al., 2015). Additionally, the case of corruption as an 
interaction term GFDI*COC has the same results as most of the other countries have 
in this study. Control of Corruption can accelerate the performance of GFDI regarding 
economic growth.  
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4.15.2 Merger and acquisitions, institution and economic growth in ten Asian 
countries. 
The outcome of merger and acquisition is not statistically significant in China. It has 
no effect on the Chinese economy  as Temiz and Gökmen (2014) stated that MNA are 
ineffective for the Turkish economy. The possible reason of this result is that MNA 
are not involved in new production capacity building.  
As this type of investment is only involved to purchase or merge in existing firm so it 
may be not more beneficial for some economies. As far as the moderating effect of 
institutional factors is concerned the results show that interaction term MNA*PS has 
negative sing meaning that political stability reduces the impact of MNA on economic 
growth in China. The interpretation of this result is political stability is not supporting 
this type of investment. The result is consistent with the previous studies like H. Kim 
(2010)  claims that while political stability is negatively correlated with the 
performance pf inward FDI. 
The results of Mongolia show that MNA have negative sing showing that it is 
negatively related to economic growth. Our results are more consist the result of a 
study conducted by Wang, he claims that growth effect of MNA is negative (M. Wang 
& S. Wong, 2009). The interaction effect of GE in Mongolia show positive coefficient 
value implying that government effectiveness is positively related to economic 
growth.  
The results are also consistent with previous studies. Government effectiveness exert 
a positive impact on productivity  to enhance economic growth (Bettin & Zazzaro, 
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2012). While the interaction term MNA*COC has, positive sign suggesting that COC 
can play a moderating role between MNA and GDP. The clear meaning of this result 
is that control of corruption could be a source of high economic growth in Mongolia. 
High corruption dampen the economic growth (Méon & Sekkat, 2005). 
The condition of MNA in Indonesia show that it has positive beta value but the result 
is not significant on Indonesians economy. The result shows that Merger and 
acquisition has not significant impact on economic growth in Indonesia. The 
interaction terms also show insignificant probability value implying that institutions 
are weak in Indonesia. The institutional factors have not in a capacity to strengthen or 
weaken the relationship of MNA on economic growth in Indonesia.  
 
Furthermore, in Malaysia the MNA has positive coefficient value but result is not 
significant implying that this type of investment has no effect on economic growth in 
Malaysia. In the same way, government effectiveness is in favour of good economic 
progress. This interaction term MNA*GE also has positive interaction effect on 
performance of MNA to achieve economic growth. Many other studies are consistent 
with our result. As government effectiveness can be a cause of increase in investment 
as FDI (Daude & Stein, 2007; Rolfe et al., 2015). 
Additionally, institutional factors give a result that rule of law has positive moderation 
role with the MNA. To support this result, a study claims that rule of law has a capacity 
to contribute economic growth significantly (Bettin & Zazzaro, 2012).  
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Similarly, in Philippine the MNA has positive coefficient in the model suggesting that 
it is positively related to economic growth. On a part Nanda (2009) discuss a point 
while discussing the benefits of GFDI,  the MNA have an advantage that there is low 
risk involved in this type investment as it not investing a new production unit. While 
it is taking over a running business and another benefit of MNA is that the profit start 
from the day first for both companies that are merging.  
 
It is also an important point that when a firm is sick the most favourite way for the 
firm should merge. These may be the reason of good performance of MNA in 
Philippine. Another reason behind this result is that MNA transfer the new technology 
and positive impact on inter industry innovation. FDI influxes and inward MNA both 
have substantial position to achieve high growth level in Asian economies (Liu et al., 
2009). 
 
As far as the result of MNA is concerned for Thailand it shows a negative value with 
insignificant probability value implying that MNA have no effect on economic 
growth. The reason for this result may be that MNA have possibility not to contribute 
in expansion of capital stock of the host country. Similarly, Harms and Méon (2014) 
claims that MNA have no impact on economic growth.  
Furthermore, the results of institutional factors show that regulatory quality play an 
interaction role on the relationship of MNA and GDP in Thailand.  The result is 
supported by another study, that claims that regulatory quality positively influenced 
the GDP growth rate in OECD Countries (Cebula & Mixon, 2014). Rule of law tends 
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to promote economic growth having a capacity to build an environment leads to 
economic development (Barro, 2013). 
While the results of data set of India show that MNA has positive coefficient value 
with significant probability value. It means that MNA it is positively related to 
economic growth in India. As this type of investment is linked with specific type of 
firms, and some time merger or acquisition can occur in that industry which is very 
beneficial for the host economy. Similarly, MNA is a channel to economic growth as 
it is involved in restructuring of domestic firms that are may at the edge of shut done 
(Stepanok, 2015).  
As well as intuitional factors have no effect on economic growth.  The possible reason 
of these results may be that as MNA reflect a just change of ownership for the firms 
that are already exist in the host country.  
The results of interaction terms show that the institutional factors have not an aligned 
chemistry to moderate the effect of MNA on GDP in India. The result reveal that 
institution exert weak pressure to enhance the positive effect of MNA on economic 
growth. The following result also supported by other study’s result as all institutional 
factors also called as governance indicators demonstrate the relative disadvantages to 
the MENA countries (Daniele & Marani, 2006). 
 Similarly, the data set of Pakistan’s institutional factors with MNA give the same 
result as India. These factors show no capacity to moderate the effect of MNA on 
economic growth of Pakistan.  While the direct effect of MNA on the economy of 
Pakistan is negative. The possible reason of this result may be that the regulator quality 
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in Pakistan is low enough to gain a positive effect from MNA. The institutional quality 
in Pakistan is very low, lack of interest of politician and bureaucracy to upheave the 
institution. In the case of MNA no interaction term has moderate the relationship of 
this investment and economic growth in Pakistan.  
The same situation can be seen in Srilanka where the MNA have no effect on economic 
growth. If we see the coefficient value it looks the highest value in the table and highly 
significant. As the merger and acquisition are change of ownership and the profit also 
start from very first day, the investor seeks to invest in an easy way to earn instead of 
installing new plant. Therefore, in Sri Lanka, the MNA has no direct effect on 
economic growth. In Srilanka, three institutional factors have interaction effect on the 
connection of MNA and GDP. The first interaction term MNA*VA has positive sign 
meaning that voice and accountability positively interact the outcomes to growth. As 
good governance including voice and accountability has a positive and significant 
impact on growth (Fayissa & Nsiah, 2013).  
The second institutional factor ROL is also positive interact with MNA in srilanka. 
Furthermore, Rule of law tends to promote economic growth having a capacity to build 
an environment leads to economic development (Barro, 2013). The interaction term 
MNA*COC is interacting the relationship between MNA and GDP of Sri Lanka. It 
means that control of corruption can positively interact the MNA to support economic 
growth in srilanka. The result of data set of Vietnam is not so different from Sri Lanka 
as MNA has no effect on GDP.  
143 
 
The RQ and ROL have negative impact on MNA performance to economic growth. 
Due to weak institutional quality, political pressures, low quality of policy 
implementation it has negative impact on the relationship of MNA and GDP. 
Furthermore, the interaction term MNA*COC has positive impact on GDP means that 
control of corruption can augment the effect of MNA on economic growth in Vietnam.  
 
The interpretation of this result is that low corruption leads to governance and finally 
accelerates economic growth. In other words, high corruption has adverse effect on 











CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0 Introduction 
The recent increase in the inflow of greenfield FDI and merger and acquisitions in the 
Asia has motivated an extensive empirical literature to search out the outcomes of 
foreign capital flows in Asian economies. The central area of this study focuses on the 
impact of GFDI and MNA with the interaction effect of institutional factors on 
economic growth in ten Asian countries as illustrate in the chapter four and 
recommended by many studies like (Burger et al., 2015; Harms & Méon, 2014; Reddy, 
2015) . Majority of the studies put light on the role of FDI to economic growth but a 
few studies tried to find the outcomes from disaggregated FDI (greenfield FDI and 
MNA) especially in Asia. Another research gap which remained ignored is the 
institutional factors’ role to achieve economic growth with greenfield FDI and MNA 
separately. The present study tried to fill this gap attempting to describe the interaction 
effect of institutions with Greenfield FDI as well as MNA. 
This present attempt can help to explore the impact of greenfield FDI and MNA to 
economic growth with interaction effect of institutional factors. In this chapter five, 
main finding, conclusion and policy recommendations will be discussed. Firstly, 
discussion has been made on findings for the impact of greenfield FDI, merger and 
acquisition and interaction effect of institutional factors on economic growth of ten 
Asian countries. Secondly, some conclusions are stated from the empirical results, 




The results of Chapter four, based on panel data analysis provide evidence that merger 
and acquisition has positive impact on economic growth. Furthermore, greenfield FDI 
has positive coefficient value but the result is not significant in ten selected Asian 
countries. While the results of interaction effect of institutional factors show that 
greenfield FDI is more interactive with institutional factors. While MNA showed a 
less interactive capacity with institutional factors. Four out of six institutional factors 
considered as governance indicator show interaction effect for impact of GFDI on 
economic growth. On the other hand, MNA interact with three institutional factors. 
 In detail, findings show for disaggregated data, MNA is the type of FDI that 
accelerates GDP in Asian countries while GFDI shows positive sign but the result is 
not significant. The findings indicate that greenfield FDI has no direct effect on 
economic growth in selected Asian countries. 
The findings also indicate that voice and accountability has capacity of moderating the 
impact of GFDI to economic growth. It is negatively affect the impact of GFDI on 
GDP in Asian countries. In addition, Kaufmann et al. (2009) VA is not performing 
positively in those countries where the government want to remain popular and 
reduces accountability either directly or indirectly. On the other hand, the interaction 
effect of MNA*VA is not significant in selected Asian countries.  
The institutional factor political stability is positively interacting the impact of MNA 
on economic growth. As Rolfe et al. (2015) claims that political stability is a 
significant determinant of FDI. while interaction effect of GFDI*PS is not significant. 
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The interaction effect of Government effectiveness with GFDI is statistically 
significant in Asian countries. The findings indicate that the institutional factor GE 
has positive effect on GFDI to accelerate its effect on economic growth. In addition, 
Alam, Kitenge, and Bedane (2017) state that GE has significant positive effect on 
economic growth. 
 Furthermore, regulatory quality does not interact with MNA in selected Asian 
countries. While RQ have statistically significant interaction effect with GFDI but the 
sing is negative. Furthermore, Loayza et al. (2005) argue that heavy regulatory burden 
on firms leads to lower growth in a country. The findings depict that interaction term 
MNA*ROL is statistically significant with positive sign implying that rule of law 
strengthen the effect of MNA in Asian countries. Similarly, Barro (2013) states that 
rule of law results more democracy that can ultimately promote economic growth. 
While ROL neither strengthen nor weaken the impact of GFDI on economic growth 
of the ten selected Asian countries. 
In addition, control of corruption is the only factor that interact both with GFDI and 
MNA in ten Asian countries.  The result is consistent with economic rationale, here 
the obtained results from Chapter four shows that control of corruption has positive 
impact on performance of GFDI as well as MNA in Asia.  
 
The findings are consistent with “sand the wheels” hypothesis. In addition low 
corruption is in the favour of foreign investment (Méon & Sekkat, 2005).  In chapter 
four, the findings of country wise analysis show that, institutions have substantial 
position in Asia.  
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Theoretically, the role of greenfield FDI and MNA to promote growth cannot be 
ignored, but practically the results are mixed. As the present study also find a new 
result that MNA has positive and significant impact on economic growth in Asia but 
GFDI is not strengthen GDP in selected countries.    
5.2 Conclusion  
Foreign direct investment inflows and economic growth literature has shown a greater 
interest, predominantly FDI inflows have been regarded as a key stuff for economic 
growth all over the world. However, aggregated FDI has its own importance but 
currently the most critical questions whether disaggregated FDI (greenfield FDI and 
merger and acquisition) have different results with institutional impact on each type 
of investment to flourish economic growth.  The choice approach to FDI, which 
recommends that performance of some types of FDI are better than others (Alfaro & 
Charlton, 2013). 
Despite the mounting studies investigating the role of FDI to achieve high economic 
growth, the interrelationship between greenfield FDI, MNA, economic growth and 
institutions paid a little attention in previous literature. In this thesis, we have 
attempted to fill the current gap in economic literature by studying different 
characteristics of the connection between greenfield FDI, merger and acquisition, and 
institutions and their implications to economic growth. 
The main purpose of this thesis was to empirically investigate the interaction role of 
institutions on the relationship between greenfield FDI and MNA on economic 
growth. Furthermore, the major argument is that as the main determinant of economic 
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growth (FDI) is giving inconsistent results even in disaggregated form. To fill the gap, 
it is better to understand the relationship between GFDI, MNA, institutions and 
economic growth. 
The study tried to give the answers of two main questions whether greenfield FDI and 
merger and acquisition give different results and institution have a capacity to interact 
the impact of these two types of investment on economic growth. These questions are 
broken down into four specific questions subsequent four objectives. 
In this thesis, empirical methodology and different econometric models have been 
used to assess the effect of greenfield FDI and merger and acquisition on economic 
growth with interaction effect of institutional factors. This study applied panel-data 
techniques in selected sample from ten selected Asian countries for the period from 
2002 to 2015. Furthermore, results of the Hausman test show that fixed effect is 
suitable method for analysis. 
The main conclusion of this study is that merger and acquisition is effective in selected 
ten Asian countries and institutions play a prominent role to interact the greenfield 
FDI and MNA’s impact on economic growth. Another conclusion of this study is that 
performance of merger and acquisition has increased with interaction effect of 
institutional factors. The results of institutional factors like PS, ROL and COC show 
positive interaction effect with MNA and are in line with (Barro, 2013; Farooq et al., 
2013; Mauro, 1995). Therefore, it could be concluded that the effect of merger and 
acquisition has increased with interaction of efficient institution in selected Asian 
countries. Similarly, GE and COC depict the positive interaction effect with GFDI. 
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These results also support previous empirical studies like (Azam & Emirullah, 2014; 
Daude & Stein, 2007). The conclusion of individual institutional factors is that control 
of corruption is the most influential factor that accelerates the positive impact of GFDI 
as well as MNA in selected Asian countries. Furthermore, secondary school enrolment 
has positive impact while trade openness has negative impact on economic growth of 
ten selected Asian countries.  
The findings of existing empirical study suggesting that this field of literature may 
need more investigation of impact of GFDI and MNA in different sectors, particularly 
in Asian countries with the role of institutions. 
 
5.3 Policy recommendations  
The results of Chapter four suggest some policy implications for greenfield FDI, 
merger and acquisition and economic growth in ten selected Asian countries. The 
findings show that MNA exert positive impact on economic growth in ten selected 
Asian countries. This result suggests that MNA needs to be encouraged to enhance its 
potential impact to contribute positively to economic growth. The result of GFDI is 
also positive but not significant. 
The study suggests that the agreement regarding GFDI should be fair and free from 
corruption to get more positive result from this type of investment. These results 
suggest that GFDI and MNA both needs to be encouraged, and efficient institutions 




The finding of institutional factors show that the most capable moderating institutional 
factor is control of corruption. In detail, control of corruption has positive impact on 
economic growth in selected countries, that is in line with common belief that control 
of corruption is helpful to growth. The study suggests that governments should 
encouraged less corrupt bureaucracy to get more benefit from this institutional factor 
(COC) for their economies. The other most effective institutional factors are rule of 
law, government effectiveness and political stability and absence of violence. The 
study further suggest that countries should improve their regulation which are in the 
favour of investors to attract the investment and pay attention on political stability to 
get good results from greenfield FDI. It should be the priority for policies maker to 
improve the investment environment through better institutions in Asian countries to 
get positive effect from both (GFDI, MNA) types of investment.  
5.4 Contribution of the study 
The findings of this thesis can be considered as important contributions to the 
discussion of issues about impact of greenfield FDI, MNA and institutopns on  
economic growth in Asia. The main contributions of this reseach can be summarised 
as follows: 
1. Chapter two demonteates that the role of aggregated FDI to get economic growth 
has prime importance in the literature but theoretically it is controvertial. As Wang 
and Wong (2009) argue that greenfield FDI, and MNA,  these two forms of investment 
are potentially different in nature and also not a substitutes for each other. Nocke and 
Yeaple (2008) also claim that GFDI is more effecive type of investmnt as compare to 
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MNA. The results of this study can contibute to to reduce the debates on impact of 
GFDI and MNA with the interaction effect of institutional factors on economic growth 
in Asian countries.  
2. Chapter four contributes to existing economic literature with the empirical evidence 
regarding intereaction effect of the institutional factors on performance of greenfied 
FDI and MNA to economic growth.This chapter fills the gap in the literature by 
analysing the institutional factors’ role with Greenfield FDI and MNA on economic 
growth by using panel data of ten selected Asian countries. 
 
3. Chapter Four contributes to existing economic literature by testing whether 
institutional factors have capacity to strenghten or waeken the impact of Greenfield 
FDI and MNA on economic growth. 
4. The practical contribution of this study to Asian countries, as the findings of this 
chapter will help Asian countries to decide whether it should invest in the form of 
Greenfield FDI or merger or acquistion. 
5.5 Research for future  
 
The empirical results of the thesis suggest the following dimensions for future 
research. 
1. It is important to do further analysis on sectoral level like the impact of greenfild 




2. The analysis can be made on including absoptive capacity of asian for GFDI and 
meger and acquistion. 
 
3. It is also recomende for the future reseachh to dig out the dimensions of 
institutional facors and their impact on economi growth. 
 4. It is also important to chek the impact of insitutional quality on greenfield FDI  
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The study also tried to verify the existence of the long-run equilibrium relationship 
between GFDI, MNA and economic growth. 
The Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method introduced by (Pedroni 
(1996)) is a reliable estimation method for small sample size, this method is also 
checked for the panel data of ten Asian countries. To confirm the stationarity, 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is applied, the result of this test shows that data 
is not stationary at same level. As the assumption of stationarity is not fulfilled, so this 
method is not used in this study. 









































































































































Appendix B Endogeneity test 
 
  Tests of endogeneity 
  Ho: variables are exogenous 
Tests                                                           P value                         Result  
Durbin (score) chi2(2)         63.2841          p =0.0000 
 
Wu-Hausman F (2,140)      51.085             p = 0.0000      Ho=Reject null hypothesis 
 
Test for weak instrument  
Ho: Instruments are weak                                             10%       15%     20%     25% 
  2SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald test                           13.43      8.18     6.4       5.45 
  LIML Size of nominal 5% Wald test                           5.44       3.81      3.32     3.09 
Tests of overidentifying restrictions:                  P value 
Sargan (score) chi2(1)                        0.026829   p = 0.869 
 
Basmann chi2(1)                                0.0252       p = 0.873     No over identification 
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Appendix C country wise results  
Table 4. 22  
Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in China 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Coefficient Prob.               
GFDI 0.688 0.001* 1.193 0.680 -4.359 0.007 2.801 0.237 2.404 0.036 2.956 0.161 -3.153 0.014 
MNA 0.109 0.181 0.085 0.454 0.007 0.935 0.095 0.140 0.141 0.058 0.059 0.689 -0.003 0.970 
DI 2.453 0.084 0.108 0.956 1.641 0.030 2.396 0.050 -1.075 0.495 2.925 0.080 3.127 0.000 
TO -1.183 0.000 -1.285 0.001 -1.447 0.000 -1.148 0.001 -2.121 0.000 -0.791 0.149 -0.828 0.000 
POPG 2.991 0.007 1.548 0.383 2.946 0.002 2.937 0.028 0.495 0.716 4.665 0.027 2.100 0.012 
SECENR 1.472 0.011 2.383 0.009 0.796 0.029 0.590 0.491 0.686 0.336 1.311 0.045 1.767 0.000 
INF 0.023 0.194 0.009 0.757 0.020 0.113 0.007 0.749 0.040 0.122 0.006 0.876 0.040 0.007 
GFDI*VA   -1.885 0.812           
GFDI*PS     4.419 0.001*         
GFDI*GE       -2.736 0.367       
GFDI*RQ         -3.084 0.185     
GFDI*ROL           -4.326 0.270   
GFDI*COC             3.846 0.005* 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 











Table 4. 22  
Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in Mongolia 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI -0.010 0.758 11.363 0.025 4.182 0.721 1.213 0.042 -1.412 0.482 -3.389 0.280 4.384 0.089 
MNA -3.630 0.083 -2.981 0.031 -3.532 0.188 -1.247 0.555 -4.407 0.009 -4.065 0.041 -3.027 0.097 
DI -0.090 0.715 -0.119 0.599 -0.106 0.753 -0.039 0.835 -0.262 0.304 -0.168 0.387 -0.238 0.232 
TO -0.143 0.677 -0.158 0.528 -0.044 0.927 0.064 0.816 -0.351 0.289 -0.624 0.174 -0.145 0.755 
POPG 1.025 0.000 3.609 0.000 3.539 0.000 3.818 0.000 3.458 0.000 3.038 0.000 3.760 0.000 
SECENR 0.268 0.718 0.480 0.378 0.229 0.830 0.402 0.477 1.199 0.090 0.263 0.729 0.959 0.209 
INF 0.007 0.354 0.010 0.113 0.007 0.476 0.006 0.383 0.011 0.169 0.011 0.084 0.010 0.164 
GFDI*VA   -10.043 0.024**           
GFDI*PS     -2.750 0.720         
GFDI*GE       -3.127 0.037**       
GFDI*RQ         2.529 0.487     
GFDI*ROL           6.832 0.281   
GFDI*COC             -4.849 0.089*** 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 









Table 4. 23  
Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in Indonesia  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.163 0.450 2.400 0.000 0.810 0.018 0.893 0.000 0.797 0.000 0.393 0.001 1.109 0.030 
MNA 0.117 0.444 0.118 0.282 0.044 0.757 0.071 0.545 -0.057 0.460 0.106 0.238 0.135 0.349 
DI 0.888 0.163 0.875 0.067 1.266 0.037 1.158 0.033 0.876 0.056 0.808 0.007 0.545 0.330 
TO -0.188 0.851 -0.336 0.490 -0.060 0.936 -0.019 0.981 0.519 0.271 -0.251 0.595 -0.519 0.549 
POPG -0.585 0.615 -0.850 0.433 0.125 0.949 -0.228 0.887 -0.485 0.621 -0.928 0.319 -0.053 0.982 
SECENR 1.629 0.318 2.103 0.138 2.036 0.245 1.462 0.321 5.225 0.031 2.452 0.054 1.979 0.211 
INF 0.003 0.854 0.013 0.473 0.008 0.630 0.006 0.666 0.054 0.100 0.013 0.229 0.011 0.533 
GFDI*VA   -2.050 0.002*           
GFDI*PS     -0.645 0.077***         
GFDI*GE       -1.425 0.001*       
GFDI*RQ         -1.612 0.000*     
GFDI*ROL           -0.729 0.000*   
GFDI*COC             -1.178 0.096*** 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 







Table 4. 24  
Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in Malaysia  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.306 0.061*** -10.002 0.137 7.374 0.118 -1.629 0.739 -0.271 0.916 -1.107 0.835 -5.458 0.051 
MNA 0.183 0.320 0.567 0.071 0.120 0.311 0.262 0.389 0.195 0.269 0.222 0.043 0.207 0.131 
DI -1.043 0.084 -1.802 0.088 -0.698 0.272 -0.952 0.145 -0.158 0.854 -0.549 0.271 1.426 0.098 
TO -0.469 0.498 -0.720 0.360 -0.117 0.851 -0.047 0.961 -0.221 0.785 0.135 0.817 0.942 0.110 
POPG -1.776 0.429 -0.054 0.983 -1.709 0.179 -1.879 0.451 -1.968 0.289 -1.898 0.261 -1.525 0.322 
SECENR 0.229 0.881 0.072 0.943 1.109 0.355 0.812 0.762 0.941 0.594 2.052 0.218 3.196 0.058 
INF 0.022 0.381 0.028 0.415 0.028 0.250 0.019 0.555 0.007 0.840 -0.026 0.523 -0.034 0.100 
GFDI*VA   11.139 0.123           
GFDI*PS     -5.106 0.128         
GFDI*GE       1.752 0.692       
GFDI*RQ         0.655 0.820     
GFDI*ROL           1.485 0.799   
GFDI*COC             4.938 0.051* 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 25  
Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in the Philippines  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Coefficient Prob.               
GFDI 0.166 0.023** -2.676 0.444 0.259 0.458 0.461 0.765 -2.782 0.436 1.068 0.327 6.379 0.055 
MNA 0.060 0.056*** 0.059 0.097 0.061 0.074 0.065 0.125 0.054 0.110 0.034 0.361 0.061 0.029 
DI 0.341 0.599 0.176 0.731 0.411 0.578 0.413 0.516 0.502 0.602 0.505 0.476 1.024 0.117 
TO -1.205 0.002 -1.501 0.000 -0.663 0.458 -0.915 0.048 -0.823 0.363 -1.193 0.016 -0.648 0.156 
POPG -1.330 0.020 -0.327 0.709 -1.930 0.080 -1.125 0.032 -1.697 0.115 -1.617 0.029 -4.179 0.009 
SECENR -0.200 0.832 -0.513 0.582 0.716 0.625 0.348 0.724 0.311 0.851 -0.025 0.983 -1.088 0.311 
INF 0.022 0.262 0.003 0.921 0.011 0.458 0.024 0.190 0.022 0.282 0.023 0.369 0.057 0.056 
GFDI*VA   2.633 0.421           
GFDI*PS     -0.202 0.633         
GFDI*GE       -0.439 0.836       
GFDI*RQ         4.519 0.416     
GFDI*ROL           -2.498 0.380   
GFDI*COC             -7.350 0.059*** 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 26 
 Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in Thailand 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.313 0.092*** 0.438 0.813 4.955 0.005 7.811 0.054 10.118 0.050 4.184 0.013 7.407 0.208 
MNA -0.116 0.667 -0.049 0.930 -0.157 0.468 0.018 0.899 -0.294 0.268 -0.197 0.005 -0.301 0.180 
DI -1.912 0.393 -2.458 0.570 -0.348 0.788 0.472 0.814 0.749 0.796 1.093 0.528 -1.019 0.655 
TO 2.016 0.241 3.030 0.611 5.085 0.016 4.258 0.000 1.667 0.221 3.680 0.000 0.367 0.887 
POPG 0.302 0.036 0.337 0.178 0.320 0.053 0.168 0.188 0.182 0.324 0.251 0.003 0.321 0.052 
SECENR 7.574 0.000 7.953 0.005 3.544 0.099 4.402 0.001 6.305 0.004 0.631 0.773 8.034 0.000 
INF 0.045 0.662 0.056 0.702 -0.062 0.396 -0.093 0.364 -0.059 0.685 -0.085 0.292 0.040 0.705 
GFDI*VA   -0.075 0.966           
GFDI*PS     -4.756 0.006*         
GFDI*GE       -9.535 0.061***       
GFDI*RQ         -12.495 0.057**     
GFDI*ROL           -6.726 0.017**   
GFDI*COC             -7.276 0.216 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 









Table 4. 27  
Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in India 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.024 0.566 10.808 0.351 -1.047 0.000 0.272 0.576 0.151 0.800 0.222 0.865 -4.248 0.008 
MNA 0.084 0.010* 0.134 0.004 0.224 0.000 0.066 0.107 0.091 0.131 0.072 0.090 0.170 0.011 
DI 0.735 0.000* 0.686 0.000 0.854 0.000 0.471 0.033 0.777 0.013 0.765 0.004 1.093 0.000 
TO -0.407 0.113 -0.482 0.098 -1.100 0.000 0.038 0.923 -0.447 0.203 -0.331 0.444 -0.600 0.013 
POPG -2.134 0.006 -1.859 0.019 -1.162 0.093 -3.002 0.001 -2.072 0.016 -2.052 0.009 -2.941 0.000 
SECENR 1.042 0.172 0.982 0.342 2.467 0.001 0.184 0.849 1.057 0.227 0.875 0.474 1.070 0.062 
INF 0.004 0.706 0.013 0.308 0.018 0.007 0.012 0.186 0.004 0.764 0.003 0.867 0.008 0.482 
GFDI*VA   -8.783 0.353           
GFDI*PS     0.906 0.000*         
GFDI*GE       -0.500 0.489       
GFDI*RQ         -0.243 0.842     
GFDI*ROL           -0.240 0.890   
GFDI*COC             4.356 0.007* 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School 
Enrolment; VA= Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of 







Table 4. 28  
Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in Pakistan  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI -0.437 0.099*** 3.807 0.077 -0.626 0.280 -1.259 0.065 -1.324 0.523 -0.137 0.726 -2.156 0.393 
MNA -0.498 0.121 0.025 0.945 -0.479 0.452 -0.213 0.575 -0.684 0.265 -0.695 0.096 -1.011 0.041 
DI 0.264 0.681 -1.046 0.215 0.433 0.691 0.467 0.516 0.125 0.884 0.394 0.559 0.674 0.414 
TO 0.565 0.320 -0.223 0.716 0.656 0.555 0.365 0.590 0.552 0.433 1.016 0.222 0.794 0.145 
POPG -8.797 0.071 -3.039 0.536 -9.138 0.238 -7.142 0.120 -9.547 0.129 -11.450 0.080 -11.521 0.015 
SECENR 2.278 0.001 0.412 0.740 1.970 0.067 1.740 0.008 2.248 0.028 2.772 0.006 2.623 0.000 
INF 0.007 0.303 0.007 0.380 0.001 0.943 0.002 0.904 0.010 0.333 0.004 0.547 0.020 0.043 
GFDI*VA   -5.206 0.092***           
GFDI*PS     0.349 0.848         
GFDI*GE       2.374 0.057***       
GFDI*RQ         2.158 0.632     
GFDI*ROL           -3.586 0.311   
GFDI*COC             1.712 0.565 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 30  
Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in Sri lanka  
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 2.704 0.001* 22.668 0.163 0.393 0.972 -5.634 0.114 -0.708 0.962 19.349 0.523 6.812 0.716 
MNA 1.014 0.786 1.535 0.643 4.595 0.320 -1.813 0.444 0.818 0.829 4.486 0.530 0.610 0.894 
DI 0.256 0.450 0.147 0.582 -0.257 0.476 0.205 0.520 0.181 0.780 0.029 0.955 0.267 0.508 
TO -1.137 0.005 -1.268 0.005 -0.668 0.268 -1.521 0.000 -1.369 0.003 -1.068 0.094 -1.188 0.026 
POPG 0.721 0.040 0.722 0.046 0.306 0.393 0.748 0.028 0.752 0.071 0.661 0.101 0.737 0.081 
SECENR -1.159 0.571 -3.787 0.158 -4.610 0.145 0.102 0.929 0.612 0.817 -5.408 0.511 -1.126 0.654 
INF -0.009 0.194 -0.005 0.432 0.007 0.558 -0.004 0.467 -0.008 0.682 -0.007 0.318 -0.008 0.400 
GFDI*VA   -20.777 0.223           
GFDI*PS     2.273 0.809         
GFDI*GE       13.454 0.012**       
GFDI*RQ         5.714 0.808     
GFDI*ROL           -24.135 0.578   
GFDI*COC             -4.243 0.826 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 29  
Greenfield FDI, interaction effects of institutions in Vietnam 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.420 0.028** 0.343 0.849 -10.222 0.133 1.840 0.104 1.593 0.003 1.737 0.027 -4.401 0.111 
MNA -0.284 0.369 -0.169 0.499 -1.572 0.062 -0.295 0.602 -0.419 0.249 -0.552 0.245 0.030 0.937 
DI -0.120 0.877 -0.266 0.824 -0.376 0.589 -0.261 0.736 -0.698 0.443 -0.791 0.336 -0.398 0.510 
TO 1.333 0.036 0.943 0.155 1.641 0.003 0.965 0.373 0.943 0.201 0.919 0.268 0.596 0.274 
POPG -0.737 0.768 -3.858 0.161 1.156 0.520 0.878 0.760 -2.331 0.421 -1.094 0.786 -2.913 0.096 
SECENR -1.352 0.134 -0.597 0.606 -1.499 0.033 -1.551 0.145 -0.735 0.468 -0.613 0.582 -1.250 0.109 
INF 0.003 0.563 0.000 0.938 0.008 0.147 0.001 0.864 0.000 0.943 0.001 0.814 0.006 0.445 
GFDI*VA   -0.238 0.949           
GFDI*PS     7.675 0.117         
GFDI*GE       -2.113 0.233       
GFDI*RQ         -3.219 0.012**     
GFDI*ROL           -2.332 0.091***   
GFDI*COC             5.566 0.080*** 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 







Table 4. 30  
Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in China 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Coefficient Prob.   Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.688 0.001* 0.558 0.027 0.801 0.001 0.625 0.002 0.805 0.006 0.711 0.049 0.584 0.009 
MNA 0.109 0.181 0.553 0.728 13.990 0.051 0.847 0.521 0.110 0.950 -1.132 0.378 -1.030 0.732 
DI 2.453 0.084 0.303 0.882 0.898 0.254 3.770 0.072 0.986 0.671 1.896 0.259 1.622 0.250 
TO -1.183 0.000 -1.248 0.000 -1.518 0.000 -0.848 0.047 -1.807 0.012 -1.351 0.003 -1.232 0.000 
POPG 2.991 0.007 1.518 0.351 2.785 0.000 3.361 0.056 2.003 0.143 2.339 0.097 2.046 0.128 
SECENR 1.472 0.011 2.190 0.016 1.683 0.000 1.151 0.006 0.717 0.481 1.352 0.039 1.433 0.019 
INF 0.023 0.194 0.010 0.715 0.019 0.225 0.014 0.259 0.020 0.444 0.023 0.460 0.030 0.129 
MNA*VA   -1.344 0.758           
MNA*PS     -11.197 0.049**         
MNA*GE       -0.948 0.555       
MNA*RQ         0.053 0.987     
MNA*ROL           2.552 0.326   
MNA*COC             1.170 0.707 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 31  
Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in Mongolia 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI -0.010 0.758 0.005 0.913 -0.011 0.786 0.011 0.472 0.003 0.930 0.015 0.579 0.005 0.789 
MNA -3.630 0.083* -124.639 0.433 -45.883 0.890 -23.979 0.003 42.520 0.447 64.003 0.058 -76.626 0.005 
DI -0.090 0.715 0.088 0.730 -0.092 0.760 -0.031 0.711 -0.120 0.724 -0.125 0.497 -0.105 0.315 
TO -0.143 0.677 0.082 0.877 -0.125 0.756 0.123 0.543 -0.292 0.431 -0.033 0.923 0.268 0.362 
POPG 0.000  3.696 0.000 3.525 0.000 3.944 0.000 3.486 0.000 3.671 0.000 3.904 0.000 
SECENR 0.268 0.718 0.062 0.938 0.273 0.797 0.276 0.674 1.223 0.073 0.312 0.763 0.137 0.759 
INF 0.007 0.354 -0.001 0.896 0.008 0.446 -0.001 0.628 0.004 0.614 -0.003 0.741 0.005 0.461 
MNA*VA   106.991 0.442           
MNA*PS     27.703 0.898         
MNA*GE       68.277 0.002*       
MNA*RQ         -86.270 0.404     
MNA*ROL           -127.360 0.046**   
MNA*COC             89.334 0.008* 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 32  
Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in Indonesia 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.163 0.450 0.182 0.379 0.262 0.250 0.182 0.526 0.164 0.554 0.201 0.379 0.109 0.662 
MNA 0.117 0.444 2.301 0.470 -2.374 0.133 -0.424 0.707 -0.044 0.943 0.101 0.805 1.043 0.668 
DI 0.888 0.163 0.814 0.241 1.602 0.012** 0.903 0.309 1.183 0.064*** 0.889 0.271 0.929 0.141 
TO -0.188 0.851 -0.415 0.686 1.482 0.243 -0.033 0.980 -0.201 0.854 -0.067 0.952 -0.553 0.704 
POPG -0.585 0.615 -0.259 0.843 -4.347 0.133 -1.165 0.455 -0.408 0.834 -1.446 0.343 0.723 0.802 
SECENR 1.629 0.318 1.575 0.402 -1.631 0.562 1.738 0.436 0.169 0.937 2.129 0.259 1.444 0.489 
INF 0.003 0.854 0.004 0.845 -0.043 0.227 0.003 0.864 -0.019 0.343 0.004 0.858 0.008 0.664 
MNA*VA   -2.011 0.490           
MNA*PS     2.105 0.131         
MNA*GE       1.000 0.652       
MNA*RQ         0.335 0.804     
MNA*ROL           0.090 0.942   
MNA*COC             -1.138 0.704 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, Dependent variable GDP.
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Table 4. 33 
 Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in Malaysia 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.306 0.061** 0.213 0.019 0.337 0.069 0.463 0.011 0.309 0.050 0.238 0.133 0.085 0.750 
MNA 0.183 0.320 14.424 0.000 -12.473 0.294 -15.197 0.012 2.168 0.660 -6.255 0.284 -0.063 0.993 
DI -1.043 0.084 -1.320 0.020 -0.694 0.377 -1.683 0.006 -0.312 0.697 -0.639 0.180 1.169 0.196 
TO -0.469 0.498 -1.715 0.015 -0.746 0.336 -1.068 0.224 -0.317 0.696 0.084 0.883 0.817 0.310 
POPG -1.776 0.429 0.721 0.709 0.087 0.957 1.646 0.539 -1.975 0.302 -1.599 0.162 -2.281 0.354 
SECENR 0.229 0.881 1.013 0.340 1.153 0.154 3.393 0.089 0.935 0.602 2.531 0.044 3.282 0.197 
INF 0.022 0.381 0.011 0.579 0.032 0.045 0.038 0.016 -0.004 0.919 -0.008 0.827 -0.019 0.546 
MNA*VA   -14.925 0.000*           
MNA*PS     8.887 0.291         
MNA*GE       13.808 0.011**       
MNA*RQ         -2.075 0.688     
MNA*ROL           7.030 0.269   
MNA*COC             0.063 0.992 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 34  
Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in Philippine 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.166 0.023 0.274 0.172 -0.100 0.566 0.136 0.153 0.188 0.082 -0.064 0.744 -0.107 0.537 
MNA 0.060 0.056*** 9.079 0.438 -2.348 0.259 0.271 0.946 2.542 0.412 -1.808 0.412 -8.966 0.173 
DI 0.341 0.599 0.246 0.654 0.407 0.544 0.404 0.511 0.452 0.625 0.308 0.603 0.288 0.533 
TO -1.205 0.002 -1.548 0.000 -0.488 0.590 -0.905 0.052 -1.062 0.101 -1.267 0.013 -0.863 0.077 
POPG -1.330 0.020 -0.599 0.322 -2.369 0.063 -1.141 0.031 -1.451 0.088 -1.628 0.048 -2.843 0.016 
SECENR -0.200 0.832 -0.731 0.410 0.935 0.538 0.329 0.726 0.117 0.932 -0.262 0.821 -1.204 0.308 
INF 0.022 0.262 0.024 0.377 0.002 0.923 0.023 0.244 0.031 0.285 0.013 0.591 0.014 0.386 
MNA*VA   -8.288 0.440           
MNA*PS     2.332 0.250         
MNA*GE       -0.320 0.957       
MNA*RQ         -3.889 0.418     
MNA*ROL           3.703 0.401   
MNA*COC             10.205 0.171 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 35  
Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in Thailand 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.313 0.092 0.355 0.232 0.272 0.154 0.289 0.017 0.161 0.000 0.180 0.120 0.199 0.197 
MNA -0.116 0.667 -1.507 0.299 -5.250 0.246 -2.741 0.446 -19.541 0.000 -2.096 0.412 -11.876 0.092 
DI -1.912 0.393 -2.263 0.566 -1.671 0.435 -1.561 0.396 0.505 0.673 -0.612 0.758 -0.349 0.870 
TO 2.016 0.241 2.985 0.573 2.614 0.205 4.477 0.002 1.905 0.000 1.597 0.358 0.476 0.848 
POPG 0.302 0.036 0.320 0.123 0.308 0.040 0.337 0.034 0.217 0.004 0.292 0.111 0.247 0.112 
SECENR 7.574 0.000 7.566 0.003 6.738 0.000 5.265 0.004 7.408 0.000 3.839 0.265 6.999 0.000 
INF 0.045 0.662 0.057 0.684 0.028 0.780 -0.009 0.921 -0.053 0.331 -0.005 0.955 0.017 0.867 
MNA*VA   1.633 0.356           
MNA*PS     4.781 0.266         
MNA*GE       3.372 0.430       
MNA*RQ         23.844 0.000*     
MNA*ROL           2.961 0.453   
MNA*COC             11.840 0.100 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 36 
 Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in India 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.024 0.566 0.094 0.282 -0.070 0.274 -0.074 0.207 0.036 0.489 0.066 0.464 0.044 0.679 
MNA 0.084 0.010** 16.406 0.395 -1.081 0.212 0.860 0.484 0.363 0.497 0.375 0.616 0.447 0.677 
DI 0.735 0.000* 0.663 0.000 0.792 0.000 0.510 0.015 0.762 0.006 0.739 0.005 0.717 0.008 
TO -0.407 0.113 -0.551 0.078 -1.299 0.003 -0.104 0.792 -0.458 0.124 -0.310 0.358 -0.332 0.369 
POPG -2.134 0.006 -1.247 0.381 -0.556 0.588 -2.586 0.005 -1.973 0.015 -2.056 0.014 -2.170 0.015 
SECENR 1.042 0.172 1.539 0.190 3.160 0.010 0.614 0.518 1.153 0.153 0.849 0.377 0.878 0.380 
INF 0.004 0.706 0.008 0.481 0.012 0.078 0.011 0.199 0.004 0.781 0.003 0.840 0.004 0.824 
MNA*VA   -13.277 0.398           
MNA*PS     1.232 0.144         
MNA*GE       -1.131 0.525       
MNA*RQ         -0.558 0.594     
MNA*ROL           -0.458 0.687   
MNA*COC             -0.402 0.729 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 37  
Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in Pakistan 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI -0.437 0.099 -0.204 0.625 -0.921 0.038 -0.548 0.286 -0.376 0.405 -0.621 0.094 -0.705 0.071 
MNA -0.498 0.121 -12.086 0.430 1.154 0.553 0.497 0.824 -1.296 0.734 0.303 0.726 -1.928 0.729 
DI 0.264 0.681 -0.056 0.951 0.928 0.151 0.574 0.487 -0.080 0.933 0.423 0.553 0.427 0.531 
TO 0.565 0.320 0.650 0.471 1.242 0.122 0.943 0.320 0.365 0.546 0.769 0.266 0.716 0.232 
POPG -8.797 0.071 -8.004 0.218 -11.968 0.031 -9.880 0.102 -8.185 0.087 -9.398 0.095 -10.843 0.024 
SECENR 2.278 0.001 2.045 0.286 2.700 0.002 2.521 0.047 1.947 0.022 2.475 0.004 2.472 0.000 
INF 0.007 0.303 0.001 0.946 -0.001 0.864 -0.001 0.952 0.009 0.444 0.000 0.967 0.018 0.068 
MNA*VA   15.764 0.440           
MNA*PS     -3.023 0.355         
MNA*GE       -2.175 0.693       
MNA*RQ         1.883 0.844     
MNA*ROL           -6.312 0.346   
MNA*COC             1.346 0.848 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 








Table 4. 40  
Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in Sri Lanka 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 2.704 0.001 2.297 0.055 2.996 0.007 3.202 0.001 2.604 0.000 2.174 0.046 4.822 0.000 
MNA 1.014 0.786 -75.723 0.001 15.088 0.781 0.159 0.997 -43.35 0.221 -67.78 0.005 -384.6 0.027 
DI 0.256 0.450 0.615 0.029 -0.143 0.804 0.091 0.821 0.193 0.566 0.632 0.013 -0.272 0.455 
TO -1.137 0.005 -1.255 0.001 -0.585 0.281 -1.223 0.001 -1.513 0.000 -1.327 0.002 -0.854 0.019 
POPG 0.721 0.040 0.931 0.019 0.352 0.361 0.819 0.131 0.835 0.033 0.967 0.004 0.777 0.033 
SECENR -1.159 0.571 -0.985 0.385 -4.705 0.110 -0.903 0.632 0.512 0.829 -0.903 0.332 -2.105 0.202 
INF -0.009 0.194 -0.005 0.410 0.002 0.872 -0.008 0.254 -0.003 0.742 -0.004 0.437 -0.018 0.017 
MNA*VA   80.823 0.001*           
MNA*PS     -9.593 0.843         
MNA*GE       0.012 1.000       
MNA*RQ         68.133 0.205     
MNA*ROL           96.944 0.003*   
MNA*COC             380.186 0.027** 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; VA= 
Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, *** denote 









Table 4. 38  
Merger and acquisition, interaction effects of institution in Vietnam 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value Beta  p-value 
GFDI 0.420 0.028 0.297 0.191 0.617 0.025 0.567 0.009 0.483 0.015 0.773 0.013 0.733 0.002 
MNA -0.284 0.369 -4.975 0.684 -30.905 0.271 7.568 0.184 5.763 0.005 6.520 0.097 -41.312 0.073 
DI -0.120 0.877 -0.014 0.990 -0.006 0.994 0.009 0.992 -0.443 0.621 -0.566 0.442 -0.630 0.285 
TO 1.333 0.036 1.017 0.174 1.398 0.053 0.976 0.300 1.011 0.159 0.914 0.226 0.685 0.193 
POPG -0.737 0.768 -3.009 0.467 0.798 0.765 0.848 0.784 -1.833 0.518 -0.568 0.879 -1.516 0.380 
SECENR -1.352 0.134 -0.929 0.518 -1.576 0.082 -1.562 0.143 -1.061 0.313 -0.440 0.642 -0.682 0.550 
INF 0.003 0.563 0.005 0.740 0.004 0.503 -0.001 0.874 0.002 0.749 -0.001 0.866 0.028 0.119 
MNA*VA   9.744 0.694           
MNA*PS     21.296 0.283         
MNA*GE       -12.824 0.143       
MNA*RQ         -18.431 0.002*     
MNA*ROL           -15.293 0.071***   
MNA*COC             45.538 0.075*** 
Note: GFDI= greenfield FDI; MNA= merger and acquisition; TO=Trade openness; INF=inflation; POPG= Population Growth; SECENR= Secondary School Enrolment; 
VA= Voice and Accountability; PS= Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; ROL=Rule of Law; COC=Control of Corruption; *, **, 
*** denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, Dependent variable GDP. 
